| Notes: | Advisor: John J. Mearsheimer.
Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Chicago, Division of the Social Sciences, Department of Political Science, 2012.
Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 73-07, Section: A, page: .
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| Summary: | Does oil hold potential as an instrument of international political coercion? Could a country use the threat of oil cutoff to blackmail other nations? If so, why, and under what circumstances is this likely to occur? I argue that oil coercion, under a narrow range of circumstances, offers great promise for a country to get its way in the international system. My argument consists of two main steps. First, I argue that oil is unique. No other strategic resource compares to petroleum when it comes to determining success on the battlefield. An adversary that can forcibly interdict the flow of oil to a belligerent in wartime could immobilize the target's military, essentially threatening the target with military defeat. The oil weapon is most potent when employed in this manner as a denial strategy of coercion.
For a state to be at risk of oil coercion, it must have some degree of baseline vulnerability. I hypothesize that three variables determine a state's vulnerability to oil coercion. The first is its degree of dependence on foreign sources of oil. For oil coercion to be effective, the target must depend heavily on foreign sources of petroleum. Second, the target's geography matters greatly, because it affects a coercer's ability to block the flow of oil. Island states are particularly susceptible to military blockade. The third variable is the country's relative power, which determines whether or not the state can protect its supply lines.
The second step of the argument explains why successful oil coercion is rare. I argue that states, as strategic actors, recognize the danger oil coercion poses to them. Consequently, they try to forestall coercion by taking anticipatory measures to safeguard their petroleum access before coercion can happen. States pursue four types of anticipatory strategies: internal measures, such as stockpiling; alliances with petroleum-producing countries; deterrence; and conquest of oil-producing regions. More often than not, these policies undermine the effectiveness of the oil weapon. As a result, when it comes to oil coercion, we see a paradox: coercive failures occur because states respond proactively to the potential of being coerced.
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