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SUPREME HEADQUARTERS  
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE  
Psychological Warfare Division  
INTELLIGENCE SECTION

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JANOWITZ

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TO : Chief of Division,  
FROM : Chief, Intelligence Section.

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE # 11

PART I - GERMAN HOME FRONT

A. OCCUPIED AREAS

The Town of STOLBERG: "The results of this whole 'Aryanizing' swindle and finagling? Along came the Nazis and took over the factories and 'Aryanized' them. Then came the war and the factories piled up paper profits, while the machines wore out and could not be replaced. Then came the Allied bombers and knocked out the factories. Then came the Wehrmacht and looted what was left. Now there is nothing but ashes and ruins and rubble. Herr Z. shook his head at it all".

Thus spake not Zarathustra but a certain Herr Z. of AACHEN, a man who ought to know all about "this whole Aryanizing swindle", for as an official Treuhaender (custodian of Jewish property) he helped to put it across. His brief sketch of life under the Third Reich can be filled in by reports on the town of STOLBERG, which present a fairly representative picture of what happened in the communities of Western Germany during the final phase of Nazi control. The majority of people remember this as a period when everybody with a uniform seemed to be ordering about everybody without a uniform, and the result was a "buzzing, blooming confusion". It was never quite clear to the people, who was to go when and who was to stay where. The Schanzarbeiten orders were regarded by some as a huge "pain", by others as an absurd "busy-work" campaign. In either case characteristic German efficiency was remarkable by its absence. Occasionally the police, knowing they could never find them by day, would rout out their next quota of workers in the middle of the night. At this point in interrogations numerous instances are cited by the natives, sometimes rather bitterly, of Schanzarbeiter turning up at the designated time and place, waiting an hour or more for some official to appear with directions, then disgustingly returning home. One day the HJ assembled the 14-year old group as "volunteers" and marched them off to "dig, dig, dig". Like Snow-White's little dwarfs, the children started off on the day's work whistling gaily. When they were locked into a barracks that night, however, they suddenly remembered that Mama had said to be home before dark. They raised such a racket that the man in charge opened the doors, whereupon all the kids scattered. Some were enticed back with Wurst sandwiches, but even these ran away home again after the Wurst was eaten.

Similar confusion was caused by evacuation. Most informants agree that no order for evacuation was issued by the government, but that local Party officials tried to enforce it on their own (this is an interesting opinion, since Gauleiter GROHE did, in fact, issue a firm evacuation order). Various notices were posted directing women, children, and old people to leave on special trains. Usually, however, one arrived at the platform to find the train loaded with Party officials, their wives and families. The result, according to the M.G. officer in STOLBERG, was that only one-third of the population evacuated - these mainly the Party people. About one-third moved into other nearby communities temporarily or took to the woods - these mainly the people who feared remaining in the town while it was involved in combat operations. The final one-third remained in town throughout - these mainly the people who, for a variety of reasons, considered evacuation a less desirable alternative than remaining under Allied occupation.

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The M.G. estimate seems reliable, for the figure of 8,000 is roughly one-third of the estimated normal population of 25,000. The fact that the Nazi evacuated while the timid and inert remained behind was reflected in the earliest interrogations conducted in STOLBERG, for the chief impression gained was of a people completely overcome by apathy and inertia, unwilling to express an opinion and unable to take a step in any direction unless specifically ordered by authority. The main fact confronting the people was simply that for them the war was over, and the most important meaning of this fact was that they did not have to strain day after day either to obey the Schanzarbeiten and Evacuation orders or to evade them. As the shock of occupation wore off, and the Military Government policy of "self-help" began to make increasing demands upon them, the citizenry bestirred themselves. Food conditions in STOLBERG were probably worse than in other German towns. Since food was (and is) the most pressing problem, a communal kitchen was started, which dispenses one liter of thick soup and a half-pound of bread per person per day for 0,20 RM. The water supply and sewage-disposal plants were put into operation. The local hospital, staffed by Germans, began to function and even the two local banks opened their doors for business. While much remains to be done in STOLBERG, a recent study reveals that the wheel has come nearly full circle from the complete confusion preceding occupation and the neurological near-paralysis immediately following occupation to current aggressive self-assertiveness even in political matters. [Of the 38 residents polled, a majority of the men favored an independent RHINELAND, while a substantial proportion of the women opposed it. A large majority opposed the Catholic Church playing a role in politics; the population is itself mainly Catholic.] The local government under American occupation was not regarded as fairly representative, chiefly because of inadequate representation of the workers and lower middle classes. [Because of the limited number polled thus far these results should not be given high credence.]

This highly condensed version of what has happened to the population of STOLBERG during the past four months does not apply in all details to other towns in the occupied areas (nor, more particularly, is it a reliable guide to what we may find in areas not yet occupied, where the Party has had a better opportunity to organize and execute its plans). But it does represent, in general outline, the pattern which life has followed in several other towns, now under Allied control, from the last weeks before we moved in till the present time. Even in AACHEN, be it noted, which less than a month ago impressed most observers as a "ghost town" with a beaten and dispirited population, there are already indications of a reawakened political interest. The local administration, which Military Government turned to as a temporary expedient to start the process of "self-help" going, is in the hands of a Catholic group (Zentrum Party). Protest from organized groups further to the Left (Democrats, Social-Democrats, Communists) has already been heard and it may be anticipated that these will grow louder.

First reports from the 7th Army Southern front picture a reception on the whole quite warm, though perhaps with a certain Alsatian reserve. In part, it seems, this may be attributed to Allied failure to provide flags. In STRASBOURG, the reception seems to have been magnificent. A crowd of Reichs-deutsch civilians were being marched off by the local Resistance members, while a local inhabitant gave our interrogator warning about how to handle the Germans: "Be careful when you get to Germany. Mistrust them all. Ruecksichtlos muessen Sie sein, ruecksichtlos! (You must be ruthless, ruthless!) Hah! They are all Nazis. They still have this crazy faith in Hitler. A German regiment will march 24 hours on a cup of cold coffee. Your men wouldn't do that -- the English wouldn't do it".

## B. ENEMY AREAS

### (1) The German Combat Zone

Although the Party has been improving its organization of life just behind the lines, there is some evidence that the problems they faced during the last

weeks of STOLBERG have not yet been completely solved nor, in the nature of the case, are they likely to be. The need to use all available manpower for industrial production, agriculture, digging, and Volkssturm is complicated by at least three major factors - Allied bombing, transport shortages, and evacuation.

The effect of bombing is indicated by a report from 2 British Army, which includes the following P/W account : In the village of MANHEIM, children from the age of 10 were required to participate in the digging, along with their elders. While working near the railway tracks, these people came under a strong Allied attack upon the railroad line. When the smoke had cleared, three of the younger children were found dead. This incident caused great excitement in the village and the people cursed the Party for ordering little children to work on military installations. The next morning families refused to send their children to the community digging, whereupon the Nazis sent armed guards to collect them. On the following day, according to P/W, the Ortsgruppenleiter of the village found a pile of discarded Nazi insignias, banners, armbands and uniforms in front of his door.

But the effect of Allied bombing, by itself, is not the greatest problem the Nazis have to face. Inadequate transportation and evacuation are, for them, even graver problems. For here the Nazis are faced with a dilemma which cannot be solved by slipping between the horns. Among the reasons why the Party insists upon evacuation, particularly in the RUHR, is the impossibility of supplying the requirements of a large population with the inadequate transport facilities available. But the very same transport shortage is the chief reason for the failures of evacuation to date. It has not been possible to organize an efficient evacuation with the number of trains available for this purpose, and since the Parteibonzen have usually grabbed the available transport for their families and belongings, the others have had to go by foot (occasionally by truck) with an allowance of 30 lbs. for personal belongings. With the prospect of being stranded on the road and strafed, or reaching a strange and hostile town where the hungry stomach rumbles in tune with the Allied bombers (these are the alternatives presented by many who actually evaded evacuation for these reasons), it is natural that many are reluctant to follow the inspirational orders of Gauleiter GROHE. The result has been conflict, and tales have been legion of SS men forcing people out at the point of a gun, of SA men dragging kicking women by the hair out of evacuation trucks, of soldiers fighting for or against the civilian population (according to their personal views of evacuation, for the most part).

The outcome has been, in most cases to date, at least partial failure of evacuation. There has even been an unconfirmed report that in the town of GANGLT, near the Dutch border, the failure of evacuation was complete. The Party is cognizant of, and clearly concerned about, its failure adequately to cope with the situation. Its solution seems to be the forced evacuation of surplus population in areas behind the lines before they are directly threatened by the Allied advance. This summary described last week the first such order in Western Germany, issued at ESSEN. The National Zeitung for GELSENKIRCHEN indicates preparation for a similar order in that town. The paper writes (23 November) that "it cannot be tolerated any longer" that women and children should crowd workers out of shelters and "the authorities have decided to clear the town" of all non-workers. In spite of this decision, however, the authorities did not order evacuation. Non-workers were "advised not to wait till compulsory measures are taken", but to take advantage of the "twenty extra trains with luggage vans" scheduled to leave in the next week. However, if there were extra trains to take evacuees out, those same trains could bring in enough food and supplies to permit them to remain where they are. The Party's hesitation to order compulsory evacuation is probably based, in consideration of the powerful resistance factors, upon doubt of its ability to make the order stick, plus doubt of just what exactly would be gained if it did succeed in evacuating the aged, the infirm, and women with children.

An illustration of evacuation difficulties, which throws additional light on the marked hostility toward the Army among civilians in Western Germany, comes from HOENGEN (near GELLENKIRCHEN). It is reported that evacuation of that town was enforced by a Luftwaffe ground unit acting in cooperation with an ex-Mayor of a neighboring town. Whether the unit acted upon its own initiative or upon request from the civil authority is not clear. The Party obviously was responsible for the order, but it was the uniformed soldier whom the civilian felt pushing him about. The Oberleutnant who commanded the unit is said to have threatened to shoot hostages and to have allowed each soldier 33 lbs. of loot, including shoes taken off the feet of civilians. Although such an incident must be considered very unusual if true, it does tally with numerous civilian accounts of looting and "swinishness" on the part of military personnel and indicates the basis of the fairly widespread reaction against the Wehrmacht.

ESSEN continues its loud protest against the failure of the Reich authorities to provide adequate post-raid assistance. The subject this time is shortage of motor transport and fuel, and the tone adopted by the National Zeitung has a "radical Nazi" flavor, which may be part of the present campaign to re-emphasize the "socialist" aspect of the NS program for the benefit of industrial workers in the West. It is claimed that the fuel allocation based on pre-war consumption is unfair, because ESSEN as a workers' town had relatively few motor vehicles. This is responsible for the shortage of essential foods. The fact that the new local Traffic Commissioner is also the local Reichsbahn President will not help the town get needed vehicles, which alone can "find their way through the rubble". On the other hand, the paper claims, the middle-class merchant seems to have no trouble - one notices many trucks transporting beer instead of bricks.

A German officer P/W who visited BIELEFELD and KOBLENZ during November described them both as ghost towns, almost completely destroyed. In BIELEFELD, his home town, the main railroad station has been knocked out; there are no bridges, theaters, or hotels; electricity is not available at all; water is secured from hydrants. Everything is a shambles and the people curse everyone indiscriminately. And yet large portions of the population still remain, living and trading in cellars. In KOBLENZ, except that some bridges are believed to be still standing and more of the population has left, people are in identical straits.

From the Southern sector of the German combat zone comes fairly impressive evidence of applied "scorched-earth" and "last-ditch" tactics. From 3 US Army comes a report of Volkssturm groups, wearing red and yellow armbands, encountered in house-to-house fighting in SAARLAUTERN. During the retreat through this zone, the Wehrmacht is said to have burned a small built-up area a part of its delaying action. An intelligence summary from 6 A.G. (26 November) reports "definite indications that systematic destructions have been ordered and carried out in the GERARDMER area. It is not known, as yet, whether the orders emanated from Divisional Commanders or from higher echelons". These incidents constitute the first serious application of formerly much-advertised Nazi plans to make every city a Stalingrad. It may well be that the Party wishes to test the effectiveness of a scorched-earth policy here before applying it to more highly-industrialized and densely-populated areas.

## (2) The Interior

From an excellent source comes confirmation of earlier evidence that Hitler's Children are not all docile little Nazis. In one aircraft factory (WESERFLUG) staffed by 850 apprentices, mainly Hitlerjugend members, it was impossible to maintain "proper NS discipline". Morality was practically non-existent. The youngsters stole with complete abandon - even opening government mail and removing all contents of value. Their sexual appetites seemed abnormal to a Nazi official who held a supervisory position over them. His objection was perhaps less to the amorality than to its lack of proper organization, for this anarchic irresponsibility frequently took the form of

political "indiscipline". The official complains that windows were forever being chalked up with slogans like "Heil Stalin !" and "Up with Bolshevism !".

The same tendency is prominent in the Youth movement called "Edelweiss-Piraten" and similar oppositional groups. The movement seems to have drawn its inspiration largely from the romantic lore of Karl May and American Wild West stories, and in the beginning devoted itself largely to the romantic tradition of Wanderjahre which German youth is heir to (recall, in this connection, the lines of the favorite song of the miller's apprentice "Das Wandern ist des Mullers Lust ... Das muess ein schlechter Mueller sein, dem niemals fiel das Wandern ein")\*. This attracted the unfavorable attention of the Party, which frowned upon "the wild camping and hiking of juveniles outside the HJ", and insisted that "special importance must be attached to the supervision of associations of juveniles under 18 in cliques". Party caution was indeed justified in this case, for recently these groups have taken a slightly more serious political turn. Although the numerous tales of Edelweiss sabotage and street-fights and armed groups must be heavily discounted, there is no reason to doubt that some such incidents have occurred. The greater danger to the Party is that this primitive anarchism, expressed in such forms as desertion from trench-digging, undermines the habit of automatic obedience which is fundamental to the morale structure of the Nazi state. A Party Chancery order (8 September) takes cognizance of this situation in a report on one Youth Labor Camp whose members "no longer conform to our conception of what is meant by faith". On the basis of present information it is not clear what use these groups may have for the Allies. In some areas the leadership is reported to be Communist; in others the dominant tone is set by former Catholic Youth leaders. It is highly probable that the Nazis have already begun to infiltrate their own agents among these groups. In the absence of convincing evidence, final judgment should be suspended until the fall, or imminent fall, of COLOGNE or DUESSELDORF, two cities which seem to be centers of the movement in Western Germany. (See P.W.E. special report on "Edelweiss" of 4 December).

The problem of foreign workers is again an extremely complex dilemma for which the Nazis have found no completely satisfactory solution. The position at present dictates an attitude of dignified benevolence toward the foreign workers. Orders have been issued instructing the population on how to conduct itself "properly" in relation to the foreigners. But this does not answer the basic problem, which appears most emphatically wherever Allied troops approach. Here the problem of how to make full use of manpower is complicated by the fear that the foreign workers will slow down, sabotage, create disturbances, or take off for our lines. In some cases, as our troops come nearer, the Germans have tried to keep the workers content by adding an occasional bit of marmalade and margerine to the meager diet, particularly of Russian laborers. The lack of subtlety is said to have provoked much laughter, and in the end the workers have taken off anyway when the opportunity presented itself. In most cases, therefore, the Party has been forced to order priority evacuation for foreign workers (for details see special report of P & PW, 12 A.G. 4 December). This has reduced the already inadequate evacuation facilities available for the indigenous population and has deprived the Reich of an important source of manpower in places where it was badly needed.

Nazi pressure upon the Officers Corps continues, as in the past, to encourage speculation about "Where will it all lead ?" The Party revealed this week that it is releasing equipment from its own stores for the Volkssturm, but apparently not for the Army. This must be regarded as a serious blow to unit commanders, who have been short all types of essential equipment for months. The failure of supplies has led to unauthorized looting, requisition and purchase by officers and men in Reich territory. In these circumstances Army officers are likely to take a dim view of special Party supplies for the VS, and considerable credence attaches to stories that officers have been actively diverting supplies (particularly arms and ammunition) intended for the VS to their own use. Overt pressure on officers to proffer their services, and the services of their wives, to the Party suggests that those who fail to comply

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\* "The miller's lad bursts with wanderlust ... He'd be a sorry sort indeed never to have felt the wanderlust".

will be held suspect. It is not altogether certain that such pressure will create a warmer feeling toward the Party among recalcitrant officers.

The main Nazi propaganda efforts indicate that the following currents of feeling are strong among the civilian population by continued attempts to disprove (a) that the Mongol invasion and other great catastrophes of the past are "small by comparison" with the "bomb terror" and losses at the fronts (b) that the question "Is it all worth while?" is now too insistent to be silenced by attributing it to enemy propaganda (c) that feelings of "guilt" (and specifically of Nazi war-guilt) are justified by the facts. A special effort is being made to prevent the "alienation of workers from the Party", mainly in the West, by stressing the "socialist" face of the NS program. It is also clear that manpower difficulties and the oil shortage are subjects of common gossip, though not of official propaganda.

## PART II - Wehrmacht Morale

### I. Stiff Resistance

Morale reports of German troops captured in the Belfort-Mülhausen drive by the First French Army indicate, on the basis of the examination of several thousand cases, that in practically every instance, the Germans fought as long as resistance was physically possible. There were practically no desertions, according to Divisional G-2 reports. Only one case was found where a unit surrounded by the French gave up after having been told of the situation by a P/W sent back to the German pocket as an emissary.

When ordered to launch the main counter-attack designed to sever French communications, they did so without ever questioning the order, for faith in the "Fuehrung" was strong. In fact, most of the men and officers interrogated felt that the German counter-attack was well planned.

Many of these Ps/W stated that they now realized that their efforts were in vain and that they would not have fought with such determination, had they been aware of the overwhelming superiority of Allied equipment. The circumstances of capture reveal the effects of Allied superiority of material. Ps/W confessed that no matter how often they may have heard about Allied strength, they never believed it until they saw for themselves. As on other sectors of the front, they were particularly impressed by the number of tanks employed and the concentrated power of artillery fire. (It is not unlikely that these German troops believed the French units facing them would not be as heavily armed as British and American units.)

This general tone of stiffer morale is reported from other sectors. The 12th A.G., P&PW, states that a "higher proportion of Ps/W than ever before in the last 2 months are expressing belief in victory." Their optimism is based on secret weapons yet to be employed, and on a frequently expressed fear that defeat ultimately means destruction of their homeland. The 89th Infantry Division and the 10 SS Division are two cases in point. Despite the heavy losses incurred by both units, their morale is unusually high. This is partly due to the fact that these units contain many seasoned troops who refuse to admit defeat. Few complaints about shortages of food, clothing or ammunition were encountered.

### 2. Trained Waffen SS Replacements.

The ability of the Wehrmacht to maintain its fighting effectiveness is seen, in one respect, in the continued functioning of the Waffen SS training program for new recruits. Despite the fact that an important sector of German youth are disaffected, production of fanatical Waffen SS replacements up to a recent date is reported.

The training program, according to a Canadian Intelligence Report, begins with a series of pep talks by veteran Waffen SS fighters to members of the Hitler Youth, after which they were given an opportunity to volunteer. They were told that every Hitler boy who claims to be faithful to his Fuehrer and fatherland would naturally sign. After two or three weeks they were called up not for military service but for patrol duties after dark in the streets of the town in which they were stationed. At the age of 17<sup>1</sup>/<sub>2</sub> they were introduced into military training in an atmosphere which was more a Hitler Youth one than a military one. No contact with civilians was allowed. After this preliminary course they joined a regular Waffen SS unit and received

their final military training including manoeuvres up to the regimental scale and many route marches with heavy packs.

Political indoctrination was as thorough as military training. Two or three times per week indoctrination meetings were held. The young SS man was trained also to speak in public and to enable him to do so, he had to address the men of his squad or platoon on political subjects. As a result, such recruitment and training produced young soldiers who believe unwaveringly in Hitler and victory and who fight with great determination.

### 3. Looting and Plundering:

Captured orders and statements by Ps/W clearly establish that looting and plundering by German soldiers have become a problem of concern to German divisional and higher commanders. The fact that the battle line has been on German soil for some time has hardly affected the situation. Moreover, officers frequently seem to have failed to take steps to prevent their men from looting and even at times themselves indulged in such practices. Field Marshal Keitel took cognizance of the situation in a statement quoted by an order of the 559 Volks Grenadier Division, dated 16 November 1944, in which he says that "superior officers, far from interfering, themselves took part in these outrages." The purely military basis for opposition is seen in the reasons given for condemning looting: (1) It removes goods needed for war, (2) it undermines discipline, (3) it shatters confidence of the people in the Army.

As a result, elaborate rules have been issued to prevent looting, including in some units imposition of the death penalty. For example, one captured order announces that all unit leaders will search through the quarters and baggage of their men of all ranks for plundered articles, particularly in the cases of those returning from leave or official trips. Men suspected of dishonest acquisitions will be court-martialed. Troops are to be instructed once a month that the penalty for plundering will be death. "The present condition of soldiers entering every house and taking the articles left behind which are not nailed down, has to be stopped immediately."

In this connection, the absence of a scorched earth policy continues in general except for certain military installations. The High Command and the Nazis both seem reluctant to undertake the responsibility for using such defensive measures. However, definite indications are reported of systematic destruction being ordered and carried out in the Gerardmer area on the First French Army Front. It is not known as yet whether the orders emanated from divisional commanders or higher echelons. On the other hand, an interesting document was captured, signed by General Kniess, Commanding 85th Army Corps (Belfort area) and distributed during the beginning of November. In the course of this, Kniess says: "The French population must be shown by our conduct that although we are in our sixth year of war, the German soldier does not harm civilian lives or property. "...We must leave to the civilian population, whose help is still indispensable to us, all food reserves available..." The General's overpowering soldierly pride in even the retreat is seen in the statement "the poorer we are, the more we want to fight properly and not like pick-pockets."

### 4. Causes for Desertion:

The continued depressing effects caused by the hardships of frontline duty and the dim hope of victory seems to have failed to increase active desertions to any great extent. As in the past, some strong longstanding ideological or personal reason for opposing Nazism is needed to induce a soldier to face the

risks involved in deserting. (Conscript soldiers and Austrians are more prone to accept these risks.) The defeatist soldier, who is just fed up with the whole business, fails to find the strength to desert. While his soldier's oath is of some importance, more significant is his simple feeling of loyalty to other Germans. The danger of crossing the battleground, the elaborate system of German controls, and the fear of reprisals against his family, make the task seem to him all but impossible.

Officer desertions until recently were almost unknown in the German Army. Recently some cases have been reported. Among senior NCO's the reluctance to desert is hardly less strong than among officers. A strong sense of responsibility for the welfare of the men directly under their command does, however, weigh heavily on these men. As a result, cases continue to occur where NCO's took the initiative to save their men from carrying out pointless orders by leading them into active desertion.

Desertion by the ordinary soldier is often the result of clever tricks, great imagination and ingenuity. Soldiers desert while on furlough. Those who reside in towns near the combat zone return to their homes to hide in civilian clothes and await the arrival of Allied troops. Desertions from hospitals are reported. Other popular techniques include: volunteering for patrol, getting lost on purpose, remaining behind during a retreat etc. But the colourfulness of the individual stories of desertion should not lead to any overstatement of their frequency.

Reports of undetermined reliability speak of the desertion inward toward the centre of Germany where deserters live underground in cities. Cologne is said to be a centre of such activity. One source even claims that the EDELWEISS in this city is protecting and assisting deserters. It is likely that such activities are extremely limited and of no real consequence. Desertion to his home town, where the soldier has his personal contacts, seems more likely to be expected.

##### 5. Volkssturm.

Little evidence has been received on actual Volkssturm fighting since the battle of Metz. Volkssturm men have been encountered in the attack on Saarlautern. A P/W reports units of the Volkssturm as having been seen in the forest east of Düren where they were organized on a regimental basis, with SS and SA personnel as officers. (This had previously been reported on the Eastern Front. Captured documents from the offices of the Nazi Party at Strasbourg throw some light on the organization of the Volkssturm in that area. Two Kreisstabführer reported to the Gauleiter, Deutscher Volkssturm Gauführungsstab, Strasbourg, on the formation of Volkssturm Battalions in their districts (Villingen and Westheim). Both battalions numbered about 400 each, made up of 3 companies. Each company was drawn from one or several Ortsgruppen. The Stadt- and Landwacht of the district Villingen were absorbed by the Volkssturm. One company was equipped as a ski company.

The general feeling of the uselessness of the Volkssturm as a military force still continues among nearly all captured Ps/W except the most fanatic Nazis. There is no evidence to indicate that these last ditch tactics have generated in the minds of most German soldiers any new antagonism against the Nazi Party. It is received as another defense measure which was to be expected, but which will produce few military results. Allied claims that the formation of the Volkssturm is a device for extending Nazi Party control over an important part of the civilian population do not seem to have occurred to the ordinary soldier. The thought that Volkssturm will strengthen the Nazi Party's hold over the home-front and thereby prolong the war, is almost completely absent.

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