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SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division
INTELLIGENCE SECTION

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TO : Chief of Division,
FROM : Chief, Intelligence Section.

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE # 14

PART I - GERMAN HOME FRONT

A. OCCUPIED AREAS

Reports from inside Germany, though still scanty, do indicate that the counter-attack has not made the war more popular with Germans under Allied rule, nor does it seem to have changed their opinion of the outcome. To many of these people, who long ago tired of the war and gave it up for lost as far back as STALINGRAD, the counter-attack mainly prolongs a painful process. Then, too, there is an element of immediate personal fear. Although no German town has yet been retaken, the residents of the general MONSCHAU-AACHEN area are once again within looting and shooting distance of the Wehrmacht. There is a clear and present danger that the Wehrmacht may take over - a prospect which they cannot but view with alarm, in consequence of the recent Nazi propaganda of terror against "collaborators". Any German in any town can be considered, by definition, a collaborator: his presence convicts him of disobeying evacuation orders, thereby defying the Reich and placing himself under the authority of its enemy. The threat is particularly acute to those who have served as officials under Military Government, and it is against these that Nazi threats have been specifically directed. There can be little doubt that should the Nazis return, some of them would be killed as "examples". One reporter noted that "most were alarmed at the possibility of reprisals" but despite their fears there has been no tendency to evacuate. A case in point is the Mayor of AACHEN, "obviously very frightened", who said that he and his associates were risking their lives by staying on but were glad to do so because it was the only way to rebuild Germany.

These remarks do not bespeak an undying loyalty to the Allies: the collaborators are, perforce, committed to us for their own safety. But it is notable that fear engendered by the counter-attack, despite lack of news and the spread of false rumors, has not led to panic - and this is due largely to a sense of confidence in Allied stability and strength. People turn to those in Allied uniform for reassurance (with the question "The Nazis won't come back?") and guidance. In WUERSELEN population and officials alike remain cooperative: on 18 December some Nazi records and files were handed over to Allies authorities; on the 20th a Wehrmacht deserter was turned in; three German parachutists who came through the town were reported by the citizens; the German police have faithfully carried out their duties. A report from AACHEN, HERZOGENRATH, and ALSDORF comments: "Military Government has not experienced any major difficulties as a result of the enemy's proximity. The people behave toward Americans as always ... In the occupied towns there is confidence that the Allies will be able to deal with the German attacks".

This reflects only a limited success for German propaganda on the counter-attack to the occupied areas. The line that this is an all-out attack "to drive the enemy from the soil of the Reich" is echoed by a response of uncertainty, but not assent, among Germans under our control. The terrorist line against "collaborators" has caused fright among officials, but has had no disruptive effect: collaborators, knowing full well what the Nazis plan for them, have no alternative but to continue collaborating. No tendency to

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run has been shown, but the desire to run would in any case be frustrated by the fact of no place to go and no way of getting there. The war of nerves has thus had the limited value of "nuisance raids", primarily designed to intensify the natural feeling of insecurity in newly-occupied territories.

In ALSACE, particularly, has this been the case. Simultaneously with the counter-attack in the 12 A.G. sector, an intensive rumor campaign was started in the 6 A.G. sector. Whispers were heard in ALSACE that U.S. and French troops had suffered very heavy losses north-west of COLMAR and around MULHOUSE; that MULHOUSE itself was cut off; that two German spearheads were advancing westward from the RHINE, led by very powerful new tanks (possibly a reference to the Jagdpanther, which has been in operation for some time). These rumors have been supplemented by "plants" in newscasts over the Swiss radio, from which the area mainly gets its news, concerning OKW strategic plans in ALSACE and false announcements of German gains in the pocket. This concentration of "plants" on Swiss Radio, which in the past has generally been reliable, moved an Intelligence Officer in the area to remark: "Seldom have so many mouthpieces been found, as during the past two weeks, to relay the most untrustworthy bits of rumor and misinformation".

This subversive propaganda, stressing the enemy's strength in the ALSACE area and his intention to return, ties in with propaganda directed straight at the Alsatians by German radio. A broadcast over the SAARBRUECKEN and STUTTGART stations (23 December) reported the formation of an "Alsatian Freedom Front" claiming that thousands have joined already. The return of the Germans is here identified with the "liberation" of ALSACE, and those Alsatian Volksgenossen who are now under "the harsh yoke of alien domination" are told to: "Bear your hard lot with calm confidence! You are not unprotected. Everyone who harms you or your property must know that he will one day have to answer for it and will be punished by merciless judges". This theme recurs in another report, from Switzerland, according to which the Records Division of the Foreign Office has been instructed by the Foreign Minister to collect, sort, and prepare for publication, all documents on cruelties committed by Anglo-American forces.

Information from psychological warfare and civil affairs sources indicates that the sturdy residents of ALSACE may not be so glad to see the Nazis as they think, that the Nazi propagandists may indeed be whistling in the dark at this point. The opinion is held by every observer in the field that the complete revulsion of feeling against the Germans has provided France with the golden opportunity to make friends and influence people through the ALSACE-LORRAINE areas. And slightly north, in the LORRAINE area, ECAD reports: "the consensus of opinion is that Germany is doomed and the sooner she is defeated the sooner reconstruction will begin".

In other occupied areas a certain administrative vigot was evident. A conference held at HERZOGENRATH attended by M.G. officials, 5 burgermeisters of nearby towns, and the newly appointed Landrat of AACHEN considered problems of inter-regional food distribution raised by circulation restrictions. This conference was regarded as a step toward attaining over-all food control on the Regierungsbezirk level. At a meeting of some 40 local farmers, called by the Burgermeister of MERKSTEIN (7 December) "planned agriculture" was introduced. Each farmer was given a quota of potatoes which he is required to sell to the Gemeinde, plus an additional amount of butter fats to be rationed solely to miners. All sugar beets are to be collected and stored by the farmers until a processing plant is uncovered by Army troops. An interesting arrangement was made concerning the land of evacuated peasants, which authorized those who remained to work the land of those who had gone. If the evacuee returned, the man who worked his land would receive half of the harvest; if not, he would receive it all.

A summary of the activity of M.G. courts in the First U.S. Army area during the last week of November presents several items of interest : 2 General, 4 Intermediate, and 6 Summary M.G. courts were in session. Trials involved 88 persons. Of 102 charges laid, 5 cases involved breach of circulation orders, 7 involved unauthorized entry, 6 each involved looting and harboring enemy soldiers. Of the total, 20 resulted in findings of "not guilty".

Among the hazards of life in the occupied areas are the mines and booby-traps left behind by the Germans. One report from WUERSELEN reports : "It is hazardous to walk along the sidewalks and fatal to enter many houses. Only the streets have been cleared of mines. Daily some German civilian gets blown up. Since the occupation on 21 November, WUERSELEN has suffered an average of about three casualties a day, some of them fatal." This is a particularly bad case, for during the 8-week battle for the town the Wehrmacht had time to sow mines and booby-traps everywhere. Even vegetable gardens have been mined and food now lies rotting while the hungry inhabitants dare not pick it up. American troops, including their sappers, have moved forward and the half-dozen soldiers left behind are occupied with more pressing matters. Resentment is directed mainly against the Wehrmacht, for it is clear to the residents that the Allied forces must give priority to combat requirements. A young Communist, who volunteered for the unpaid job of minesweeper, helped interrogators pick their way among the infernal engines cursing the Nazis and insisting that not one American life should be lost undoing this harm done by them to their own people.

B. ENEMY AREAS

(1) The German Combat Zone

(1) An unusual situation in the small town of ANDERNACH, on the west bank of the Rhine a short way north of KONLENZ, is described by one P/W. Unlike the larger cities of the Combat Zone, life has remained fairly comfortable for the people of ANDERNACH. The few bombs dropped on the town fell mostly in the fields, and in a recent letter P/W was informed it had been declared an "international hospital town". The food ration is quite sufficient, although there is sometimes a delay of three days on butter and fats, but no Black Market is operating. Electricity, water, and gas services are functioning. True, P/W's household was increased from 5 to 7 by refugees from COLOGNE (most refugees are from that city said P/W), but ANDERNACH is not crowded and no evacuation orders have been issued. Some people want the Wehrmacht to quit, but are certainly not hostile to it. [The Party is censured for most difficulties and particularly for false promises, but HITLER is not blamed, nor is the local Ortsgruppenleiter unpopular.] Pfarrer Adolf ROSCH was arrested several times for political preaching and people thought he should keep quiet. P/W and his family do not listen to Allied radio and none of his acquaintances admits to listening.

One inclines to the view that conditions of life and opinions much like these are to be found in many small towns throughout Germany which have been bypassed by the war. Elsewhere in the Combat Zone, the "strenuous life" continues under conditions less pacific. The terrific morale effects of sustained mass-bombing, as distinguished from sporadic bombing which frequently has little effect and sometimes even strengthens determination to stick it out, is shown again by the evidence from COLOGNE. The Koelnische Zeitung (8 December) shows how eagerly the bombed west seizes on promises of relief from air attack, saying "The west listens to every word promising it relief from its most torturing pest, i.e. the enemy air terror". Quoting SPEER and GANZENMUELLER's recent promises the paper says : "There may still be delays in date, our times of suffering are not yet over, but the day of relief is not far off." An attack upon this attitude is made by the N.Z. of OBERHAUSEN, 29 November, which considers it dangerous that rumors should circulate saying that a definite date has been given for the end of the air war. The paper writes that evacuation will continue, all rumors to the contrary notwithstanding.

"Nothing is more erroneous than to operate with dates, and nothing is sillier than to infer that one can safely stay at home during the short time it will last till things are all right".

From COLOGNE, too, come further reports of riots and disturbances, due primarily to attempts to force evacuation of the city. Their date is uncertain and they probably refer to the disturbed period in October about which so many stories have been received. While the details of such stories are always dubious, the circulation of the tale is a further indication of the extent of public reaction against bombing and evacuation measures in COLOGNE. One slightly new version tells of the killing of 4 SA men by civilians : in reprisal 50 men from the 16-60 age group, picked at random as hostages, were shot. A P/W repeats the story, told of many German towns, of slogans written in crayon on the pavements alongside devastated streets : "Das haben wir unseren Fuehrer zu verdanken" (We can thank our Fuehrer for this). Another P/W, resident of COLOGNE, tells that the EDELWEISS have been very active and have taken advantage of the opportunity to secure arms by enlisting in the Volkssturm. He quoted a recent letter from his wife to the effect that several Politische Leiter had been shot, presumably by members of the EDELWEISS. The same P/W claims to have seen the bodies of eleven civilians hanging on a gallows in the EHRENFELD section, a story which in most previous versions counted twelve corpses. Another P/W, from DORTMUND, who claimed membership in EDELWEISS, said that the group was quite strong in the surrounding villages. All the boys he knew in it were, or had been, HJ members and their aim was quite definitely to cause trouble for the HJ. He told of one case in COLOGNE where two policemen who tried to stop a fight were killed by the EDELWEISS boys. P/W felt sure that the organization was directed by older men, although he did not know such leaders. He explained his dislike of the regime quite clearly - mentioning the abolition of personal thinking, the suppression of political liberties, and similar cogent points. Interrogators felt, on the basis of his articulate political opinions, that "some educational work was done in this organization".

From another source an anti-Nazi P/W from COLOGNE gives an interesting list of Black Market prices in that city in July : 500 grams coffee for 600 RM; a single cigarette for 1 - 1.50 RM; 500 grams butter for 80 RM; and Toilet Soap for 15 RM. The same P/W also read in the Westdeutsche Beobachter that "Americans had confiscated all food supplies in occupied areas and left the civilian population to shift for itself". The population of JUELICH was estimated to be 13,000 at the end of October by a P/W. He reports that people grumble about being constantly stopped on the street for identification, and that Party functionaries have arrived from THUERINGEN (those from JUELICH having departed) and instituted a more rigorous system of controls. The citizens do not blame the Wehrmacht for evacuation orders, but sympathize with the soldiers and place all blame on the Goldfasanen. He claims that they are anxiously awaiting the Americans and that Burgermeister KINTZEN has said that he will surrender the city without a battle. ECAD cites a report (18 December) that a group of 1,050 workers of all nationalities has been sheltered in a paper mill in JUELICH since 4 December 1944.

A P/W from MUENCHEN-GLADBACH, carrying German passion for precision rather far, estimated destruction there at 97%. At any rate we can safely assume there has been considerable damage. The town was an important textile center with a normal population estimated at 140,000 before the bombings. The P/W who was granted emergency leave when his own home was completely destroyed, reports that curses upon HITLER and his regime for not giving in were frequently heard. A tag to recent stories of wholesale transfer of industry from the RUHR is a cautious report that the Rheinmetall-Borsig Works at DUESSELDORF have started transferring the machinery, engineers, and workers of several departments to VOHRINKEL, about 15 K.M. to the east. Local dispersal of this type is likely because of the relative ease of housing the workers, many of whom could still live in their own homes. Two Russian Ps/W tell of the panic that gripped the border areas of Germany during the swift approach of Allied armies in September. The feeling that the end was imminent was aggravated by soldiers asking civilians to give them civvy clothes, by rumors that the government had proclaimed the Rhine region untenable and had decided to establish the MLR east of the Rhine. The order for civilian evacuation confirmed popular belief and for a time "chaos was complete".

All foreign workers in the EIFEL area were evacuated on foot to KOBLENZ, where they were to build fortifications in depth. They stayed in KOBLENZ only one day or so, after which they were returned to EIFEL, formed into labor companies to build fortifications and sent to the LUXEMBOURG frontier. Although German organization of the areas behind their lines has no doubt improved considerably since those September days, a passage in a letter written as late as 26 November from ELM (near SAARLAUTERN) suggests that confusion reappears with the approach of the enemy: "Everything is upside down. Refugees, army, everybody is in our house. The Party and the Army are giving orders which contradict each other".

(2) The Interior

An extremely interesting document transmitted by 1 French Army contains a confidential report on Wehrmacht and civilian morale by the German Postal Authorities, who seem to have a special bureau assigned to reading personal mail for this purpose. Although the conclusions naturally show some divergence from Allied estimates it is gratifying to note that the subjects treated and the emphases coincide exactly with those of Allied investigations. A paragraph of interest is the following:

"Man hofft und wartet auf die neuen Waffen, die Erloesung vom feindlichen Druck bringen sollen. Verschiedentlich wird aber gemutmasst, dass die Versprechungen ueber den Einsatz der neuen Waffen nur leere Versprechungen seien und wir nur auf Mut und Tapferkeit der Soldaten gestellt blieben. Ein Grossteil der Briefe handelt von Bombenterror, dass es so nicht weitergehen koenne und eine wirksame Abwehr gefunden werden muesse. Am meisten niederdrueckend wirkt die Menschenjagd der Tiefflieger. Die Grenzbevoelkerung berichtet von Schanzarbeiten, der Naehes des Feindes und der Moeglichkeit, die Heimat verlassen zu muessen, was nur ungerne getan wuerde."

(One hopes and waits for the new weapons, which will bring deliverance from the enemy pressure. Repeatedly, however, it is assumed that promises concerning the introduction of new weapons are only empty promises and we must continue to depend upon the spirit and courage of the soldiers. A large number of the letters deal with the terror bombings, that things cannot go on this way and that an effective defense must be found. Most depressing of all is the strafing of civilians by low-level fliers. The border population discussed trench-digging, the proximity of the enemy and the possibility of having to leave their homes (i.e. evacuation) which they would be most unhappy to do.)

This report, dealing largely with weak points in the enemy's morale, pictures a fairly low state of mind among the civilian population. Introduced as strong points of civilian morale are Trust in the Fuehrer and Faith in Final Victory. These two sentiments are strong points indeed for those who genuinely feel them. That they are still widely felt among Germans is not at all certain; somewhat more certain is it that they are not felt by those who are most irritated by bombing, overcrowding, food shortages, circulation restrictions and evacuation.

(2) An interesting answer to the question "What keeps the Germans going?" is given by [a] mature Russian P/W, formerly a political education officer in the Red Army, who spent several years at labor for the Germans and watched them while he worked. His analysis is prefaced by the observation that not all Germans have "kept going", that many hope for the overthrow of the Nazis, and continues along these lines: [A]part from a few early objectors, the whole of the German nation has a strong feeling of guilt. The Germans know full well what Germany did to the conquered nations, and are well aware of the atrocities committed by the Wehrmacht in Russia and Poland. They realise that the whole German economic program was based on a systematic exploitation of the occupied nations and the enslavement of the conquered people. With their own eyes they witnessed how Russian women were forced to split rails and were used on other hard labors. [They fully endorsed the

(2) Nazis while the going was good and as a result have a collective feeling of responsibility. In spite of these facts they still consider themselves a nation with "kultur" and shudder at the thought of what nations with a far lower "kultur" will do to them in retaliation. They have heard that the U.S., England and Russia have reached an agreement whereby the German nation will be held responsible for all the destruction and used to re-build Europe and Russia. As a result of this, people are individually afraid and feel that they have nothing to lose any more.

(2) [These are surely most potent factors in the maintenance of a certain psychic unity. A collective sense of guilt, strengthened by fear of a ruthless retaliation by less-civilized nations, and apparently supported by the announced intentions (as announced by Dr GOEBBELS, at any rate) of these nations scarcely leaves an alternative to a stiff upper lip.] It must be noted, too, that life in the Reich is by no means unbearable for the majority of people. During the years of war-production, industrialists and workers in Germany, as in all industrial countries, have prospered rather more widely than during the years of the depression decade. The sixth year of the war finds money of little value in Nazi Germany, with a consequent increase in Black Market and barter activity, and here workers do less well than propertied classes (including farmers). But the rationing system continues to operate and workers are assured of a subsistence diet at least. Bombing has destroyed homes and people, but those who survive have been given shelter somewhere. The shortage of consumer goods means that in BERLIN fashion, or what was formerly meant by this term, no longer exists. But people are still neatly clothed - even, to the surprise of field reporters, in those areas of occupied Germany which have taken the most severe pounding of all. Sober consideration of these facts is required to balance frequent hopes, and occasional tales, of internal collapse in Germany. Life in the Reich is undoubtedly a daily strain, with disastrous neural effects upon a considerable number of individuals, but under the nearly omnipotent controls of the Party life goes on and things get done. And in the absence of a strong organized opposition, which alone could make serious headway against the Party, life will more than likely continue to go on.

PART II - WEHRMACHT MORALE.

I. Morale of the Counter-Attacking Troops.

a. First P/W Interrogations.

Such interrogations for morale purposes as have been received suggest that the success of the present German offensive was not limited by any lack of will to counter-attack on the part of almost all the troops engaged as forward elements. The paratroopers jumped and fought with their traditional fanaticism even though their efforts were quickly checked. Interrogations of a number of Ps/W taken from the SS Panzer units who bore the brunt of the push in the central sector of the attack, showed them to be soldiers of good morale or even ones fanatically determined to carry out orders. Among formations of the Volksgrenadier Divisions assigned to secure the flanks of the attack, some signs of defeatism were encountered. Nevertheless, a 12 AG consolidated report dealing with Ps/W from the 212 Volksgrenadier Division captured in the Luxembourg sector, described their morale as good. Renewed aggressive spirit was also reported in other Volksgrenadier Divisions in this sector. Only in isolated cases did Volksgrenadiers use the offensive as an opportunity to desert.

PWD-SHAFF interrogators commented on the remarkable difference between group of Ps/W captured during the first days of the offensive and those interrogated during the preceding few months. Their younger age, their better physical condition, their higher fighting spirit and wider battle experience were all notable.

Reports so far received are too few to warrant any conjecture as to how far the Ps/W captured during the initial phase are representative of the larger bulk of troops involved in the drive. The vigour of their efforts makes it reasonable to assume that their morale was as good or better than that of the men who before the counter-attack were offering determined resistance to Allied operations. Similarly, no adequate information has been received about the extent to which the German troops encountered during the last few days, when the drive began to spend its force, continued to display stiff morale. (See below: How the Troops reacted to the Offensive.)

b. What the Troops were told.

The offensive was launched with a reported address by Hitler to his battle commanders, as well as special orders of the day by Rundstedt, Model and Manteuffel. The contents of Hitler's appeal have not yet been ascertained since it was not broadcast generally. However, according to a few Ps/W who reported having heard it while being relayed to their units, it contained a strong note to the effect that the final decision had come. According to one source, the Fuehrer declared that, like Frederick the Great, in the battle of Koeniggraetz, he had decided to throw all his forces into this winter offensive in the West to achieve a final decision. Whether these reports are correct or not, Rundstedt's order of the day openly declared that "everything is at stake." These statements appear to have become the groundwork of all-out psychological preparation of the troops by their commanders. On the basis of scattered statements it appears, as the messages passed down the line to company commanders, it was recast and elaborated in many varied ways, all generally giving the same impression of an all out effort now at hand. Typical was the exhortation to the I SS Div. (Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler) as it went into battle that Liege was to be given to the Fuehrer as a Christmas present. A breakthrough to Paris was indicated and air support of 800 planes was promised. The troops of the 116 Panzer Division were told that they had 90 tanks in support and that their objective was Antwerp. Similar statements were made to the Volksgrenadier units. The CO of the 276 Division told his men that the Wehrmacht had started the decisive attack of the war; operations from Aachen to the Atlantic Wall were underway. The 352 Volksgrenadier Division received a "Fuehrerbefehl" that this was the decisive battle from Holland to Switzerland. However, as is apt to happen in many armies of such a time a great many troops went into battle without any general morale preparation except for being told that an attack was underway. In one case at least it seemed necessary to play down the scope

of the offensive; a P/W from the 212 Div. reported that the men in his unit were told that this attack was only to test the strength of the enemy. Some paratroopers believed that they were only on a practice jump until just shortly before going into action.

There is evidence that a few tactical units went into the attack with only the scantiest briefing as to their immediate objectives and the location of American troops. This may be ascribed to reasonable security measures. However, Ps/W, in scattered cases, insisted that they were not given any information as to their mission with the effect that they believed the attack to be hastily organized and doomed to failure from the very start. A paratrooper reported that in view of the poor showing of the pilots in delivering their airborne soldiers to their objectives, he personally believed that the pilots had not been told of their destination.

c. How the Troops reacted to the Offensive.

Irrespective of the briefing given to the troops before attacking, a natural increase in spirit was felt as the drive got under way. This was in part simply due to the fact that they were now attacking, after long periods of defensive fighting. They had been promised adequate weapons and these promises were fulfilled in large measure. The presence of the Luftwaffe could be seen when the weather permitted and during bad weather the Allied superiority was absent. Armour was present in great strength. Quantities of semi-automatic and light weapons were supplied, especially to the Volksgrenadier Div; many a P/W reported great enthusiasm over these arms in their units.

Obviously, a basis was supplied for the feeling of heightened confidence by the penetrations achieved during the beginning of the drive. Efforts were made by official German propaganda releases to the troops to support this feeling, but no Allied leaflets were dropped. The Wehrmachtberichte of 21 December declared that the Germans had crossed the road leading to Liege and were pursuing the enemy across the Meuse. A special mimeographed edition of "Mitteilungen fuer die Truppe" informed the men that 40,000 Americans had been killed in the Aachen sector. News was broadcast to all troops on all fronts, as far down as the company level. Such announcements probably received little attention among the troops actually engaged in the counter-offensive because of the well-known difficulties in disseminating propaganda to fighting troops. They were designed in part for troops in other sectors less busily engaged; there are preliminary indications that the bulk of these troops received the news with great hopes.

High morale over the short run was helped by the spread of rumours about the successes achieved. In part, there is some evidence that these rumours were systematically spread by German officials. But it is to be expected that rumours will spring up of their own accord in such a situation where the battle shifts quickly and hard news is absent. Liege was soon occupied by paratroopers, according to rumours; Brussels and Aachen were threatened. The fall of Paris by Christmas was even predicted. Totals for planes shot down reached 1800. Allied reserves were near the exhaustion point.

A small minority of the Ps/W seem to have entered the offensive with reserve and doubt as to its outcome, doubts which in many cases were strengthened as the American counter measures proved so formidable. A feeling that was encountered among Infantry soldiers who fought well were expressed by a P/W: "At first we were hopeful since it had been relatively quiet on our sector during the last couple of days. When we reached the American lines and received their fire, we realized that we had been too confident." Another disrupting factor which set in on some sectors was a shortage of food due to the difficulties of supply. Ps/W were encountered who mentioned not having received any food at all during the entire period of their offensive action.

However, German soldiers who took part in the offensive and were captured declare, now that they are prisoners, that if the offensive were to fail, the entire fate of Germany would be decided. Such an attitude on the part of Ps/W is, of course, far from indicating a collapse of the will to re-

sist on the part of the remainder of the Wehrmacht after the counter-attack spends itself. It would, however, be natural to expect a sharp depression of morale if the German army fails to reach any outstanding and clear-cut geographical objectives. On the other hand, German propaganda may even then be able to interpret the situation in such a way as to prevent a further breach from developing between the Fuehrung and the average German soldier. If the present battle line with its penetration in the Allied position is held, or even if a withdrawal without any undue loss of men and material is accomplished, the drive can be presented as a successful diversionary and delaying action with important political repercussions and so used as a foundation for justifying continued resistance. It will be claimed that the High Command never intended to drive the Allies out of Europe. Even more important, Allied plans for the invasion of the Fatherland have been upset, and more time gained for further total mobilization and the production of new weapons. Allied losses will be reported as heavy and the increase in the war weariness of the enemy noted. (This line is already being employed in German Overseas propaganda.) These arguments are likely to have a certain amount of success. Moreover, a considerable number of soldiers have in the past fought on while despairing of victory in the hope that continued resistance would produce better terms than can possibly be obtained at present; these men will still continue to hold the same opinion. In so far as any conjecture can yet be risked as to the results of the present fighting, it seems that only an unmistakable disaster such as the capture of large German forces by Allied counter-measures will leave Wehrmacht morale markedly worse after the offensive than it was beforehand.

d. Fear of Mistreatment as a P/W.

None of the Ps/W interrogated by PWI interrogators on the subject were aware of the shooting of American Ps/W by German tank crews and in this respect their attitude towards captivity did not differ from those Ps/W captured previous to the offensive. Likewise, all Ps/W questioned denied any knowledge of the use of US uniforms by German troops, although in a few cases they learned about it after capture. They knew that such practices would result in death and professed to consider this just.

It should, however, be added that German soldiers who do fear mistreatment may well be fighting to the bitter end. Reports that we are taking less prisoners may be related to this. Moreover, it is impossible to judge until further interrogations have been received whether German soldiers still lack any fear of being mistreated as Ps/W.

e. Morale of Pilots.

The large number of pilots shot down during recent days over our lines makes possible for the first time in many months an evaluation of their morale. One source points out that the pilots of Fourth Fighter Group are comparatively new. They appear to face their dangerous and difficult task without flinching. Their morale was, if not exuberantly high, at least determined and unyielding. There was little of the arrogance noted among Luftwaffe pilots in the early years of the war, but there was a determination bordering on desperation.

II. Volkssturm in Action.

a. Saarbruecken Volkssturm.

Interrogation of the Commanding Officer 1st Company, Volkssturm Bn Saarbruecken-Stadt reveals the unsurmountable difficulties he encountered in attempting to employ his men in support of the Wehrmacht forces operating in his area. The Wehrmacht in this particular case seemed to be rather indifferent as to the potentialities and the fate of its Volkssturm auxiliary.

Coordination was lacking from the very inception of the formation. The recruits were issued an order on 19 November to assemble for an Erfassungsausschuss (roll call) which they were told would last for a few hours. But the

situation at that front, in the opinion of the local Kreisleiter, required that they begin their military career immediately and without interruption. They were sworn in and taken that night to a group of bunkers nearby in Ens-dorf. This caused great dissatisfaction among the men since they had been forced to leave home without the slightest personal preparations. Promises of leave were extended but never fulfilled.

Kreisleiter Vollbehr, who performed the induction proceedings and delivered the oath to Adolf Hitler, did not himself join the Volkssturm. According to one Volkssturm soldier who was present, Vollbehr felt it necessary to explain his action as well as that of his Ortsgruppenleiters and Zellenleiters (district and cell leaders). He is reported to have said: "We did not lose the last war because we were short of 50,000 men but because we were short of 50,000 Ortsgruppenleiters and Zellenleiters. Vollbehr's action seems to vary from the Nazi Party directive that Party members are to join the Volkssturm. (See below)

The Battalion was commanded by a brewery official who received his position because he was a First Lieutenant in the last war. He was ordered to a ten days course for Volkssturm Bn COs and seems never to have returned to offer his service to the Saarbruecken Volkssturm. Instead his Adjutant assumed command. One of the Company commanders, railroad official purchasing agent, by the name of Hans Heinz, was ~~was~~ selected for CO because he held a commission as a reserve railroad police lieutenant and had been a non-com in the last war. He reported the following career of his detachment: Conditions in the bunkers where military training was supposed to be going forward were quite unbearable, especially since little thought had been given to the supply problem. No transportation was available and food was brought in by pushcart from wherever available. Medical care was absent, except for a two day visit by a civilian doctor. Heinz took it upon himself to send home the men least physically fit since none of the recruits had been given a formal medical examination. The men could write home but could not receive mail. No steps were taken to extend support to their families since the necessary clerical action simply was not taken. Weapons, old Italian rifles, Panzerfausts and grenades were issued to the men in the bunkers. Some perfunctory training was given by Wehrmacht personnel in the area which left the recruits almost completely unable to even handle their weapons.

On 3 December, the Company Commanders attended a Battalion Conference at which no Wehrmacht officers were present. The question arose whether the Volkssturm should be reinforced or relieved since it was made known that the last German troops were being withdrawn from the far side of the Saar. No one knew the answer, except that the Volkssturm Battalion had been assigned to the Wehrmacht for tactical command. The Volkssturm officers were only responsible for the welfare of their men, but not for making tactical decisions. However, even in the matter of procuring food no one present seemed to have any clear ideas.

In the meantime, the men continued to vent their anger against the Nazi Party functionaries for being called to service without having been given a chance to straighten out their personal and business affairs. They did not try to hide from themselves the fact that they were only second class material without training and proper equipment at that. The right thing, many of them felt, would have been to put such old men into the Army and mix them with regular soldiers, so that they would not have the feeling of being sacrificed.

Soon after the conference, the command channels within the formation broke down and CO Heinz was never able again to contact Battalion Headquarters. After no word had been received for a few days, a runner was despatched to Battalion Headquarters with the request for further instructions. He returned reporting that the bunker in which the Headquarters was supposed to be located was empty. The Battalion supplies were scattered about and civilians were helping themselves to whatever had been left behind. No one knew where the staff had gone.

The day before the American troops arrived and captured the bunkers, the CO sent a written request to an Abtl. Schink of the Army unit to which he was responsible requesting that his unit should either be relieved or reinforced. He realized that these men were completely untrained and incapable of defending themselves. There was no point in their being assigned a mission to hold the bunkers since they would simply be unable to do so. The Army officers replied to the request: "Es kommt eventuell Verstaerkung." (We shall probably send up reinforcement.) But none ever came. The messenger who had gone up to Oblt. Schink and brought back the answer reported to his CO that Schink had read the message and then spoken to another officer telling him: "Auf diese Bunker legen wir sowieso keinen Wert." (We don't attach any importance to these bunkers anyway.) This news completely demoralized Heinz for he then realized the complete uselessness of his efforts to keep his Volkssturm unit intact. The American troops arrived soon thereafter and blew the Volkssturm out.

During interrogation the CO described the entire action as irresponsible. "The Kreisleiter Vollbehr is probably the man responsible for this crime since he wanted to show off."

b. Volkssturm on the Westwall.

The employment of Volkssturm units in areas considerably distant from their native communities is foreshadowed by the report of two Volkssturm deserters who were assigned to man Siegfried Line defences in the Buechelberg area. Instead of being committed to the local defence of their communities, these members of the St. Avold Volkssturm Battalion were sent in October to Sarreburg where they were employed in harvesting crops and preparing field fortifications. Early in December, they were ordered to the vicinity of Buechelberg where they were detailed to machine guns in the casements of the Siegfried Line. These Ps/W claimed that they had no military training at all. Ps/W of other units have alluded to the presence of Volkssturm personnel in Siegfried fortifications but few of these people have been captured with the exception of those from the Saarbruecken area.

Regardless of the difficulties experienced by the Volkssturm in coordinating its efforts in battle with those of the Wehrmacht, all indications seem to point to Nazi Party officials continuing to press to maintain the independence of the Volkssturm wherever possible. Special regulations have been issued which attempt to set up an independent medical service for the Volkssturm. Doctors are liable for service in the Volkssturm. The doctor will use the institutions of the Party and its formation as well as of the Deutsche Rote Kreuz. A Head Doctor of the Volkssturm will be nominated who will, in conjunction with the Reich Health Leader, serve on the staff of the Reich Leader SS.

A further indication that the Volkssturm is to be used in other than local defence is seen in the regulation calling for the establishment of a medical group in every Gau from which doctors can be made available in case of mobile employment. Armed Forces medical officers are directed to give medical assistance to Volkssturm soldiers as far as possible, when these are fighting within an Armed Force formation.

A reply by Bormann to an enquiry by Gauleiter Wagner states that "as soon as the Volkssturm is ready for service in units and armed" the order for Party members to join the Wehrmacht ceased to apply. In fact, Party members transferred to the Army because of an acute emergency should be transferred back to the Volkssturm. An OKW decree states that all persons employed as civilians by the Armed Forces are liable for service with the Volkssturm. The order also stated that Armed Forces officials in the home war areas, too, may be called for service in the Volkssturm. All AA auxiliaries are also liable for service with the Volkssturm with the reservation that AA services take precedence over Volkssturm services. All male members of the Air Raid Warning System are also liable for Volkssturm service. These regulations seem to establish that whatever parttime manpower still exists in the German Reich will in final phase of resistance be put under the jurisdiction of the Volkssturm rather than the Wehrmacht.

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