| Summary: | Chapter One studies a regime change model in which, when a rebel leader mobilizes civilians, he faces a trade-off between the increasing number of potential supporters and the risk of information leak. The authority may then decide to use one of two punitive approaches: 1) harsh collective punishment, in which both rebel participants and those associated with them are punished, or 2) lenient punishment, in which only the rebel participants are held accountable for their actions. I find that harsh punishment results in a smaller rebel group size compared to lenient punishment, which is subject to the free rider problem. Meanwhile, choosing harsh punishment comes at a price, by forcing many to side with the insurgency, which may decrease the authority's survival chances. My findings also indicate that lenient punishment is more useful to prevent a revolution by ordinary citizens, while collective punishment should be adopted to prevent a coup staged by the politicians. Furthermore, when both authorities and rebel leaders compete for support by threatening retribution against the non-supporters, both parties tend to prefer the use of harsh methods to force civilians to choose sides.
In Chapter Two, I model a relationship between an incumbent autocrat (a king) and his appointed successor (a crown prince). A king generally prefers selecting a capable and powerful successor for his kingdom as long as his own position is not threatened. However, the crown prince selected by the king himself can be the most dangerous person because the crown prince has the incentive to accrue power and seize the throne as early as possible. I find that when the information transition between the king and the crown prince is less informative, the king is more likely to strip the crown prince of power. Furthermore, when multiple candidates vie for the crown prince position, the king selects the best candidate when the ability difference among the candidates is large. However, when the ability difference is slight and all the candidates are relatively incapable, the king selects a weak candidate.
In Chapter Three, I attempt to answer the question on how the Chinese government relocates its officials or human capital inside the system to achieve its economic goal. The central government increases the number of officials assigned to non-export-oriented provinces to promote local exportation. We use difference in difference method to examine the effect of the WTO on the cross-province official assignment. Results indicate that joining the WTO significantly increases the promotion probability of the officials from the export-oriented provinces to the non-export-oriented provinces. However, the officials from the export-oriented provinces do not necessarily have higher promotion probability to the central government or other export-oriented provinces.
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