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SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division
INTELLIGENCE SECTION

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TO : Chief of Division,
FROM : Chief, Intelligence Section.

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE # 9

PART I -- GERMAN HOME FRONT

A. OCCUPIED AREAS

Several towns within the zone of Allied occupation have begun to function as normal, or nearly normal, communities once again; as a result the German people in the zone have begun to fall into the recognizable strata of urban population groups, with corresponding attitudes and activities. The Military Government formula of "self-help" places responsibility for the normal functioning of any community upon the members of that community; from the psychological point of view, it thus presents a challenge to the initiative of outstanding individuals or organized groups. In the Rhineland, where no organizations prepared to deal with the problems of government have yet appeared, the challenge has been met in most cases by individuals whose occupations and economic status are traditionally the residence of individual enterprise - intellectuals, clergymen, professional men and independent business men. Individuals from this class have taken hold and, under the supervision of Military Government, have begun to organize the life of their communities. They comprise a comparatively small group, however, and the bulk of the population, which has been forced into a limited amount of activity by the combined efforts of Military Government officials and German appointees, for the most part still remains inert.

Source - (1) An opinion survey of over 200 AACHEN civilians, a fairly homogeneous group of Rhenish, Catholic "non-Nazi" workers and lower middle class, was conducted by P & PW First U.S. Army. Complete mental lassitude is perhaps the key reaction revealed by this survey. A disinclination to fix their thinking upon large public problems is apparent in the majority of cases; in some cases there seems to be an actual inability to use the mind, due either to innate weakness or long disuse. This lassitude may account, in part, for the nearly universal lack of interest in the political future of Germany. Questions concerning the post-war period evoke (1) epithets against the Nazis, or (2) vague and contradictory predictions about partitioning, or (3) the display, or at least, profession, of complete ignorance and disinterest in public problems. The third attitude is that of the greatest number.

(2) There is far greater interest in questions concerning personal post-war plans. All want work and enough supplies to maintain life, and it is said by most that any government is welcome which will provide these. (To which some add, "if they don't bother us with politics"). Most of these would favor even a long American occupation of Germany, for there is a widespread belief that America will feed conquered Germans. This belief is hardly more than a naive assumption; the few who have asserted that it was based upon Allied broadcasts have been unable, when pressed, to cite, even approximately, any specific broadcast. The smaller group which gives evidence of having thought about the problem also express a desire for a long-term occupation, but for more subtle reasons. They usually speak of an Allied occupation, as distinguished from a specifically American one (which is pictured by many as a great feedbag). Among their reasons for desiring a long occupation are: (1) Germany will not be able to survive if first destroyed militarily and then left to her own devices in a hostile Europe; (2) The Nazis will return if the Allies leave; (3) Germany does not understand the meaning of democracy and must be taught to respect and use it. (On this point, however, specifically American occupation is mentioned).

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(3) This cleavage in basic attitudes towards public questions is, as indicated, largely an outcome of accustomed position in the social structure, accentuated by the pressure of events in the recent past - these areas have been subject to heavy bombing and shelling, have been the scene of battle action, have passed under the control of foreign armies as conquered territory. For the wealthier groups, usually comprising the individuals of training and enterprise, have suffered less from the pre-battle terrors and the post-battle displacement than the lower and lower-middle classes. Consequently, the shocking and numbing effects of recent events have induced a fairly widespread state of semi-paralysis among the "lower classes" which only now is beginning to wear off under direction and control "from above". While there are no certain grounds for belief that this pattern will be repeated in the larger cities within Germany, where the shock of occupation may be absent or softened, and where various labor, religious and relief organizations exist, it is clear that in the areas now under Allied occupation the pattern of control has been largely dictated by circumstances and has, on the whole, worked out quite successfully.

In Landkreis MONSCHAU, for example, a system of cooperative action has been established between the towns of TOTT and ROETGEN for the purpose of mutual improvement in food distribution. From MONSCHAU, too, the acting Burgermeister is reported to have volunteered the suggestion that outstanding local citizens be used for broadcasts to the rest of the Reich to repudiate current Nazi propaganda. These moves in the direction of "self-help" reflect, of course, the initiative of the leading citizens, but the recovery of larger segments of the population from post-operational paralysis is indicated by reports of reconstruction activity from AACHEN and other badly-damaged areas. All this bespeaks the considerable success of Military Government in a difficult situation. The attitude of all sections of the population toward the Allies is, in varying degrees, favorable. The judicial record shows that obedience is the general rule, and P.W.D. interrogations reveal that the desire to cooperate actively is fairly widespread. Relations with the Church continue to be extremely cordial. The resignation of Father JANSEN, who had been serving as temporary Burgermeister of BREINIG, is in conformity with the Church policy of avoiding identification with any political administration. As a G-5 spokesman has characterized the situation: "It would be much more effective for the Church to have the relationship of Independent Contractor than that of agent to the Military Government".

B. ENEMY AREAS

(1) The German Combat Zone

The traditional significance of the combat zone as an area wholly under military control is being obliterated by the Nazis. This obliteration, which follows automatically on the Party's clear policy of relying only upon its own controls at all crucial points, is particularly important in the combat zone where policy most directly affects practice. That the Party policy is based upon distrust of the Officers' Corps and the population alike is revealed in the mechanisms of control which it has adopted.

The Volkssturm is, of course, an ingenious instrument which cuts both ways and thus makes economical use of the limited number of trusted Party workers available for policing the nation. By mobilizing all males of 16-60 into Einsatzbataillone (Combat Echelons) the Party brings the strongest elements of the population directly under its own control. With the formation of Standbataillonen (Command and Service Echelons), designed for security and political tasks, the Party carries its own administration directly to the front lines, thereby eliminating the traditional area of military authority and extending its own control over the military to the limit. Within the Wehrmacht itself, Nazi controls over the Officer Corps are continually strengthened by the use of NSFO's (Nazi Guidance Officers). The establishment of a separate chain of command giving the NSFO, and through him the lowest Landser, a means of circumventing military channels on all "political" questions has been already reported here. The direct relationship between the Party NSFO and the Landser, cutting through the authority of tactical commanders, has now been extended by an order that transfers publication of Mitteilungen fuer die Truppen to the authority of the NSFO.

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That there are good reasons for the Party to suspect the Officers' Corps and the population has long been clear. It is less clear that the Volkssturm is a completely satisfactory solution. The evidence from METZ, where the VS was reported in action for the first time on the West front, indicates that it may not be the answer to a Nazi's prayer. The leaders and older men tired of war as soon as they tasted it and returned to METZ; the younger boys considered it an exciting adventure. But it is noteworthy that of the 8 VS prisoners already interrogated, not one seems to have completed the duties assigned him or to have fired a single shot. They seem to have done nothing further, in fact, than hide in cellars and enjoy the fun while waiting for the Americans to come and get them. The Nazi score for the VS first inning is thus no hits, no runs, and pretty clearly one error.

From this sector, too, comes the interesting case of S.S. Brigadefuehrer DUNCKERN (also Generalmajor der Polizei and chief of police for all of METZ, SAAR, and LORRAINE Palatinate), the first high Nazi official captured by Allied troops in Germany to date. The Party has shown itself to be extremely sensitive to recent charges that Parteibonzen (Party officials) are inclined to do the talking from safe areas in the rear and the story of AACHEN's desertion in the hour of stress by all Nazi officials seems to have had strong repercussions in Western Germany, particularly in KOELN. Reports of certain Party officials in that city being ordered to stick to their posts have already been quoted here (see PWD Weekly # 8). DUNCKERN may be the first sacrifice to this new policy and, seeing that he was captured while swimming away from the town, hardly a willing sacrifice.

The German public was carefully prepared by the Propaganda Ministry for the fall of METZ. By contrast, the French success at BELFORT seems to have taken the public and authorities alike by surprise. On 19 November, the day the French arrived at the gates of the city, a reassuring Front Report was broadcast from BERLIN, claiming that the September successes had given civilian diggers sufficient time to construct a deep defense system. It asserted bluntly: "The road to the RHINE is blocked". Two days later, DNB was talking about "a surprise success" achieved by "comparatively small forces" and calling for energetic counter-measures. The complete failure of the much-vaunted frontier ditches under their first serious test will certainly not increase public confidence, but the effect of this should not be over-rated since all the evidence goes to show that public confidence was already at a low ebb. The German war effort is being sustained by other, more weighty, factors.

A newspaper account of TRIER emphasizes that the Party and local administration have successfully preserved the normal aspect of the town, although the front is only 10 kilometers away. After heavy U.S. shelling and air attacks, the Party started evacuation - and claims to have had such success that only one-third of the population of 85,000 now remains. Excellent shelters have been blasted in the rocks on the sides of the MOSEL Valley. The picture from COLOGNE and ESSEN is quite different. The latter is reported nearly destroyed, including 90 per cent of the Krupp works. It is reported that the remaining material and personnel will be moved to BRESLAU. Apropos of the evacuation of foreign workers, one report has it that this is decided by each worker's terms of employment: if he holds an individual contract, he is allowed to stay behind; if he is included in a group contract, he is evacuated with all other members of the group. From COLOGNE comes an editorial which indicates that, while national propaganda mainly ignores air attacks, life has almost ceased in that "collapsing town ... cut off from the outside world".

(2) The Interior

One important bolster to German morale has been adequate food. Although agricultural imports have been steadily reduced during the recent past, the German farmer has produced excellent harvests, especially of the all-important potato. Despite severe rationing of certain items, such as white bread, Germany has not been hungry. But there is some evidence that this situation is now changing and may shortly become quite serious. From many sources come

confirmations of the extreme shortage of transportation, which is primarily responsible. BACKE himself emphasizes the fact that transport troubles, which prevent the interchange of bulk foods inside Germany, dictate the policy that regions must become more self-sufficient in agricultural products - a policy which amounts to "no less than a change in the structure of agriculture". The indications are that the West and South will go short of potatoes; the Ruhr, Rhineland, east and central Germany of vegetables; Austria of bread-grain. There is no pretence that production can be increased; appeals are made for increased delivery, particularly of milk. The peasants are told they must do "what seems impossible" with a 60 per cent nitrogen fertiliser cut, or else "the foundation of food-policy will be shaken".

Foreign workers continue to be a chronic problem, which occasionally becomes acute. An order of the Reich Labor leader shows that after D-day Eastern and Polish workers began to form organized bands pursuing "a well-planned policy of injuring the Reich by all possible means", including terrorization of other foreign workers and raids in search of arms. Reports on the extent of sabotage done by foreign workers vary greatly, but indicate that, while there is no large organization of saboteurs, local sabotage is fairly common and carried out in subtle and devious ways.

Rumors are again a target of Reich propagandists, and rumor-mongers are severely threatened. The continued absence of HITLER from the public eye is, of course, a particularly juicy subject, made even more important by the appearance of the universally-disliked HUMMLER in his place. Rumors concerning Nazi preparations for underground activity after the defeat are now so widespread that even the most likely-sounding are suspect, unless their sources are clearly reliable. Further reports are heard of training in youth elite schools, of the leadership of the Security Service, and of the use of false credentials in new places. In POSEN, during May 1944, it was accepted as a fact in SD circles that all political prisoners would be murdered before the defeat and that Germans thereafter cooperating with the Allies would be attacked

PART II -- BATTLE FRONTGeneral Picture

1. The highlight is still on the Western Front and particularly on the operations in ALSACE where progress has exceeded all expectations. In spite of the fact that a number of new enemy Divs have been identified on the Front since Nov 11, violent counter-attacks by the Germans only succeeded in holding up the Allied advance temporarily at a few isolated points and nowhere stopped steady progress forward.

2. The Eastern Front was mostly quiet, although there were indications of movement in the near future. In ITALY and from the East the news was good but meagre.

WESTERN FRONT

3. The offensives launched during the previous week by all three Army Gps continue to make progress, particularly in the South.

4. 6 Army Gp has succeeded in breaking through on both flanks.

(a) On the right 1 Fr Army captured BELFORT, and breaking through the BELFORT GAP reached MULHOUSE and the RHINE. The line now starts on the RHINE 20 miles North of the SWISS Frontier and for a few miles runs due West. Then at ENSISHEIM it swings South-West through MULHOUSE and so up to the summit of the VOSGES at BALLON D'ALSACE where it makes a sharp turn to the North. German counter-attacks intended to break off the French spearhead are well under control.

(b) In the centre considerable progress has been made in the Mountains and Passes of the VOSGES East of ST. DIE while the most dramatic advance was that of US 7 Army, whose armour, headed by the 2nd Fr Armd Div captured SARREBOURG (Nov 21), SAVERNE (Nov 22) and STRASBOURG (Nov 23). The remnants of possibly 8 German Divs must now get back across the RHINE as best as they can even if they do not become completely cut off, and a considerable haul of prisoners should fall into our hands. This, however, is unlikely to reach figures such as 70,000 suggested in the Press.

5. 12 Army Gp

(a) 3 US Army in the centre has also had considerable success including the capture of the city of METZ which had been surrounded the week before last. (Some of the forts round the city are, however, continuing to fight). Heavy resistance has been met and many counter-attacks, some of which were supported by tanks, but the line has been pushed forward along its entire length, particularly in the area North and North-East of DIEUZE where the enemy salient has been eliminated.

(b) 1 and 9 US Army have had heavy fighting East of AACHEN. In the face of very heavy opposition, bad weather and enemy counter-attacks, progress has been maintained and although the gains look small compared with those achieved further South, the losses caused to the enemy may prove more serious in the long run.

6. 21 Army Gp

(a) 2 Br Army has made satisfactory progress towards the expulsion of the last enemy troops from the Western bank of the River MAAS, but operations have been considerably impeded by the weather and by flood conditions, which render most roads impassible to armoured vehicles. On the Northern flank of 21 Army Gp there has been no change.

7. General

During the week 13/20 Nov the total of prisoners since D-day rose from 678,000 to nearly 702,000, an increase of about 24,000. This figure excludes the Ps/W captured by 1 Fr Army from 17/20 Nov which has been reported to exceed 7,000.

8. RUSSIA

(a) Baltic

OESEL ISLAND has been occupied by the Russians. This is the largest Island of the group commanding the Gulf of RIGA and the object of the operations is presumably to free the Gulf of RIGA for the Red Fleet and also to remove one of the two threats to the Russian flank before recommencing the drive against East PRUSSIA. The second threat comes from the German pocket in LATVIA where the remnants of 30 Divs are being steadily reduced.

(b) HUNGARY

East of BUDAPEST the Russians have advanced and taken, among other places, the rail centre of JASZ AROKSZALLAS. The Germans are reported to be fortifying the capital and also mining buildings for demolition in the event of a withdrawal. The MARGARET Bridge across the DANUBE has already been blown, possibly as a result of accident or sabotage.

(c) YUGOSLAVIA

The front is approaching ZAGREB. Activity has also increased North of the confluence of the Rivers DRAVE and SAVE. The Port of CATTARO has been captured. On the sector between the two Bridgeheads on the West bank of the DANUBE, the Russians have thrust fresh forces across the River and gained yet another foothold on the Western Bank. All these Bridgeheads have been enlarged and extended and will soon be more than mere Bridgeheads.

9. ITALY

(a) Patrols of 8 Army are now only one mile from RAVENNA. 19 miles South-East of RAVENNA the prepared defences of FAENZA on the BOLOGNA-RIMINI Road have been broken and Allied troops are four miles from the centre of the city. MONTE FORTINO which had been retaken by the Germans, was again captured. Small German counter-attacks South of BOLOGNA were repulsed.

(b) In PIEDMONT, LOMBARDY and LIGURIA, Partisans are now said to be well organised and have had a number of successes against the Germans. The Italian "Republican" Fascist troops have proved unreliable against them and considerable bodies of German troops have had to be diverted.

10. BURMA

Spearheads of our troops are now 10 miles from the CHINDWIN River Port of KELEWA.

11. PHILIPPINES

Americans on LEYTE have smashed a Japanese counter-attack near LIMON. The Japanese are officially stated to have lost 60,000 men killed and wounded on the MARIANA and PALAU ISLANDS.

PART III

WEHRMACHT MORALE

I. REACTION TO THE PRESENT OFFENSIVE:

The recent Allied attacks are being met with stubborn opposition. The apparent discrepancy between such determined fighting and the general impression of demoralization and weakness gathered from current P/W interrogations more than ever requires explanation. During late September and October the slowing down of the Allied offensive definitely contributed to the stiffening of morale among German troops. The temporary stabilization of the front reduced, on all sectors, the feeling of hopelessness and despair felt during the August-September period of hasty retreat. Even during October, most Ps/W were not confident of victory and believed that Allied material superiority would ultimately defeat Germany.

The paradox still presents itself of the German soldier who fights effectively but yet, shortly after capture, expresses defeatist views. The reasons for his continued resistance have often been mentioned here:

1. It is easier to fight with one's comrades than to risk the hazards of desertion or even surrender. It is often dangerous to desert or surrender, through fear of being killed by his own men or by the enemy, or of Nazi reprisal against his family.

2. It is easier to obey automatically, under the discipline of military life than to take a personal decision.

3. It is difficult to escape the pressure exercised by the hard core of Nazi fanatics who are a powerful influence in keeping the Wehrmacht intact as a fighting unit. Two or three such men in a platoon are often enough to stiffen resistance particularly as they stifle the discussion necessary before a group will surrender. This fanaticism is often found among field officers as well.

4. There is a widespread faith in Hitler as a man who so loves the German people as to make it unthinkable that he would prolong a lost war needlessly.

5. Many believe that the threat of occupation of the Fatherland gives point to the traditional Nazi propaganda warning that Germans must choose between victory and annihilation. Appropriately enough evidence is available which makes it possible to estimate how important these fears of occupation are in stiffening resistance.

II. FEAR OF OCCUPATION:

When questioned generally about their expectations of Allied occupation, German Ps/W tend sharply to distinguish between Anglo-American and Soviet occupation. They frequently express the opinion that they expect fair treatment for themselves and their families at the hands of the American and British occupying Forces. Nevertheless, because of an overpowering fear of Russia, almost all German Ps/W are fearful of some aspect of the forthcoming occupation. The geographical proximity of Allied Forces has only served to heighten these fears. For example, of a group of 70 Ps/W interrogated on the subject, only three stated that they had no fears at all and three others were generally apathetic. The rest did not accept the prospect of Allied occupation with indifference, despite their recent hardships or their comparative security as Ps/W.

Fifteen felt that Germany would suffer heavily by the occupation regardless of who did the occupying - Russia, Great Britain or America. These were the convinced Nazis for whom a German defeat meant the end of personal existence. Their statements revealed an underlying sense of guilt due to Germany's role as an occupier of other countries and a feeling that similar treatment was in store for them.

More typical was the attitude of forty Ps/W that Germany had nothing or little to fear from the United States and Great Britain, but that Russian occupation would be unbearable. Many of this group cited Allied plans to divide Germany into three zones of occupation. The few who had families in the Russian

SECRET

zone expressed great anxiety. The remainder were concerned lest too little of Germany come under Anglo-American control and for too short a time lest the Soviet Union take control. Some made indirect pleas for Britain and America to extend their influence in Germany. Others, using cynical realism as a cloak for wishful thinking, insisted that we could not under any circumstances afford to allow Russia a predominant position in Germany. In isolated cases, reasons for immediate declaration of war by the United States and Great Britain against Russia were even offered.

Six Ps/W expected the Americans to seize most of Germany. American rule, according to these Ps/W, will be correct and hard; the Germans will be reduced to a colonial-like existence. Two other Ps/W expressed the hope that Anglo-American occupation will be long and thorough since only by that method could the Nazis be eliminated from Germany.

Despite the feeling of pessimism about the future of Germany as a nation, many German soldiers view their own personal future with more confidence. Support for this conclusion is given by above mentioned series of interrogations as well as other sources. The group (15 Ps/W) who foresee hardships, miseries and national destruction for Germany, during any kind of an occupation, predict indefinite forced labour for themselves. Twelve others were generally doubtful and fearful of their personal fate; six had no clear opinions. On the other hand, thirty-two Ps/W were reasonably optimistic about themselves, either because of some personal skill or because they counted on getting reconstruction employment after a relatively short period of forced labour under Allied control. These feelings of relative personal confidence in the prospect of employment were present even among Ps/W who expressed strong fear of Russia. This contradiction can be explained by the fact that a decade of totalitarian economic control has led many Germans to believe employment problems are capable of solution by any government; and because the main fear is that Russia will obliterate the political and cultural marks distinguishing the German nation.

The prospects of employment in Germany after the war were of no importance to four others who had formulated definite plans to emigrate from Germany after the war.

III. DETERIORATION OF HEALTH:

In some units, at least, it is clear that the strengthening of assistance cannot have been assisted by the physique and health of recruits. A survey reported by the 21st Army Group on 950 Ps/W captured by the British Second Army revealed that 10% were lousy. This represented a marked increase in the number of lice-carriers compared with men examined some 14 days earlier. The survey was also directed to discovering the evidence of ex-typhus fever cases. It was found that German anti-typhus measures had been limited and that on the Eastern front these measures did not appear to be highly effective. In that epidemics have occurred as recently as July of this year with high mortality figures.

Of 1000 prisoners who entered the British Second Army Cage from 15-19 October, 486 were found unfit for combat service under British medical standards.

From the First U.S. Army, the PW Combat Team relates that rain, and the consequent muddy foxholes, are affecting health, especially since the issue of winter clothes has not been completed. The matter is complicated by attempts to discourage men from reporting sick. According to one source, men refrain from reporting in order not to be called cowards and be sent straight back to their units without receiving medical attention.

IV. VOLKSSTURM REPLACEMENT:

The battle experience of the "First Volkssturm Battalion Metz" in the defense of that city, indicates that these last ditch reserves will probably contribute little to the Wehrmacht's fighting effectiveness. Eight captured recruits from this formation report that their total period of service in the line was one day, during which they did not fire a single shot.

On Sunday, 12th November the recruits who had responded to appeals, or who

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SECRET

had been impressed into service, were assembled and sworn in formally. The oath to Adolf Hitler was administered by the local Kreisleiter. There were four companies of roughly 100 men each; Company I and II were composed of auxiliary police members of NSKK and other formations; Company III of railroad men; and Company IV (from which the Ps/W came) was a collection of 15 and 16 year old youths and men over military age. Company and platoon leaders were veterans of World War I and Party members; the CO was a 32 year old SA Obersturmfuehrer. The Battalion was not informed that it would be employed for frontline duty, but was told it would be used for police and similar duties within the city.

The most important military item issued was the red, white and black arm band, bearing the words: "DEUTSCHER VOLKSTURM". The men were required to provide most of their own equipment. The insignia was sewn to a simple uniform supplied by the Wehrmacht. Some were issued with Ersatz Army papers, but others had no further means of identification than the postal notification that they had been ordered to report for duty. Training in "sharp-shooting", and the use of the MG, "Panzerfaust" and hand grenade was given. "Duty" was three times a week after work.

Near the end of the Allied attack on Metz, the VS was employed in individual groups. There seems to have been no clear chain of command. Members of one group report that they were ordered by a Lt in a Wehrmacht unit to fill a gap in the line. In another case, an SA leader attempted to assume command. The appointed VS leaders apparently disappeared from the front and headed towards Metz.

The speed with which this formation of VS was recruited and organized will not be typical of the units certain to be encountered as the Allied drive progresses into Germany. Such units will be better armed and organized but will be composed of the same human material.

V. REACTION TO COMBAT LOUD-SPEAKER OPERATIONS:

Confirmation of the effectiveness of these operations is provided by a wireless message captured by 21st Army Group last month, from the General commanding the 64th Infantry Division to units under his orders. This message ordered that:

"Any appeal of the enemy to our troops to surrender or desert is to be answered immediately by fire from both infantry weapons and artillery."

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10