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Psychological Warfare Division.
INTELLIGENCE SECTION

7 October 1944

TO : Chief of Division.

FROM : Chief, Intelligence Section.

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE #2.

PART I - GERMAN HOME FRONT.

(1) A. Occupied Areas: The week's intelligence comes from [the report of a FUSA PW Combat Team (30 Sept) based upon interviews with five residents of ROTTGEN. This group of elderly, middle-class people expressed the following sentiments, which are reported here as illustrative of a special rather than a general German attitude:]

1. REACTION TO OCCUPATION - Most pronounced reaction was relief, derived from an over-whelming war-weariness and from gratitude that fighting in the area was less severe than expected.

(1) 2. [ATTITUDE TOWARD ALLIES - General anticipation of good treatment from the Americans, based partly upon memories of last occupation. English and Americans are considered as "Kulturvolk" like the Germans themselves.]

3. WAR GUILT AND WAR AIMS - This group believes that Germany started war for material gains and assumes that the U.S. has the same purpose. They expressed skepticism when told we are fighting to restore the rights of man to all peoples, but agreed that "this indeed would be wonderful if only true."

4. HITLER - PWIO compares feelings of these elderly Germans toward Hitler with one French attitude toward PETAIN. They believe Hitler was elected (sic!) at a time when Germany stood in great need of a leader to solve the unemployment problem caused by the Versailles treaty. They consider it regrettable that he started the war and persecuted the Jews, for neither was popular with the German people.

(2) 5. [POSTWAR EXPECTATIONS - Uncertainty predominates. Two principal worries are that younger men may be kept indefinitely in other parts of Europe for reconstruction work, and that German currency may become worthless as a result of Allied occupation.]

6. NOTES ON THE TOWN - Normal population of ROTTGEN was about 2000. Approximately 1/3 had been evacuated--voluntarily, except for the Party functionaries who had been ordered back. Those who remained are friendly, even helpful, but very guarded in conversation with Army personnel. One resident showed his printshop, which is equipped with an automatic press capable of turning out 1500 pieces an hour and with a fair supply of paper and ink. The shop is in excellent condition but lack of electric power prevents present use.

B. Enemy Areas:

1. FRONT UND HEIMAT - Psychic cohesion between the battle front and home front was the large theme of propaganda for home consumption this week. The stabilization of all fronts was claimed as a major strategic success, but no optimism was predicated upon this. The word

Victory was not used by any leader. Instead, preparation of the population for a "winter war" was begun, with confidence in the "unity of spirit" among all Germans as the basis for numerous exhortations calling upon the population, figuratively, to take arms.

(3) 2. CIVILIAN RESISTANCE - THIMMER, who seems to be directing civilian resistance through the SS, predicted that "Germans in the rear will fight better than even the guerillas in Russia." GOEBBELS declared: "If the enemy should succeed temporarily in penetrating more on to the soil of the Reich he will find every house a fortress. A wall of bodies will rise to stop the hated invader."

It must be noted that these leaders carefully refrain from official and specific orders to the population. Considerable evidence indicates, in fact, that the Nazis may be whistling in the dark on this point. For purposes of analysis, it is necessary to distinguish between (a) types of civilian resistance offered to the advance of our troops, (b) plans for resistance behind our lines.

Available evidence on these points indicates the following:

(a) that in areas actually occupied by our forces thus far, civilian resistance has been negligible (see "Occupied Areas, "P" Intelligence Weekly #1). It has been confined thus far to individual cases of sniping and distemper, and expectations for the near future indicate more of the same. Most Ps/W and all recently-returned foreign workers concur that there is no possibility of a levee en masse in sight and predict that even scorched earth policy will fail. The one notable exception is a PWIO interrogation of 19 recently-returned Luxembourgers who state that in the Saarland and Trier considerable resistance from individuals and small groups is to be anticipated. In this area both the Landwacht and Hitlerjugend are reported to be already armed and trained. There are other isolated and unverified reports that in some areas Arbeitsdienst groups and special Landesschutzbataillone are being readied for armed resistance (P & PW, 12 A.G., 30 Sept.)

(b) Evidence on Nazi plans for underground activity and guerilla resistance behind Allied lines is scanty and mainly hearsay. Through the week persistent reports have appeared in Allied intelligence summaries that "young Nazis" are being supplied with the papers of dead anti-Nazis. Equipped with these new personalities, they are said to be planted in new localities with the main purpose of preparing sabotage of all types after Allied occupation of these places. Such a development is not unlikely, but the source of all these reports is obscure and they should not be regarded as confirmations.

3. DISSENSIONS AND FRICTIONS - Despite the highly-advertised "psychic unity", many sore points continue to make life in Nazi Germany difficult.

In the Western areas EVACUATION has become a particularly sensitive friction point. In several cases evacuation orders have been disobeyed by a considerable proportion of the population, who hid until ordered to return by the Americans. Where evacuation has been carried out, the attendant confusion has been aggravated by the strain upon the transport and food supply of the receiving centers. In both cases the SS, which seems to be co-ordinating civilian evacuation and "last-ditch" resistance, has borne the burden of the popular displeasure.

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TOTAL MOBILIZATION has its sore points as well, particularly among the women. A captured press directive instructs newspapers to combat "Fabrikangst" (Fear of Factories), which is apparently becoming a fashionable neurosis among German females. And several editorials set out to destroy complaints, apparently much heard, that "prominent people" and their wives are able to escape the rigors of total mobilization through their contacts with officialdom.

4. REVOLT AGAINST NAZIS - Despite frictions, however, no serious signs of popular revolt are anywhere apparent. A report from P & PW, 12 A.G. (30 Sept) states: "The only group seriously considered, when the topic of popular revolt against the Nazis is raised, is the Communist element ... (which has survived) in spite of repeated purgings, but not in sufficient strength to precipitate events before the arrival of our troops. The strongest groups of Communists in the Saar are reported to be in NEUNKIRCHEN and BREIBACH."

The same source reports it improbable that "specifically Catholic groups are likely to exercise initiative in trying to overthrow the Regime."

A D.I.S. from P & PW, 12 A.G. (3 Oct) reports the existence of a COMILITONES organization, an anti-Nazi youth movement with 1,000 members, many formerly members of the HITLERJUGEND. They are said to be centered in the Rhineland around MANNHEIM, "complete with passwords, codes, rendezvous and program for the time when U.S. forces reach the Rhine. No connection with EDELWEISSPIRATEN of lower Rhine".

5. ALLIED PROPAGANDA - Evidence continues to reveal that listening to Allied radio is fairly general in Western Germany. The most popular broadcasts are Ps/W programs & newscasts in German. The best broadcast time is 22 hours.

Information about Allied leaflets is vague except for the belief, held by all recently-returned foreign workers, that the towns of Western Germany are now in an extremely receptive mood for Allied propaganda in leaflet form. "Sober and intelligent" leaflets are highly recommended.

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PART II - BATTLE FRONT.

A. FRANCE.

(1) With the surrender of CALAIS, DUNKIRK is the only remaining pocket of resistance west of the German bridgehead south of the River SCHELDT and it is anticipated that its fall will not be long delayed.

(2) The bridgehead south of the River SCHELDT is being gradually squeezed out but strong resistance is being met by troops of the British First Army advancing westward along the north bank. There is further evidence, however, of the withdrawal from the island of WALCHEREN, the western tip of which has been flooded by our action.

(3) The EINDHOVEN-NIJMEGEN salient has been widened and strengthened. The threat to EINDHOVEN has been completely removed and the same may almost be said of NIJMEGEN. Heavy railroad traffic into ARNHEM indicates the enemy intention to continue his strong holding here, as indeed he must to protect his troops in Western HOLLAND.

(4) Previous reports of civilian refugees being driven into our front are confirmed from KIRKIRADER, where large numbers of persons, estimated at 30,000 to 35,000, most of them Dutch, have entered our lines.

(5) On the sector from METZ to EPINAL heavy and fluctuating fighting continues. Reports of the capture of FORT BRIAN have not been confirmed.

(6) In South Western FRANCE it is estimated that 60,000 enemy troops are still at large, of which 12,000 are at LA ROCHELLE and 10,000 in the GIRONDE ESTUARY. It is reported that the General Commanding at LA ROCHELLE has indicated that he has no desire to surrender either to the French or American forces in the neighbourhood.

(7) The general picture evolved during the week appears to be that the enemy is concentrating his armour on his flanks, partly because the country is more suitable for its deployment and partly to bar any out-flanking operation in HOLLAND. Continual reinforcements of heavy artillery protect the centre of the line where the country is not good tank country and where the artillery, by covering and assisting the SIGFRIED LINE pill boxes with fire, can keep our forces from closing in.

B. ITALY.

The main Allied threat from the mountains towards IMOLA is expanding to the East but little progress is reported beyond MONTE CAPELLO. Resistance along the whole line has been extremely heavy, reinforcements having arrived. On the German right flank, however, resistance has weakened and Allied advances have taken place in that part of the GOTHIC LINE which lies north and north-west of PISTOIA. Such limited defensive success as the Germans have been able to achieve has been as a result of the re-shuffling of his troops by KESSELRING, an expedient which can only be temporarily successful.

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C. RUSSIA.

(1) Substantial mechanised forces are reported closing in on BELGRADE from the north, north-east and east. The approach is over open country and should be easy for armour. Reports of the junction between the Red Army and Marshal TITO's forces, when closely examined, appear to indicate that there is "co-ordinated action" between the armies, rather than physical contact.

(2) The general line, which has not materially altered from the BALTIC to CERNAUZI, now runs roughly in an arc from the last named place through a point south of CIUSJ to the 1939 RUMANO-RUMANIAN forces). From here, after going about 10 miles into HUNGARY, the line goes south, thrusting west again to take in VELIKI BUKHARIN, 30 miles north of BELGRADE, circling BELGRADE and falling back to the east to TURNU SEVERIN, south of which there appears to be no fixed line.

D. GREECE.

Satisfactory progress is reported from the Allied forces landed in GREECE. As stated last week, the mainland of GREECE has already been largely evacuated by German troops and no serious or prolonged resistance is anticipated.

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PART III - WEHRMACHT MORALE

A. GENERAL MORALE

German soldiers, fighting on the German border continue to offer formidable resistance, even though after capture they express little hope for an ultimate victory, or even a compromise. Only fifteen per cent of a group of sixty German enlisted men captured during the last days of September on the Third U.S. Army front still believed in the success of the Wehrmacht; even these offered reliance only on new secret weapons or simply on faith in Hitler as the basis of hope. On the First U.S. Army front interrogators estimate that "over 90% of the prisoners consider the war hopelessly lost, with only a small number of fanatics still clinging with blind hope to the miracle of the promised secret weapon".

Nevertheless the conditions of capture of the 60 Ps/W mentioned above indicate clearly that the bulk of the group, following the lead of a determined few, fought on with such mechanical motivation as to offer well-organized resistance. Initiative to withdraw themselves from a hopeless conflict was almost completely absent except for a handful of active deserters. Some solved their dilemma by offering only token resistance. A 23-year-old alert and "politically unreliable" infantry squad leader described this automatic unrealistic participation in battle in the following terms :

"We are all fed up. Nine tenths or even more want to give up the battle. And it makes little difference in what fashion. Many hope to receive wounds which will send them home. But no-one inflicts wounds on himself. Many prefer the prisoner of war camp. But no-one deserts. The majority of us have become too apathetic to act on our own initiative. We remain in our foxholes and await orders. Those of us who continue to fight do so simply because we mechanically obey orders."

Almost none of the Ps/W have a clear picture of where resistance will cease, if the Germans continue to retreat. Few of the group see themselves or their comrades fighting a last ditch battle or carrying out a scorched earth policy. The German nation and the Wehrmacht are not equipped or psychologically prepared for such action, Ps/W feel. "Orders to defend the German cities will be carried out, but never will the German people destroy their property as the Russians did". "We will fight for the freedom of our homes, but even the most outspoken National Socialists realise that the German people will have to return to the destroyed cities". Partisan warfare and underground resistance will never be carried out by the average German once the armies in the field are defeated. Only a small group of fanatics will attempt such action, according to these Ps/W.

It seems reasonable to predict that, although there is little desire on the part of the average German soldier to carry out a last ditch stand, his lack of a clear idea as to what constitutes defeat, will allow Nazi leadership to press organized resistance even after deep penetrations into Germany are made by the Allies.

B. THE NEWLY CALLED-UP SOLDIER

The results of the total mobilization orders of the summer are already being seen among recently captured prisoners of war. Infantry men who have been in the Wehrmacht for no more than two

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months and who have had less than a month's "training" are being encountered. They consider themselves as the last drop of manpower being scraped out of the German reservoir. In the main, they are older men with strong family ties who can generate little enthusiasm for fighting, regardless of their national patriotism. A strong anti-Nazi sentiment is evident among these men, since many are former trade unionists. A captured document dated 23 August 1944 reveals that in order to fill total mobilization quotas for front line divisions, men from the age group 1897 to 1905, can be called up.

The new 18-year-old recruits of the past months are being thrown in the line with training and preparation equal to that of the older comb-outs. Their strong pro-Nazi attachments make them better soldiers. A portion of these youths are completely apathetic to the war, since for them the last five years have been a series of unending deprivations, and they are too young to remember the peacetime "glories" of National Socialism.

Employment of Home Front and sick Battalions continue. Recent P/W reports tell of the closing of coal mines in certain areas to release men; even the Navy is transferring men to the Wehrmacht. According to statements by officer Ps/W, Luftwaffe training and ground personnel are being formed into new "parachute" formations. It appears that these units are given no parachute training and no parachute role, but the name is more glorious than that of GAF field division.

The most startling device for meeting the manpower shortage is the formation of SS teams, according to prisoners of war, which stop all trains going into the Reich from the West at stations just inside Germany. All soldiers, regardless of furlough papers or authorization for official trips, are taken off and organized into "Assault Battalions". These units are then sent directly to the front. This organization also patrols highways for the purpose of nabbing all those unable to produce proof of a vital mission.

C. CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE

Although the evidence is inconclusive, it appears from P & PW interrogation that the size of groups being captured is increasing. This appears to be the case even if mass surrenders are excluded. In the sample of 60 Ps/W described above, almost half of the Ps/W were captured in groups of over 10. There were 8 cases in which the prisoner was captured in a group which contained over 25 men. Reports from the PW Combat Team with the First Army speaks of whole companies giving up.

There is some evidence to believe that this trend is associated with an increased discussion among soldiers as to their personal fate. Although the general picture is still one of automatic obedience (see above GENERAL MORALE,) Ps/W more frequently report that before capture they had discussions with their comrades as to what kind of treatment they could expect as Ps/W. These discussions in many cases were caused by the receipt of Allied leaflets. Although no trend similar to the organization in the last war of disciplined "soldiers committees" is evident, such informal group discussions appear to be affecting the fate of isolated units and increasing the tendency toward token resistance.

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In this connection, the previously reported increase in attempted homeward desertion rather than surrender to Allied forces is further confirmed. This movement started immediately after our break-through. Some German soldiers donned civilian clothes in order to escape our pockets, and some of them never changed back into uniform. In the Siegfried Line area, Allied military authorities have issued strong orders to apprehend such German soldiers who are following in the wake of our armies in the hope of returning directly to their homes at the end of hostilities.

D. ALLIED PROPAGANDA

Reports have been received from P & PW, 21 Army Group which give the details of the largescale leaflet and loudspeaker operations against the Channel ports. Prisoners officially credited to loudspeaker broadcasts (18-21 Sept.) by the Infantry Brigade making the assault on Boulogne totalled over 900. Last broadcast was timed to precede the final assault on the central strongpoints of the town. Results, included above, were 500 prisoners who came out under the white flag. In the Le Havre area, over 80 per cent of the 12,000 prisoners taken were either in possession of, or had read, our leaflets. Here too, the capture of numbers of prisoners was credited to specific loudspeaker broadcasts.

The effect of Allied propaganda in the battle for the Channel ports is further attested to by captured orders. On 11 September 1944 the officer in command of the garrison at Boulogne issued an order of the day appealing to his troops not to be misled by Allied propaganda, "which pretends that the resistance of the German garrison troops in the Channel Fortresses is senseless". The German order claimed that the propaganda attack in the form of leaflets was in itself an expression of the weakness of the Allied offensive, which was in desperate need of the port for communications. At Le Havre, the NSR officer issued an elaborate statement in which he appealed to the troops not to commit the "most shameful act of any German soldier -- to desert". He also reminds them that the "enemy resorts to propaganda as a weapon, which he used in the last stages of the first world war," in order to point out that German victory depends entirely on the determination of the German soldier. No commitments for immediate relief or specific, matter of fact reasons for ultimate German success are given.

A message by General Model in the form of a leaflet dropped in North-western France on the retreating troops has been found on Ps/W. It appeals for an orderly withdrawal and issues specific instructions to that end. The only propaganda appeal is found in the closing sentence which calls for the winning of more time which the Fuehrer needs in order to employ new troops and new weapons.

E. POST WAR ATTITUDES

(4) A write-in poll of the post-war attitudes of over 600 Ps/W captured during the first week in September in the Metz-Nancy area confirms previous observations that Ps/W are hopeful about the shortness and lack of severity of the occupation, and have few concrete ideas about the political reconstruction of Germany. Out of the entire group, over 25 per cent believed revenge will be taken on the population, while 60 per cent thought not. The younger, more Nazified prisoners were more fearful of revenge. (This result is valid only inasmuch as it covers attitudes toward Anglo-American occupation; all other sources indicate fear of occupation by the Russians is almost universal).

On the length of the occupation over 50 per cent gave no

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answer, while over 25 per cent thought it would last for a year or less, or for some unspecified short period of time. About 10 per cent gave answers which indicated belief in a longer period. Even among the older men over thirty who rejected Hitler, the estimates were only slightly more pessimistic.

(5) [In answer to the question, "if Germany loses the war, which leaders or group would you like best to rule the country", almost 60 per cent of the sample gave no answer. About 20 per cent of the entire group expressed preference for the National Socialists (40 per cent of the young Nazis and almost none of the prisoners who did not trust Hitler). About five per cent of the group selected "socialists", while 10 per cent voted for various democratic and republican symbols.]

D. Rear

PART IV - FRANCE

A. POLITICAL

1. General

The public, particularly in Paris, still seems mainly anxious that the Government should be seen to govern. It is probably in this light that they will regard the decision on a definite date (7 November) for the meeting of the Consultative Assembly, and on a definite division of seats in that body (174 to Resistance, 60 to the former Parliamentarians, plus 12 for Overseas Territory). It has also been announced that local elections will begin in February; this is later than many people expected, but, like the symbolic parade of the Garde Republicaine to the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, will be welcomed as evidence of a trend towards normality. General de Gaulle spoke at Lille of a "planned economy", and measures of social reform are still the matter in which the public above all expects the Government to lead. The wealthy continue to give only grudging recognition to the General.

As regards Party politics, the Communists continue to be in the fore, though the Socialists are active in Paris, and the Christian Democrats are regarded with interest because they hold three seats in the Government. Very little is heard of the Radical-Socialist Party as yet, but the formation of a new "Party of Order", calling itself the Liberal Party, is announced and may possibly compete for the support of the Centre.

2. F.F.I.

In Paris, the F.F.I. situation is improving as the programme of incorporation into the French Army gets under way. The best, and perhaps most influential, of the F.F.I. officers are not concerned to mould a political weapon for ulterior purposes. What they desire is the creation of a new French Army, inspired by the pure patriotism which they regard as the driving force of resistance, and not an Army dominated by those military elements which did not serve in the actual liberation of French soil. In some of the provinces the situation is still clearly very complicated, though it is perhaps now less likely than before that the F.T.P. will emerge as a dangerous military organisation on its own. But it is likely that the Government's decision to purge the air force of personnel who were inactive before 6 June is the first step in a programme which would go far to reconcile the vast majority of all F.F.I. members and sympathisers.

There is an abundance of information to show how difficult the position has been. Thus, in Paris the Prefecture of Police states that during September the police arrested 179 bogus F.F.I. implicated in acts of banditry, etc. In Brittany, the original order to disarm was necessarily disobeyed by the F.F.I. troops who were confronted by units of the Wehrmacht which rallied after Allied armoured formations had moved on. This made difficult the subsequent control of lawless bodies of men, partly identified with the F.T.P., who seized the chance to intimidate the countryside by force of arms. Further south, the military position has tended to place the civil authorities under the control of the F.F.I.; its embodiment in the regular army has made slow progress; and the F.T.P. extremists have kept their organisation more distinct.

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3. Collaborators

In some quiet provincial districts, where resistance called for few sacrifices, there may be a disposition to let bygones be bygones. Everywhere else the delays in the programme of the purge, and uncertainties as to whether it will ever be properly carried out, are agitating the general public, and resistance leaders in Paris point indignantly to the fact that not one collaborator has been shot since the city was won. The higher clergy of the Paris Archbishopric are said to be drawing up an ecclesiastical indictment against the chaplain of the Paris F.F.I., who has persistently attacked their alleged Vichy sympathies.

B. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The Paris press is still preoccupied with internal affairs. There is a lack of knowledge of the Allied war effort, so far as civilian effort and civilian restrictions are concerned. There is, not unnaturally, concentration of interest upon the question, 'When will the prisoners, etc., get back to France?'

Relations with the Allied troops continue to be excellent, though it is still felt that German prisoners receive better treatment than they deserve and, more generally, that the French are the people who, from long and bitter experience, know the Germans best. The status of France as a Great Power, and the full recognition desired for her Government, are points on which French opinion is very sensitive, but this does not appear to affect the cordiality of relations between individuals.

C. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC

The economic position is substantially unchanged, except that Paris can no longer hope to obtain coal before the end of the year.

Distribution:

General McClure	P & PW, 6 A.G. (6)
Col Kehm	P & PW, 12 A.G. (6)
Mr Jackson (A.I.S.)	P & PW, 21 A.G. (6)
Mr Crossman	Political Officers, S.H.A.E.F.
Mr Oechsner	Radio Luxembourg (3)
Captain Herz	S.H.A.E.F. (Forward), G-2
Intelligence (3)	" " G-3
Leaflets	" " G-5
Radio	O.S.S., Major Coolidge (2)
P.W.D. (Forward)	AF. HQ., P.W.D.
Major O'Brien, PWD, Rear	AF. HQ., P.W.D.
Additional distribution from London	