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SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
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Psychological Warfare Division
INTELLIGENCE SECTION

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TO: Chief of Division
FROM: Chief, Intelligence Section.

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE # 6

PART I - GERMAN HOME FRONT

A. ALLIED AREAS

The detailed story of the evacuation of Aachen has been heard from various sources this week. It follows, in its main outlines, the pattern of failure established by earlier attempts at evacuation from the RHINELAND (see P.W.D. Weekly # 3): (a) inadequate organization; (b) inadequate physical facilities, particularly transportation; (c) unwillingness of the population to leave. In view of this failure, and the worsening position in the interior with regard to providing for evacuees, it is by no means impossible that reports received this week that no further evacuation from the KOELN-AACHEN area is contemplated are accurate. From other areas come confirmatory reports of the frictions caused by evacuation. In KOHLSCHEID, where the Party leaders had characteristically disappeared and left the operation in the hands of S.A. and S.S., evacuation took two weeks of ruthless coercion. It is said that actual battles raged in the streets between the women and the Party troops.

The evacuation of AACHEN throws light on several other problems of future interest to P.W.D. Most of the S.A. involved in the evacuation were from BERLIN and DUESSELDORF - those from AACHEN had left about 15 September. Civilian clothes and forged credentials were piled in the basement of the Kreisleitung on Grossestrasse 6. This may be confirmation of frequent reports heard in the past that the Party had made plans to distribute S.A., S.S. and H.J. with new credentials in places where they are not known - chiefly for the purpose of preparing the ground for sabotage and underground operations after Allied occupation. The reception of Allied troops in the first large city to fall may be an indication of what types of assistance we may find in other cities of the Rhineland. In addition to an extremely docile obedience to Allied orders, many Aacheners volunteered valuable military information - even pointing out the hiding-places of Wehrmacht soldiers and units. Colonel WILCK, the surrendering commandant of AACHEN, complained bitterly about the effect of this civilian antipathy upon his soldiers, and stated that it was based upon the overwhelming desire to end the war, which he says is found throughout the Rhineland. His remarks indicate the extent to which the Landser, fighting on his own soil, depends upon the support of the civilian population.

B. COMBAT AREAS

There is overwhelming evidence that the average Rhinelander believes the war to be lost and longs above all else to see it ended. So far has this development gone that the obedient German has begun to disobey. Several thousand citizens ignored Party orders, and evaded or resisted coercive measures, to make them evacuate their homes and destroy their property. Reports of open fights between civilians and S.S. in the streets of KOELN and DUESSELDORF are too frequent to be dismissed lightly. It is significant, too, that the average Landser has sided with the civilians. Where the Wehrmacht has ranged itself with the Party, as during the last days of AACHEN, the only result has been to involve it in the Party's unpopularity. Finally, the persistent accounts of two underground groups - the Edelweiss-Piraten and Schwarze Partei - suggest that at least the organization of opposition, and that on a large scale, is possible even if there is not yet evidence of their having achieved any very significant action.

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Two additional factors in our approach to the combat areas require careful study :

(1) FOREIGN WORKERS: They are our friends and, equally important for propaganda purposes, the Germans know it. An AACHEN industrialist asserted that all 700 of his foreign workers disappeared one day in response to Eisenhower's appeal. They are a source of dissension in the German mind - the Nazis threaten to use the Volkssturm against them; the non-Nazis sympathize with them, feed them, and even cohabit with them; the anti-Nazis (e.g. the Schwarze Partei) claim to have included them in their plans for revolt. Thus they are a source of weakness within the German body politic.

(2) CITIZEN AND SOLDIER: Numerous civilian complaints recorded in Allied areas concerning the bad behaviour of soldiers are to be read, for psychological warfare purposes, in conjunction with even more numerous reports of civilians helping soldiers to hide, surrender, and desert. Now that he fights on German soil, the soldier leans more heavily than before upon the support of the people. A demoralized citizenry would soon demoralize the soldiers.

It would seem, therefore, that all the elements of disruption are present. The only thing that remains to be achieved is to bring citizens, soldiers, and foreign workers to realize in common how directly the personal consequences of a prolonged war are connected with the issue of action or inaction on their part. The example of AACHEN has shown how this realization led citizens from passive resistance to, during the last days, outright defiance of the S.S. and active aid to the Allies against the Wehrmacht. In towns now being encompassed within the combat zone, where sporadic open revolts are already reported, the earlier realization of personal consequences might lead to organized resistance and a state of semi-revolution.

There can be no doubt that if all Germans in the Rhineland simultaneously acted on their personal feelings, the war would be over. It is tempting, and possibly correct, to infer that Allied propaganda can openly assist in the activation of the German population to this end. On the other hand we must bear in mind the increasing use of fear and force by the Party, who, as Allied troops approached German soil and evacuation introduced extra confusion, have been careful to evolve mobile coercive instruments expressly intended to keep the fluid situation in control. The evidence from AACHEN is clear that the Party was unable to entirely prevent contact between soldiers and civilians, but this may not be true in areas where the Party has had a longer period to prepare the apparatus of supervision. The apathy and fatigue which all sources agree to dominate daily life in Germany will also tend to prevent any positive oppositional action. Nor must it be taken for granted that hatred of the Party is now strong enough to obliterate the suspicion that Allied advice to revolt against it derives from ulterior motives - a suspicion which may increase the disinclination to do anything. On this showing, it is likely that organized revolt is not to be expected until Allied military action makes it not only safe but even obviously advantageous.

C. ENEMY AREAS

First reports of the Volkssturm in action come from East PRUSSIA, all rather general and with a transparent purpose of persuasion. WAGNER, introduced as Leader of the VS "Gruppe Nord", gave the first account of the VS under fire. "Detachments of them stood for days in heavy defensive battle and fought valiantly ... Even in the heaviest bombardments and air attacks these old World War soldiers did not lose their nerve" (Deutschlandspiegel, 30 Oct.) . Moscow Radio, on the other hand, reports (31 Oct.) that the chief Volkssturm battle to date was fought by their retreating groups against the S.S. in the LEETZEN district, in which 150 VS men were killed, and adds that in some units the Nazis have had to shoot one out of ten men for cowardice. The German correspondent HAAS emphasizes the tremendous Russian superiority facing the VS men and claims for them only the modest military achievement that they lie

in the trenches completely unprotected while the rain pours down on them. It does not appear whether enthusiasm in that quarter has been dampened by this circumstance, but there are many signs that Germans in other parts of the Reich have not been trampling each other in the rush to the VS recruiting offices. DNB has announced (30 Oct.) that complete units of the 1928 age group are being set up in the VS under leadership of the HJ. Military training "lasting several weeks" will be given them jointly by HJ and RAD, while the younger groups (presumably the 14-16 class of Jungvolk) will continue to receive "suitable" pre-military training in HJ camps. AXMANN has again stepped forward to announce that "Youth has arisen in arms behind the Fuehrer's banner", but his former trumpetings to the "16 year old volunteers" were muted this time.

Whatever the effectiveness of these children in armed formations may prove to be in future, the serious problems they have already raised are clear. Increased complaints about juvenile "delinquency" are heard among German civilians. The greater freedom from home and school ties of children who are being used as Luftwaffe auxiliaries, diggers, or war workers has led to a breakdown of controls. This situation has been aggravated by recent glorifying of heroic youth, which is part of the Volkssturm campaign. The HJ, particularly, whose former arrogance is augmented in many places by their being armed and assigned para-military duties, has been widely criticized. Among other sections of German youth, specifically, anti-HJ sentiment seems widespread - e.g., the Edelweiss-Piraten in the Rhineland seem to spend a considerable amount of energy roaming the streets after dark to beat up HJ members who appear in sufficiently small numbers. All this has added a heavy burden to the already harassed parents of Germany, for these children, whatever their political tendency, are primarily children to their parents, who are certain to be worried by bleeding noses and blackened eyes and bullet wounds, whether acquired for the greater glory of the Fuehrer or not.

On the higher level of national leadership, it is quite clear that the Volkssturm is an instrument by which HITLER means to assert his control over the Wehrmacht even at the fighting fronts. As such it is a mass instrument and a supplementary control to the more direct method of NS Fuehrungsoffiziere within the field formations of the Army. A HITLER order gives the political officers a separate chain of command by means of which they can completely circumvent military channels, and makes this channel available to all enlisted men. Such an order is potentially disastrous to the authority and morale of the Officers' Corps; at the least it is a considerable deterrent to disaffection among wavering officers (see Part III of this report). This deliberate Party campaign against the Wehrmacht is an important part of the increased programme of Fear and Force evident throughout the Reich. The impression gained from interrogations concerning towns in the combat zone particularly, is that the S.A. and S.S. are everywhere present in force. The HJ seems to have been "upgraded" as a repressive agency. The "politische Staffeln" are apparently deployed as mobile squads of political trouble-shooters. An order issued this month reveals that police formations are being reinforced and redistributed. Small wonder, then, that one hears increasingly the old remark: "Der kleine Mann kann ja den Mund nicht aufmachen".

Yet, stories of underground anti-Nazi activity continue to multiply. Nearly all interrogees have heard of the Edelweiss-Piraten, but their accounts vary immensely. One report, for example, asserts that Edelweiss is a reactionary group, dominated by middle-class elements. Another asserts that since most of the members come from lower-income families, it has certain leftist tendencies. The relation of Edelweiss to P.X., an organization of roughly similar origin (Catholic) and activity (anti-HJ) is indeterminate. Old reports of concerted anti-Nazi groups (mainly students and deserters) in the Schwarzwald are revived this week. The Communist underground is mentioned frequently - in connection with the Kampfbund der Falken (active in BAVARIA); the Amzet Apparat (short for "Military Disintegrator Apparatus", active in AACHEN to July 1944); the KJ ("Communist Youth", active in BOCHUM); and particularly the Schwarz-Partei,

which is said to be the most effective resistance movement, active throughout the Reich and with close contacts among foreign workers and within the Wehrmacht. From AUSTRIA come stories of two organizations with branches in BAVARIA, the Sturmscharen and Ostmark-Jugend, whose speciality is communications sabotage. It must be emphasized that these stories are vague and often contradictory, and that hard fact is lacking in nearly every case.

PART II - BATTLE FRONT.

General Picture.

1. The general picture in Europe has not materially changed during the past week. Allied progress has continued on all fronts.

WESTERN FRONT.

2. General.

(a) The Emergency (Kampf) Divisions have not fought well. They were formed out of the staff and cadres of administrative and basic training divs. (as opposed to Field Training Divs.); since in any case cadres of these divisions are needed at home for training, it is likely that they will be dissolved again and absorbed into others.

(b) Of the much advertised "Volksgrenadier" divisions, 526 has already been dissolved and the continued existence of 180, 189 and 190 is uncertain.

(c) A significant feature is the weakness of the German Armoured Divisions, the average tank strength of the divisions in the line being only about 20.

(d) 3 and 5 Parachute Divisions have re-appeared in the area of NIJMEGEN as has 7 Para. Div. not before identified. The presence of these reinforcements for 2 Para. Army indicates an intention to hold this hinge position if possible but the quality of these Parachute Divs. is by no means what used to be expected from such formations.

3. 21 A.G.

(a) The main feature during the week on the Western Front has been the advance of 21 Army Group in Western HOLLAND. The enemy has been cleared almost entirely from the territory south of the River MAAS.

(b) Strong resistance was encountered at ROSENDAL during the advance, 50 to 60 self-propelled guns having been concentrated in support of the Infantry. 10 SS Pz. Div. was identified in this area by PW and it would appear that the mobile elements of this division were drawn in - but too late. They were, however, probably successful in aiding the withdrawal of the bulk of the Infantry across the River MAAS.

(c) The Island of BEVELAND has also been occupied and the occupation of the Island of WALCHEREN will probably be complete by the time this summary is published. At present the remnants of 70 Inf. Div. together with the personnel of the coastal batteries and Flak Units are putting up a determined resistance.

(d) The German bridgehead on the south bank of the River SCHELDT has also at last been eliminated. 12,000 prisoners have been taken in this area since 10 October, of which 5,000 were taken during the present week. This action means the wiping out of a further German Infantry Division, namely, 64 I.D.

(e) On the eastern flank of the 21 A.G. a German counter attack had some success and succeeded in temporarily re-occupying LIESEL. This town has, however, since been re-captured by the Allies. 15 P.G. and 9 Pz. Divs. which had been brought up from the south, were used in this attack.

4. 12 A.G.

On 12 Army Group front there was comparative quiet until 2 November when an attack was launched to the east of LACHEN to clear up the enemy salient in this area.

5. 6 A.G.

(a) On 6 Army Group front there has been more activity and there have been several new identifications, including 260 Inf. Div. at COLMAR. This Division is from SCANDINAVIA and is interesting as being evidence of an intention to use troops accustomed to mountain country in the VOSGES Mountains. It may be noted that although this Division left BERGEN on 28 September, it only arrived in the line on 26 October, an indication of the difficulties experienced by the enemy in transportation.

(b) 553 Div. and 11 Pz. Div. have suffered heavy losses and remnants of 11 Pz. Div. have been withdrawn. The Div. is at present unlocated but it is believed to have gone in a north-westerly direction, probably in order to refit.

(c) 361 Inf. Div. has arrived in the south from HOLLAND, an unsatisfactory substitute for 15 P.G. and 9 Pz.

ITALY.

6. The enemy defence line on the River SAVIO has crumbled. The line now runs from a point on the ADRIATIC just south of RAVENNA to the southern approaches of FORLI and from there to ROCCA CASCIANO, which is among the places occupied by us. The line then goes in a northerly direction until reaching a point about 10 miles south of BOLOGNA where the resistance is still stiff and has been strengthened by the transfer to this sector of 29 and 90 PG Divs. from 76 Corps on the ADRIATIC flank. From the centre the line goes west to the coast just south of MASSA which is about 15 miles north of PISA. On this flank BARGA 12 miles east-north-east of MASSA has also been captured.

EASTERN FRONT.

7. (a) NORWAY. NIEDEN, 17 miles west of KIRKENES was occupied on 28 October and the PETSAMO area is now quite clear.

(b) E. PRUSSIA. Further advances made in the TILSIT area of East PRUSSIA have slowed down in the face of heavy resistance. (BALDEN, DILESKEN and TAPELEN are among the towns which have fallen to the Soviet advance).

(c) CZECHOSLOVAKIA. Advances have also been made in this area and the rail centre and Fortress of MUKACEVO (MUNKACS) has been captured.

(d) HUNGARY. In spite of a German claim to have annihilated encircled Soviet formations north of DEBRECEN, the feat does not appear to have halted the Soviet advance which has continued to the north east of the city.

(e) Advances have also been made towards BUDAPEST, Russian troops driving N.W. between the Rivers TISZA and DANUBE have overrun a great many localities including the town of KECSKEMET and have reached a point only 17 miles from the city. 7,500 P/W have been taken in this area since 1 November.

(f) YUGOSLAVIA.

(i) In Northern YUGOSLAVIA, 118 Mountain Div. and 13 SS Div. are reported to be working on a defence line to strengthen the gap between the Rivers DRAVA and SAVA and the River DANUBE.

(ii) The Russian and partisan forces now hold the east bank of the DANUBE for 35 miles below BAJA, captured last week. NOVI SAD, up river from BELGRADE, and VALJEVO, have been captured.

(iii) The Allies have landed at DUBROVNIK to assist the partisans in blocking the escape routes from the south east and SPLIT farther down the coast is also reported to have been occupied by the partisans, leaving the DALMATIAN coast from there to STRUGA clear of the enemy.

(g) ALBANIA. KORITZA and ORCHRIDA have been evacuated by the Germans and occupied by partisan forces.

(h) GREECE. The whole of GREECE has now been cleared of organised bodies of German troops. Allied troops entered the town of SALONIKA on 30 October.

8. BALKANS. GENERAL.

The front line in the BALKANS is still not clear but it would appear that, although isolated bodies of German troops may still be found, there is no effective enemy occupation or resistance south and east of a line drawn from VALONA (on ALBANIAN coast opposite BRINDISI) to Lake OCHRIDA, from thence to BELGRADE, then along the DANUBE to BAJA.

FAR EASTERN FRONT.

9. No further news has come in from the PHILLIPINES but General MacArthur announces that operations are proceeding satisfactorily. The Japanese Fleet has so far not reacted after the shattering blow it received.

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The second is the fact that the present system of taxation is not adapted to the needs of the country.

The third is the fact that the present system of taxation is not adapted to the needs of the country.

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The fourth is the fact that the present system of taxation is not adapted to the needs of the country.

WEHRMACHT MORALE

I. GERMAN SENIOR OFFICERS:

Recent interrogations indicate how mixed are the loyalties of many German senior Officers. Because their superiors have told them to do so, these professional soldiers of long standing, attempt to defend their sectors until actually overwhelmed. Yet they are under no illusions about the futility, from a military point of view, of many of these last ditch orders, about the hopelessness of Germany's military situation.

Colonel Gerhard Wilck, for example, Commanding Officer of the defense of AACHEN, stated to G-2 interrogators, that in his opinion the whole defense of the City could only be regarded as senseless bloodshed. He did not even believe, it had any value as a delaying action. For the troops inside Aachen, would have served a much better purpose if withdrawn in time and used to bolster up German defense lines east of the city. In fact, he apparently regarded himself as a scapegoat to be sacrificed in place of a General Staff Officer. Although the main body of his own division was outside the Aachen ring, he was ordered to enter the city without his staff, just as it was about to be encircled. Two days later he requested that he be allowed either to surrender, or else to fight his way out of the city. Permission was refused. Therefore, motivated by "his conscience, plus 28 years of service, plus the prospect of a generalship" he fought on for 8 more days. Wilck added, moreover, that the order to fight to the last man had come directly from the Fuehrer's Headquarters. Only when his daily strength reports showed a total of no more than 500 men, and his rations and ammunitions indicated that the City would last no longer than 6 hours, did he surrender.

For such an Officer as Col. Wilck the prospect of German victory through the series of "V" weapons is of no importance. They are much too well informed and (more significantly), they believe that such weapons if in existence would have been employed long ago. Moreover, they realize that Allied material superiority, especially in planes and artillery, is certain to increase with time. Volksturm reserves and guerilla warfare, the most recent threats of the Nazis, obviously appear strategically insignificant to such professional soldiers. Other Officers, however, cling to hopes of an open break between Russia and the Anglo-American block. -Perhaps about the Balkans.- Then German Diplomats, whom these senior Officers are still willing to trust, will by some unspecified means turn the situation to Germany's advantage.

The failure of the 20th July Putsch, has resulted in the almost complete isolation of the senior commanding Officer and their domination by the Nazi security system. Important as considerations of professional military discipline may be, it must be clear to him, that, under most circumstances, he can do nothing except obey or be relieved. In this connection many Officer Ps/W cite reprisals against their families in Germany as the most frightening among Nazi methods of control.

II. NAZIFICATION OF WEHRMACHT:

New evidence continues to be reported on the ever increasing extension of Nazi control over the Wehrmacht. As a result of the moving of the fighting front to German soil, Nazi party formation are now being directly and almost independently employed in the support of the Wehrmacht.

Front reports speak of the establishment of Nazi Command Posts in fighting sectors presumably to co-ordinate and control the Allgemeine SS, the Volksturm and the ditch diggers. But no real evidence of Volksturm units being committed to battle has been received on the Western Front. A captured Order, issued by the CO of the SS forces in the West, on 21 September, reveals that the Allgemeine SS and State Police have been given the normal military function of maintaining a continuous line of demarkation between the front lines and the rear areas. These police units are charged with: 1.) arrest and execution of deserters from the army, 2.) prevention of contact between the people and the troops, 3.) control of civilians who remain in the army rear areas, 4.) prevention of infiltration of Allied Agents. They will act as a last ditch reserve in case of Allied breakthrough.

Another captured document from the Fuehrer's HQ, September 1944, outlines the duties of the NSF Officers (propaganda officers) and gives them the "same standing as tactical assistants of the troop leaders." Greater power is delegated to them by their right, in cases of "particular political significance or where delay implies danger" to report immediately and directly to the NSF Officers of the Superior Command, and upwards to the highest authorities, irrespective of routine communication channels. To interfere with this independent Nazi "Chain of Command" is made a military crime.

III. SURVEY RESULTS.

Written answers of 92 Ps/W to a questionnaire administered by P & PW, 12 AG, confirm the conclusion of other sources that the majority of German soldiers still express satisfaction with their Officers. (In the present case about 2/3 of the Ps/W answered yes to the question "Were your Officers good leaders." Although this question failed to distinguish between immediate Officers and higher Command, it seems reasonable to assume that the answers given, dealt with the Ps/W's company Officers). Only ten Ps/W cited specific incidents, where they thought their Officers attracted attention through their poor behaviour. The criticism most frequently made was that the Officers were too young.

Confidence in the High Command was markedly less than that shown towards young Officers. Only about 50% of the Ps/W thought that their unit was used to advantage by the High Command. As regards weapons, almost all the Ps/W felt these were not adequate. The lack of heavy weapons was repeatedly mentioned.

This poll also confirmed reports that despite the loss of huge food stocks, the Wehrmacht is still able to give its front line soldiers enough food. Less than 15% of the Ps/W were dissatisfied with the food received during the week before their capture. The majority in fact, felt that prison camp food was worse than that in the Wehrmacht.

IV. SOLDIER'S LETTERS:

According to a 12 AG report, captured letters written by German soldiers during September and October, are mainly concerned with saying how fed up they are with the whole war, and how worried about their home folks in the Rhineland, in the East and in the bombed cities elsewhere. Evacuation of families from the Rhineland

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leads to long delays of mail, and consequently increased worry about the fate of their families. In this respect, the wholesale evacuation by the Nazis has had a demoralizing effect because of the resulting confusion and separations.

Many Ps/W are confident, that the end will come before the New Year, (a point confirmed by interrogations.) The opinion that only a miracle can now save Germany is widespread. Mentions of defeat as possible or even almost certain, are much more numerous. Few soldiers, however, express any intention of doing anything to hasten the end of the war. For obvious reasons, there is extremely little criticism of the Party, in contrast to interrogations. The idea that something should or could be done, actively, against the leadership, is practically unheard of. Impatience with conditions leads to queries whether everything at the top is still in order, but these queries seldom or never - in the letters reported on - take the form of outright condemnation or expression of revolt. Belief in the Fuehrer is still quite strong.

In general it seems that the conclusions drawn from captured letters about the morale of the Wehrmacht are quite similar to those drawn from direct interrogations. The only effect of the restraints connected with writing letters to the home front seems to be to decrease criticism of the Party. On the other hand, soldiers hardly feel any need to feign bravado in their letters. More important, however, is the fact that the letters of German soldiers only indirectly reflect the automatic resistance which they display in battle.

V. NEW ANTI-DESERTION MEASURES:

Among recent measures against desertion to be reported are: 1.) Revision of the Military penal Code, 22nd October, 1944, under the signature of Keitel applying the rules about stragglers to military office Staffs, as well as to fighting troops; the reduction from three to one days of the time limit within which a man must either find his own unit or attach himself to another one, (in practice, under the conditions of the retreat, this means that he must at once attach himself to another unit.) 2.) In one unit, the construction of a barbed wire fence and the laying of special mines. 3.) Intensification of rumours about the Allied mistreatment of Ps/W. e.g. that an agreement has been reached between President Roosevelt and Marshall Stalin to send all German Ps/W to Russia for reconstruction work, thus justifying the present German slogan "SIEG oder SIBIRIEN" (Victory or Siberia.)

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