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SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division
INTELLIGENCE SECTION

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I.S.280

2 December 1944.

Janowitz 4.4.4

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TO : Chief of Division,

FROM : Chief, Intelligence Section.

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE # 10

PART I - GERMAN HOME FRONT

A. OCCUPIED AREAS

The Wehrmacht's retreat across the German border marked the start of a new and apparently widespread hostility among German civilians toward their soldiers. This hostility appeared as a direct consequence of fighting on German soil, which brought the deepest horrors of war from the front page straight into the back yard. The feeling is shown more widely than was to be expected even in the Rhineland, and its significance must be measured against the background of traditional German reverence for their Armed Forces. It is not so long ago that newspapers spoke habitually in terms of "the German soldier, the expression of the mobilized German people's soul...." Things have gone so far the other way, according to PWs, that civilians will not yield their seats in a public conveyance to even a crippled soldier. Clearly, many Germans have suffered a serious change of heart toward G.I.Herman since he came marching home.

What actually happens when a given area is brought into the combat zone ? First, the Wehrmacht takes control under the sacrosanct rule of "military necessity". Homes are taken over as officers' billets; movement of civilians is severely restricted by a "circulation order"; whatever the Army needs is "requisitioned". In addition to these official measures, numerous cases are reported of soldiers looting on their own (see Part III of this report). The situation which usually obtains when soldiers take over a town and start pushing civilians around is known to every army. The Wehrmacht is a losing and retreating army, and its soldiers have been through a serious phase of disorganization and demoralization. This has aggravated the tendency of men in uniform to mishandle the hapless civilian, who is the most convenient "innocent bystander". In many cities of the Rhineland, to add the final fillip, the Wehrmacht has been used by the Party to enforce evacuation orders upon an enraged and unwilling citizenry - evacuation being clearly the most serious point of friction. All this, moreover, in relation to a population anguished by the destruction of their homes, the loss of friends and relatives, the bitter end of once-sweet hopes. The Army, together with the Party, has trampled out the vintage of these grapes of wrath.

The extent of civilian hostility toward the Wehrmacht cannot be exactly measured. At the present time, it is quite clear that the Party is still the chief target of hostility, but the new attitude toward the Wehrmacht found among many civilians may have even a deeper effect on morale. (It should, however, be emphasized that there is as yet no positive evidence of this effect). Although seen most clearly in the occupied Rhineland, it seems reasonable to suppose that the same reaction will be found in some measure in other towns west of the Rhine which lie in the path of Wehrmacht retreat. Should this hostility spread among the German population, they will have lost their last concrete embodiment of hope. For the Wehrmacht has always symbolized, among even anti-Nazi segments of opinion, the German power and glory.

A study of the occupied areas reveals the interesting fact that no large organized destruction of public works has yet been carried out by the Nazis prior to Allied arrival. In AACHEN, both the power station and its sub-station were found to be only slightly damaged and ready for operation. The modern sewage-collection system also has suffered little damage. The first coal mine

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taken by Allied troops in the MOSELLE Basin had suffered only the damage of a smoke-stack, blown up by an "unknown" person shortly before our arrival. The commander of German troops in the area, in fact, had billeted a crew at the mine office to keep the pumps working. Whether this was done in the absence of Nazi orders to the contrary, or despite Nazi orders, is not clear. According to a SHAEF G-4 report : "Officially, at least, it appears that the Germans have no intention of destroying the mines". On the other hand, one notes that nearly all records dealing with Nazi Party activities and personnel have been removed as in AACHEN, or destroyed as in BLEIALF. In some towns this has been true also of other records considered valuable for occupational authorities. An interesting legal illustration of this point was provided at KORNELIMUNSTER, where a Military Government intermediate court convicted Maria JENSEN of concealing records of the NS Frauenschaft and sentenced her to 6 years imprisonment. (Reviewing authority reduced the sentence to 2 years).

Acceptance of Allied authority, and confidence in the Military Government regime, is indicated by the continued increase of deposits over withdrawals in the 5 banks now operating in occupied areas. Cash holdings are still extremely low, however, and in MONSCHAU (otherwise reported to be a model M.G. town) Allied authorities were forced to discontinue the payment of allotments for this reason. Continued improvement in morale, with corresponding increase in measures of "self-help", is reported from nearly all towns in the area.

B. ENEMY AREAS

(1) The German Combat Zone

The second visit of Goebbels to W. Germany within two months (announced by DNB on 25 November as having occurred recently), Ley's visit to the same area, and the general tone of recent propaganda output suggests that the German authorities are seriously concerned about the current state of morale. Three weeks ago local papers in North Germany were printing items which threw light on the attitude of the public. The Kieler Zeitung of 12 November, in a column devoted to local news, published what purported to be a letter from a soldier to his mother - "Unshakable fanatical belief must be demanded from everybody, even if such belief in our cause contradicts all the laws of human reason", and on the same day the Lübecker Zeitung quoted a speech made to local youth : "We must never give up - never - and even if the issue of the struggle appears completely hopeless, we must smash an empty pistol into the enemy's face and get at his throat and at least make him follow us if we must die". If North Germany needs to be stimulated by such heroics, it is easy to imagine what conditions are like in the west, more heavily bombed and threatened on the ground by an enemy whose advance,if gradual,is none the less maintained .

The stimulants and diversions devised by the Party - mobilization, Schanzarbeiten, Volkssturm - have by now exhausted their immediate tonic effect and one of the periodic slumps in morale would seem to have set in more or less contemporaneously with the general Allied offensive. Too much should not, of course, be expected of this. It is not likely to lead to violent action on the part of the discontented, largely for physical reasons described in the next section. The more likely result is that the authorities will find that supervision is increasingly necessary in order to make the rank and file take the action needed to make a community function. The Party solution is to admit both the quantity of the resources at the Allies disposal and the seriousness of the threat which the offensive constitutes but at the same time attributing their own difficulties to the other side, to suggest that the Allies must win by Christmas or collapse from exhaustion. There is no reason to suppose that this hand-to-mouth expedient will not tide over the immediate depression - especially if the Allies have no spectacular military successes - and a temporary improvement may easily follow. But it should be noted that with the turn of the year either an Allied military success or the mere fact that we are still "unexhausted" may cause the nostrums adopted in the present slump to have a considerable boomerang effect.

Further evidence of the difficulties in the West has come in this week from ESSEN. Some 400,000 people still remain in a city with a peacetime population of 670,000. The importance of ESSEN's industries makes it essential to keep them working, and on 17 November the Deputy Gauleiter announced in the local "National Zeitung" that to frustrate the enemy's intention of forcing the population to abandon their working-places, all applications for job-transfer due to "alleged housing shortage" would be refused. Allied bombing has, however, caused an acute shortage both of housing and of good shelter accommodation, while the supplies needed by a population even of the present size place a heavy burden on a transport system already overtaxed. Accordingly, the authorities are naturally anxious to get all superfluous persons removed from the area. But an item in the National Zeitung on 11 November suggested that this would be more easily desired than done. A mother with four small children, already evacuated to Holland and then, thanks to military developments, brought back again, wrote to complain that she had been refused fresh evacuation because she had a roof over her head. Commenting on the latter, the paper said "The possibilities of transport are limited because the facilities are strained to the utmost for direct tasks of defence. Everyone will understand that the extra trains which can still be made available must primarily be reserved for homeless women and children". The incident makes all the more significant the announcement of the Gauleiter on November 18 that, for the first time in any area not immediately threatened by land operations, a compulsory evacuation of ESSEN was to be carried out, all unemployed people, invalids and mothers with young children having to leave immediately. By this means it was hoped to reduce the existing population by half.

PW reports from SAARBRUECKEN give the same impression of the difficulties engendered in industrial cities by the approach of Allied troops. The Party desire for large-scale evacuation conflicts with the pressing needs of production. The civilians who suffer from this difficult situation become more outspoken in their criticism of the Nazis and even, where the soldiers take a hand in pushing them around, of the Wehrmacht.

It has been said by some PWs that COLOGNE is "completely evacuated" except for some Government officials and soldiers. This is clearly an overstatement, for the Koelnische Zeitung was being published as late as 18 November. It must be presumed, however, that only a small portion of the peacetime population of 770,000 remains. A number of PWs and civilian refugees are in our hands who left COLOGNE in late October and it is clear from their testimony that evacuation raids had not at that time succeeded in clearing the city. A PW reported that he had advised his mother against leaving the city, since evacuees are not treated well in rear areas. Although tales concerning anti-Nazi opposition in COLOGNE are not so numerous as formerly, two PWs, apparently generalizing from their experiences in that city, asserted that the KDP (Communist Party) is still powerful in Germany. One of these even predicted that Germany would have a Communist government after the war.

Another PW reports that in COLOGNE proper, which has been without regular gas, light, and water supply for two weeks, a Gestapo patrol was attacked on 16 October, suffering casualties of one dead and two severely wounded. In the suburb of EHRENFELD, at the end of October, the local Nazi leader was pulled off his bicycle and beaten up in the street. In connection with these expressions of antagonism to the regime, the first report of official posters being torn down by day has been received from GLADBECK.

KOBLENZ, the traditionalist seat of German Civil Service in the Rhineland is the source of several interesting tales. A PW reported the town plastered with posters reading "We will never capitulate". A small boy crossed out the word "never" from one poster and was beaten up for his pains "by the Party people". People in the city supported the youngster's sentiment by repeated assertions that under no circumstances would they fight in the Volkssturm, but would surrender at once. In the light of the evidence from METZ, one is inclined to believe this statement.

(2) The Interior

The pervading contentment in the occupied areas contrasts most sharply with the semi-chaotic conditions within the German combat zone and with the steadily worsening morale in the interior of the Reich. It is extremely significant that since July of this year, according to the German press, attacks upon policemen have occurred at three times the previous rate. It has become necessary to offer large money rewards for apprehension of the offenders. Within the context of characteristic German respect for uniforms and the symbols of authority, this is a notable development. It is not quite clear whether foreign workers, anti-Nazi groups, or miscellaneous segments of a population in distemper are responsible for these numerous outbursts. Reports of popular belief in the efficacy of lawlessness, at least as a salve to wounded feelings, seem well founded. But it would be misleading to consider these signs as indication of a "potentially revolutionary situation" throughout Germany. The ruthless efficiency of the control system shows no signs of decreasing far enough to permit more than isolated and small-scale acts of resistance. One may, in fact, see as a countermeasure reports that the S.A. no longer bothers to conceal the results of its brutality against unfortunates whom it has "investigated". Contrary to earlier practise, their victims are now allowed to reappear in public view before the scars have healed. This may now be considered as the most effective warning to would-be dissidents.

The population of the Third Reich is sick in body as well as in spirit. The psychological apathy which reveals itself occasionally in violent outbursts, but mainly in passive existence from day to day, is part of an overwhelming physical fatigue. The German people have been working a 60-hour week for some time now, and they are just plain tired. G-5 reports that a special stimulant is being administered to workers, with marked success in increasing output. Sweets with Vitamin C, given in doses up to 100 grams during the first stages of exhaustion, allegedly have increased working capacity by 20-25 per cent. The latest method is to combine this stimulant with alcohol, making a liqueur which is said to be exceptionally valuable for attaining peak production. On the other hand, the penalty for absenteeism is cancellation of the offender's extra ration coupons. If true, these measures are temporary stopgaps whose final consequences may be more serious than the original situation they were designed to cure.

Further evidence of the overwhelming "just plain tired" condition of German workers may be seen in the report of a serious flu epidemic in an industrial area of Germany. This report is not yet confirmed, but its inherent probability is great at the start of a German winter without fuel, without building materials to repair damaged homes, without sufficient time or energy to undertake such repairs in any case. What can be expected of a population in this condition is apparent only in general outline. Clearly, one cannot expect an organized revolt against the regime; for this requires tireless efforts of underground organization, preparation, and action. People who work a 10 hour day, stand in long food queues, drill in some formation or other two nights a week (or on Sunday), and because places of amusement are closed go home to a cold and cheerless house where there is no rest, cannot be expected to enter actively into an anti-Nazi movement which may cost them their lives into the bargain. On the other hand, it is very unlikely that people in such state will gaily enter into the spirit of "Stalingrad, HIMMLER version". It is difficult to conceive of these people burning their homes, destroying their "Gut und Hab", or entering the lists valiantly as fighters of "Deutscher Volkssturm Wehrmacht".

An item of tremendous importance in the daily lives of Germans, particularly German women, is the cumulative effect of the breakdown of homes and families. The able men have long been away in Wehrmacht service; the able girls have been "drafted" for DAF service. Now the young boys and old men are being turned into heroes of the Volkssturm, and the aged, the infirm, and the handicapped are being evacuated willy-nilly. Central Germany is coming to be a vast camp for refugees; millions are homeless; and the German women are alone, very much alone.

PART II - BATTLE FRONT

1. General Picture

Although in this theatre interest has probably been mainly fixed on our own operations in FRANCE and GERMANY, the Russian drives in CZECHOSLOVAKIA, HUNGARY and JUGOSLAVIA have considerable importance. In ITALY fortunes have fluctuated while from the far East there has been little news.

2. Western Front - General

Progress has been considerable but has gradually slowed down. The main territorial gains have been in the 3rd US Army area where the Germans appear to be withdrawing from LORRAINE, although fighting strong rearguard actions. The bag in ALSACE was not closed and a large proportion of the Germans in that region have now crossed the RHINE. On the AACHEN front, there has been steady progress in the face of heavy opposition and 2 Br. Army have cleared the Western Bank of the MEUSE.

3. 1 Fr. Army have pushed up from BELFORT and are approaching the line of the River THUR. They were not able to continue their advance North from MULHOUSE, being pinned down by determined German counter-attacks which were made to hold open the escape route through NEUF-BRISACH, where several temporary bridges have been erected. It seems clear that the whole of ALSACE will before long be clear of the enemy.

4. 7 US Army have widened and strengthened their STRASBOURG salient. The French Armour which took STRASBOURG has not crossed the river where all bridges are firmly in enemy hands, as is all the country between the RHINE and the PETIT-RHIN. This force, however, has pushed down the West bank of the PETIT-RHIN to a point a couple of miles South-East of BENFELD. The left flank of this front has been pushed North and runs almost due West from the important communications centre of HAGENAU to North-West of WINGEN.

5. 3 US Army have pushed North from the SARREBOURG area and have reached SARRE-UNION on the right. In the centre ST. AVOLD having been captured, troops have thrust North into the FOREST ST. AVOLD. On the left the enemy salient towards METZ has been eliminated and the line is approaching SARRELOUIS and SARREBRUCKEN from the South-West. The German border has been crossed and the River SAAR reached above SARRELOUIS. Frozen ground has provided good going but resistance has been determined in parts and progress has been slowed by blown bridges, mines and fortifications.

6. 1 US Army: The line here has been static except in the North where very heavy fighting has been taking place. Slow but steady progress has been maintained as the Germans are gradually being driven back on DUREN and the River ROER.

7. 9 US Army: Conditions are very similar to those on 1 Army Sector and the same battle is being fought. The River ROER has been reached South of LINNICH and a break through here might enable JULICH to be outflanked.

8. 2 Br. Army has succeeded in clearing the enemy from the left bank of the River MEUSE, with the exception of a small pocket at HANSSUM. VENLO itself has been captured. The going in this sector is extremely difficult owing to floods, and the marshes to the east of the River MEUSE provide even more unsatisfactory terrain than that encountered hitherto.

9. General

During the week 20-27 November, the total of prisoners in the Western theatre since D. Day was increased by 40,000 to over 742,000. This figure includes the PW taken in METZ and BELFORT, and 192 Staff Officers of 19 Army captured at MULHOUSE.

10. Italian Front

(a) There has not been very much movement on this front, although there have been certain indications of prospective enemy withdrawals of men.

(b) South of FAENZA Allied troops crossed the River COSINA and reached the line of the rivers MARZENO and LAMONE, the former of which has also been crossed.

(c) Heavy enemy counter-attacks succeeded in recapturing the important feature of MT. BELVEDERE, 10 miles South of BOLOGNA.

Russian Front

11. Czechoslavakia: The Russian offensive has driven the enemy from RADVAN and KOZKOVCE and has formed another bridgehead over the River TISZA, North of the much disputed town of NYIREGYHAZS.

12. Hungary

(a) The enemy has lost EGER, 66 miles East-North-East of BUDAPEST and SZIKSO, 10 miles North-East of MISKOLCZ. The Russians have thus cut the railway MISKOLCZ-KOSICE and are approaching KOSICE andPRESOV.

(b) South of BUDAPEST a new breakthrough across the DANUBE on a 90 mile front has penetraded up to 25 miles in places. Among over 300 places captured were PECS, MOHACS and BATASZEK.

13. Jugoslavia

(a) KRALJEVO between BELGRADE and NISH has been lost by the enemy. This town was for some time used as a centre through which the troops from the Balkans were withdrawn.

(b) SCUTARI having been evacuated by the Germans, there are now practically no enemy troops South of a line SCUTARI-NOVI BAZAR.

PART III - WEHRMACHT MORALE SECRET

I. THE UNPOLITICAL MAJORITY

Those whose approach to social problems is over-intellectual are often surprised to find how far considerations of personal welfare dominate the man in the street to the exclusion of politics. This is equally true of German combat troops who display a marked lack of concern about political issues of war as presented to them by Nazi propaganda. Psychological warfare interrogations after capture tend to magnify the political awareness of the ordinary soldier. While in battle, the immediate campaign for personal survival and satisfaction of basic human needs reduces political goals, and the claims of propaganda and counter-propaganda to minor importance. The occasional statement of an introspective prisoner or the candid remarks of an intelligent non-commissioned officer reveal the more accurate picture of almost brutish self concern, ignorance of the simplest facts of the outer world, credulity in the wildest rumors and even acceptance of superstition.

Even those political beliefs professed after capture as being important sources of personal conviction (such as faith in Hitler), seldom enter into soldiers' minds while in the midst of battle. A striking example is a statement by a feldwebel about the reactions of his troops to the failure of Hitler to deliver his annual speech on 8 November. "From your question I see", he replied, "that you have a false impression of what our Landsers go through. They lie in their holes and are happy if they live through to the next day. If we think at all, then it is : The end of the war and return home". (Out of 55 PWs queried, almost all were unaware of Hitler's failure to speak and attributed little importance to it. When pressed for an opinion, some merely stated that he was probably too busy. Occasionally, convinced anti-Nazis cited Hitler's failure to speak as further evidence that the war was lost).

The simple facts of the battle situation outside his own sector are barely known to German soldiers. Three weeks after the capture of AACHEN, PWs were still encountered who were uninformed of the fall of that city. Of the Eastern Front, most soldiers know little more than that the Russian armies stand on the borders of Germany. Ignorance of the war in the Far East is quite complete.

With such lack of specific information German soldiers become easy prey to rumors (Fluesterpropaganda). Many of the rumors circulating in the Wehrmacht are detrimental to German morale since they disseminate gross exaggerations about home front conditions, the effects of air raids and the failure of German production and supply, among others. But many others help to keep the soldier in check by generating fears that can only be countered by continuing to fight. Rumors about Allied mistreatment of prisoners of war frequently crop up and seem to be sponsored in part by Nazi sources. Allied post-war plans for enforced labor of German PWs are encountered in great detail. Recently, rumors about the consequences of failure to carry out orders are reported as being directly instrumental in coercing German soldiers to continue resistance. According to a report from the PWD Combat Team, Seventh Army, fear of the consequences for neglect of duty are partly based on rumors of execution and severe punishment for failure to carry out to the last letter orders to "hold out to the end" by withdrawing prematurely or by attempting to hide away from battle. Many of these rumors are not without foundation, but embellished by rumormongering they present a more frightening story.

What little realistic discussion takes place among soldiers at the front seems, in the main, to be led by long standing defeatist elements. These discussions start either by chance or because of the receipt of an Allied leaflet. One of the central themes repeatedly mentioned on such occasions is the condemnation of Hitler, the Party and the SS for needlessly prolonging the war. Great concern is expressed over the uncertainty of Allied post-war plans. Fear of punishment and retaliation against one's families obviously stifles participation in such discussions and even the presence of one determined fanatic Nazi is enough to suppress them completely.

II. ENEMY PROPAGANDA

Propaganda efforts by the Nazi Party to counter Allied claims and general apathy among German soldiers have been increased during the last month. Lack of facilities and difficulties of dissemination, however, hamper these efforts. By now, whatever influence traditional Wehrmacht officials had in the matter of indoctrination has been eliminated. Mitteilungen fuer die Truppe, main indoctrination publication for Junior Officers and NCO's, heretofore issued by the Wehrmacht, passed under the direct control of the Party during the month of November. It is now being issued by the NS Fuehrungsstab der Wehrmacht. It should also be noted that Himmler, as Commander-in-Chief of the Home Army, has complete power over the training and indoctrination of Volks-grenadier Divisions which are now being formed either from new recruits or merely by renaming old divisions.

For the Luftwaffe, the NS Fuehrungsstab has started a special new weekly publication designed to provide the "basis for regular political education in the Luftwaffe". (Materials on NS Leadership for Unit Leaders - Beitraege fuer NS-Fuehrung fuer Einheitsfuehrer). The poor showing of many Luftwaffe ground units while in battle, as well as the low fighting morale of Luftwaffe personnel transferred to the ground forces, is no doubt a cause for special indoctrination measures. Goering himself took cognizance of the situation in an order dated 17 October 1944, in which he says : "In shameful flight, not only individual cowards but even entire troop formations and headquarters have given up their weapons to the enemy undestroyed". Propaganda to the Luftwaffe is reinforced by permission to impose, without obtaining previous consent from Goering, the death penalty for abandoning weapons.

Even the German garrison in ST NAZAIRE is not being neglected. A small newspaper Die Festung (The Fortress) is being issued every three or four days. Miniature size editions of Front und Heimat and Der Voelkische Beobachter are being flown to the pockets. Many captured orders and PWs interrogations indicate, likewise, intensified personal activities of NSF officers among the troops.

A captured order of a Divisional NSFO officer, dated 3 November 1944, indicates the line to be followed on the treatment of Allied military government in the occupied areas of Germany. After quoting General Eisenhower's occupation decree that "we come into Germany as conquerors" it omits the portion on the statement "but not as oppressors". It orders that "this statement, carried into action by the destruction of WALLENDORF and the setting up of an Anglo-American regime of terror in the occupied strips of Germany, will be the point of departure for an especially intensive campaign by the NS leadership".

The great difficulty in implementing such a directive is seen by the release of a propaganda item that "30 good-looking girls were compelled to wait on U.S. officers".

III. CONFIDENCE IN WEAPONS

More important for morale than concern with political issues is the German soldier's confidence in his own weapons and his estimate of Allied weapons. Small arms, machine gun and mortar fire has in the past months been the mainstay of German resistance in the eyes of the German PW. This is especially the case since the Luftwaffe has failed to appear and PWs will freely admit the numerical superiority of Allied artillery fire. Recently, some PWs have expressed a lack of confidence in these light automatic weapons - shortages, defective weapons, and a general feeling of inability of such weapons to withstand tank assaults. (This is not to be interpreted in any sense as an evaluation of the actual military situation but rather as the professed attitudes of some German soldiers after capture). Such statements have been made by PWs from various sectors, but there is no statistical evidence at hand to determine whether this is becoming an important attitude among German soldiers. It is quite likely that in part, dissatisfaction with their weapons is to be expected among soldiers who are seeking rationalizations for their defeat and capture.

From the First Army front, for example, it is reported that complaints about their weapons are frequent among German soldiers. In particular, stoppages of the new MP 44 and the new semi-automatic rifle are cited, as well as a shortage of machine guns. Anti-tank men frequently stated that their weapons are inadequate, and even faulty. The Panzerfaust seems also to be greatly feared due to the tremendous blast.

The situation is made even worse for the German soldier when he considers the Allied superiority of weapons. For him the effects of artillery and Jabos (fighter-bombers) are most demoralizing. The German soldier is more impressed by the large-scale employment of artillery and tanks than by any technical superiority of such weapons or by the thoroughness and determination with which they are employed. In fact, PWs continue to report that they are amazed that Allied troops do not push on more vigorously with their material superiority after initial successes have been achieved. According to some PWs, this delay usually results in offering Germans an opportunity to reorganize their defences. The claims of Allied propaganda to the effect that we are anxious to save lives and expend material seems to have little influence among German soldiers who interpret the tactics of our offensive action as a sign of weakness.

IV. PARTY CONTROL OVER WEHRMACHT

A recent important item on the ever increasing Nazi Party control of the Wehrmacht is the report of two key appointments by Himmler to the OKH of Party men to replace Wehrmacht officers. SS Obergruppenfuehrer August FRANK has taken over the HVA (Army Administrative Office) and SS Obergruppenfuehrer JUETTNER is the new Chief of the AHA (General Army Office), in place of General OLBRICHT, who was liquidated.

Drastic evidence of extension of political control over the officers corps even at the expense of military efficiency can be inferred from a Sauckel circular dated 25 October published in the Reichsarbeitsblatt in November which says : "The Fuehrer has ordered the rejuvenation of the officers corps. Hence a considerable number of older soldiers have been released. I attach special importance to their speedy and complete employment". The political significance of this "rejuvenation order" is enhanced when it is viewed in conjunction with the apparent shortage of officers in the Wehrmacht. (Evidence for the lack of Wehrmacht officers is supplied in part by a regimental order dated 2 November which states that "70,000 openings in the German Officers' Corps must be filled"; fewer officers are found among PWs, one statistical count shows the lowest ratio yet encountered in the Western campaign).

Reports still persist that the German High Command is disinterested in the Party's Volkssturm and is even not cooperating. In fact, German officers relate that the High Command has been preparing its own type of partisan warfare. Two almost contradictory plans have been reported from sources of undetermined reliability. In one plan thousands of snipers who will operate in conjunction with the regular army are to be left behind to inflict as many casualties as possible on the advancing Allied infantry. These units are allegedly being trained now in special Wehrmacht and SS camps. German military experts place great hopes in these snipers who are regular members of the armed forces. Plans are also reported that elaborate preparations have been made under the direction of the German General Staff for the organization of a post-occupational sabotage force. In this plan the Gestapo is cooperating by issuing false papers to four youths in each Kreis who will behave as if they were welcoming the Allied troops but will carry on German resistance. A possible prediction of the pattern to come is the announcement in the Westfaelische Landeszeitung (d.n.q.) that "the first companies of the Hansa-Dortmund Regiment of the Freikorps Sauerland have been formed". This is the first observed reference to the actual establishment of any organization with the title "Freikorps".

Distribution:

General McClure
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Major O'Brien, PWD, Intelligence, Rear, for further distribution in London.