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SUPREME HEADQUARTERS  
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE  
Psychological Warfare Division

SECRET  
19 March 1945

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE # 25

PART I -- GERMAN HOME FRONT

A. OCCUPIED AREAS

COLOGNE: "QUI NON VIDIT..."

A phrase current in medieval times declared: "Qui non vidit Coloniam, non vidit Germaniam" (He who has not seen Cologne has not seen Germany). The accident of geographical position made Cologne, long a center of commerce and culture, a leading gateway of Western Germany as well. The shortest way from Paris to Berlin, for example, is via Cologne. This great city - seat of the Cardinal Archbishop, a large university, and the oldest Chamber of Commerce on German soil - fell to the First U.S. Army on 6 March 1945. What interrogators found there is fairly representative of conditions in the newly-won areas and gives a foretaste of what we will find as we advance further into the Reich.

THE FACE OF THE CITY: Perhaps the most striking psychological factor which has emerged from six months' observation of Germans in the occupied areas is that people seem able to establish a "tolerance" to whatever conditions of life are thrust upon them. Interrogators now reporting from Cologne are struck mainly by the "cellar life" which has grown up; the average citizen there seems by now to consider it "normal" that he should spend the better part of his life underground. A typical "middle-class" cellar will contain, for example, bedding, stove, cabinet, stocks of food and coal, and minor conveniences designed to make the place "feel like home". In the cellars and bunkers of Cologne, as has been reported from Coblenz and other places, there has even sprung up a fairly brisk commercial trade and a kind of community life.

The "inner city", comprising the cathedral and the main railway station is very badly damaged - although the cathedral itself still stands. Few of the houses in the area are habitable, and the residents seem to be living mainly in their cellars which are generally quite deep. At a point about 500 meters from the cathedral, going towards the west of the city, more houses seem to be still intact and inhabited. It is very difficult to tell, however, unless one examines each house, for many an apparently undamaged house consists of nothing but rubble behind the intact facade.

THE CONDITIONS OF LIFE: There is apparently no serious food shortage in the city, and all the cellars are well-stocked. People do not seem undernourished and many children wander about the streets eating candy (a 10-year old in a totally bombed-out area stopped one interrogator and offered him a piece of her candy bar). The proprietor of a cooling house in Severinstrasse started to distribute meat and cheese indiscriminately, until the crowd became unruly and he had to ask for an armed guard. At present he still has 3-4 carloads of meat in reserve.

The water system has been badly damaged, and this represents a very serious problem for the population. Electricity is available only in those districts which are supplied from the outside - for example, the EHRENFELD district which draws electric power from the little town of Bergheim. Looting by German civilians is as widespread in Cologne as in other newly-occupied areas. One interrogator writes:

"In all parts of the city civilians wander around in stores and homes - looting. They look around in bombed-out homes for whatever valuables can still be found and used. All private property has become the property of the masses".

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THOSE WHO FLED: During the week preceding occupation, many women and children were leaving the city without express evacuation orders by the Party, but simply to avoid more intimate contact with the "horrors of war". On Tuesday, 27 February, the "Hängebrücke" (suspension bridge), which suffered 9 direct bomb hits during a previous air attack but was nevertheless declared safe for pedestrian traffic, collapsed under the weight of the stream of evacuees. About 700 people, trying to cross the river from west to east at the time, are reported to have drowned. This catastrophe considerably reduced the flow of evacuees, because the one remaining bridge could not accommodate all the essential traffic and because people were afraid that this bridge too might collapse. On Friday, 2 March, a direct instruction from the Gauleitung ordered all women and children, as well as men over 60, to the east bank of the Rhine, and announced that two transport trains would be available for this purpose in the afternoon. However, nothing further was done till late Saturday night when town criers went through the streets ordering all classes designated for evacuation to be out of the city by midnight, taking with them only what they could carry in their hands. Very few obeyed the call because it was physically almost impossible to do so.

Some top Party leaders had left the city during an earlier phase.. The remaining Bonzen got out of town during the hours of darkness on Saturday. Informants report that many of them wore Wehrmacht greatcoats over their brown uniforms and that, upon reaching the east bank of the Rhine, "all" the Party leaders changed into civilian clothes.

THOSE WHO REMAINED: Estimates of the number of people left in Cologne at the moment continue to vary as widely as they did in the period prior to Allied occupation when a figure between one and two hundred thousand seemed reasonable (see No. 21 of this Summary). One source puts the total figure at 200,000, which is probably too high. Another estimates that only some 50,000 are left in the city, which is undoubtedly too low. The most reasonable estimates yet received vary between 120/150,000; this includes some 50,000 still living in cellars or hidden in the outskirts of the city. The population remaining in Cologne differs from that found earlier in western Germany in two main respects. First of all, there are many foreign workers of all nationalities. These hid away from the Nazis on 23 February, when they were all supposed to be evacuated across the Rhine. Most of them thus far interrogated stated that they were hidden by German civilians (which tallies with reports from other sources that Germans are now being helpful to foreign workers as a kind of "insurance against occupation"). In the second place, there are a great number of Wehrmacht deserters in Cologne, nearly all in civilian clothes. Some of them admit quite openly that they are deserters and state that they intend to register as such when the proper offices have been established. There are, as well, many Volkssturm men and policemen wandering round the city in civilian clothes.

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On/Sunday morning preceding our entry, the Volkssturm in Bickendorf, a northwesterly suburb of Cologne, was called out as on every Sunday morning and marched off towards the one remaining bridge across the Rhine. On the way, they were told that they were to be evacuated, although their understanding had always been that the V.S. was to defend its own home district. It is reported that when these men, about 180 strong, arrived at the bridge, most of them deserted in spite of warnings that they would be fired upon by the S.A. men who accompanied them. It is believed that most of them escaped and have returned to their homes. As far as can be established through interrogation of civilians there was no resistance to Allied troops by the V.S. in the Bickendorf area, although there have been reports of scattered resistance by other V.S. units around Cologne.

THE STORIES THEY TELL: Since November of last year, Cologne has been the center of numerous tales, or versions of the same tale, of the mass hanging of civilians in reprisal for attacks against Nazi leaders. The most widespread story was that, after the heavy raids of last October, civilians in the Ehrenfeld section of the city attacked (or shot or killed) 4 local Party officials and that in reprisal 11 (or 12) civilians were hanged. Interrogators have been unable to check this story, but civilians have been telling them of other, equally drastic, atrocities.

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According to several informants, 84 men and 34 women were executed publicly by the Gestapo on the Appellhofplatz on 28 February. It is said that their "crimes" included not appearing for work, or being caught with a loaf of bread which they could not account for. The victims included Belgians, Frenchmen and Ukrainians, as well as Germans, and informants said that all day long 3 SS men were busy executing these people 10 at a time. The procedure seems to have been as follows: The victims were lined up on a platform and a rope tied round their necks. Then the platform was removed from under their feet and placed in preparation for the next 10. Some of the corpses are said to be still lying in the public square.

One interesting rumor current among the population is that a group of 100 Gestapo agents in civilian clothes have remained in the city. These men, who are designated by some as "Die rachehende Schar" (The Avenging Band), are supposed to have as their main mission the detection of collaborators. The current rumor has it that they intend to kill any man who collaborates with the occupying authorities and destroy his home and family. There is a family relationship between this "Band" and the "Avengers of German Honor" whom Nazi propaganda declared to have been active in the Aachen area during the winter. Such stories sound dubious, but they illustrate the type of rumor which sweeps through a newly-conquered city during the first phase of occupation, before communications are restored and the dissemination of accurate information is possible.

"THE GREAT RECEPTION": The first interrogators in Cologne noted without exception, as they went through the town in the wake of the combat elements, the "terrific" welcome given to American troops. Free beer and wine were offered by several beerhouse proprietors. People along the street, or leaning from windows, looked shining at the new heroes: men tipped their hats and said "Guten Morgen"; girls put on their most seductive smiles. Civilians showed an inclination to pat soldiers on the back and addressed jokes to them.

Everywhere a spirit of "liberation", genuine or synthetic, was in evidence and tanks were stopped by civilians, who in broken English or in plain German simply said: "Endlich seid Ihr gekommen, seit Jahren haben wir auf Euch gewartet" (At last you have come, for years we have been waiting for you). One interrogator reported that such phrases as "We waited five years for you" were often heard.

POSTURES AND ATTITUDES: The second day was gloomy and the sense of "liberation" began to fade away. American troops did not bother much about the civilian population, the taverns were closed, and civilians living close to the Rhine received orders to move away immediately. This was the first order issued by the American Army; people did not gripe, they took their bedding and moved, but it was clear that they realised a new authority was giving orders.

Nevertheless, a sober sense of release, akin to "liberation", is reported to exist still in Cologne. Much of this is patently false; expressions of enthusiasm and smiling goodwill have always come easily to the people of this area. The opportunists reveal themselves inevitably by their eagerness to "spill the beans" or "put the finger" on the remaining Nazis left in the town. It is profitable to recall, in this connection, how a leading Centrist once defended his joining the Nazis with the following cynicism in Cologne dialect: "Mer Kölner sin wie der leewe Jott, immer mit der sterkste Battallione" (We people of Cologne are like God Almighty, always with the strongest battalions). Quite obviously, the shoe is now on the other foot.

There remains, however, a number of people whose expression of "liberation" seems to be quite genuine. There is, of course, good reason for this sentiment, for if "freedom from fear" is a condition of the good life, then many of these people have recently gained it. Allied occupation means chiefly relief from the horrors of air bombing and artillery shelling; relief from the fear that they may at any moment be evacuated willy-nilly (leaving belongings, and perhaps families, behind); relief from their constant life underground. One woman said to an interrogator: "Sie koennen sich gar nicht vorstellen wie leicht mir ums Herz ist, seit Ihr angekommen seid" (You cannot imagine how relieved I feel since your arrival). There is no reason to doubt that she was indeed relieved.

Such relief in the lightening of the physical burdens of daily life can easily be confused with a genuine political sense of "liberation". In this respect, those liberated in fact are far fewer than those who fancy they have been liberated. Reports now are frequent that "no man or woman has anything but the worst kind of invective for the Hitler regime and the war". During the first few days following occupation, there is always a real "feeling" to such invective; for the Nazis have, after all, been responsible for the heavy burdens which these people suffered before our arrival. Experience in the areas which we have occupied for several months has shown, however, that this immediate sense of release departs rapidly and that heated anti-Nazism the day after the Nazis leave is not equivalent to deep pro-Allied feeling and affords no reliable guide to what people may be thinking or saying within a month.

THE CONDITION OF INFORMATION MEDIA: 1. Cologne Radio. The Funkhaus", at 38 Dagoberstrasse, has been damaged but can be used for offices and living quarters. All radio equipment was removed by the Germans "some time ago". No apparatus of any sort can be found, except a Siemens teleprinter in apparently good condition and a dusty file of old wax recordings of speeches made at Cologne studios.

2. Koelnische Zeitung. An inventory obtained from the superintendant of the building revealed comparatively little deliberate sabotage by the Nazis, but considerable damage during the course of the battle. The last Allied air raid destroyed the power transformers which adapted the municipal A.C. current to the D.C. current used by the newspaper's two main presses. One warehouse contained a considerable stock of paper. The Nazis earlier withdrew certain key personnel to a secondary plant on the east side of the Rhine, so that the newspaper could continue to appear in the event we should occupy the left bank.

3. Koelner Nachrichten. The plant of this newspaper was largely destroyed during Allied air raids of the last few months. At present there are no presses in operating condition. The only available rotary press and the two off-set presses, will have to be renovated before they can be used. A small amount of paper and metal stocks were on hand. There was no personnel present at the plant.

4. Police Radio Station. The personnel operating this station for the Cologne police force withdrew across the river just before our arrival, destroying both antennae and removing all the receiving and sending equipment. No use can be made of the remaining plant at present.

5. The Bildienst fuer Private and Amtlicher Handelsnachrichten (Express Service for Private and Official Commercial News) and the Reichsverband der Deutschen Zeitungsverleger (National Union of German Newspaper Publishers) are reported completely destroyed and informants state that both organisations moved across the Rhine several months ago.

6. The D.A.F. building is very badly damaged and most of the material has been destroyed. The N.S.D.A.P. Headquarters is heavily damaged but some documents have been found by U.S. forces.

GERMAN RADIO ON THE FALL OF COLOGNE: For some time Nazi propagandists tried to convey the impression that Cologne would not be given up without a fight. The importance of this to the Party can be seen from a dispatch carried by DNB on 8 March (two days after the actual fall of the city) which announced:

"The Party has equipped Cologne for total defense..... Volksturm companies and tanks are wheeling forward, meeting supply vehicles returning from the front..... The faces of the men display calm confidence. They know that Germany's eyes are on Cologne. They will it that Cologne shall defend herself. Let the Americans come. Each heap of rubble they capture on Cologne's sacred ground they will have to pay for with the blood of their best divisions".

A Transocean broadcast to Europe, made a few hours before the above statement, makes it quite clear that the Nazis were aware the city had fallen, but were not yet prepared to admit it at home:

"As for Cologne itself, the part of the city on the left bank of the Rhine has been lost after very heavy fighting".

Not until 9 March did the OKW communicate announce tersely, and only in passing:

"In the Cologne sector the Americans succeeded in pressing our forces to the eastern bank of the Rhine".

#### ENEMY AREAS

#### THE "CRISIS" IN GERMAN MORALE

"In Germany today we are witnessing an attempt by an authoritarian government to continue an apparently hopeless war, not disregarding the civil population but recognising that its co-operation is essential, by using the method of applied social science (propaganda, calculated intimidation, neutralisation of every potential nucleus of resistance, etc) to force this co-operation out of a civil population which has not only ceased to believe that victory is possible but even that utter defeat can be avoided. In this case, the attempt is bound to fail because the material factors are weighted too heavily against Germany but (because there are no precedents for the present situation) nobody can guess how near it is likely to come to succeeding - that is how long it will be possible to wring the necessary support out of an unwilling population". (PID German Propaganda and the German, March 12).

It is in view of the situation formulated above that Joseph Goebbels has been rousing himself to extraordinary exertions, speaking in both Goerlitz and Lauben on March 11 and returning to the microphone again on March 12. His theme has been the need for extraordinary efforts by the civil population without which Germany will be unable to survive. And at this critical hour the most serious of all Germany's dangers is perhaps the current civilian attitude of inertia and submission which, by checking any disposition to resistance, have so long served the Nazi leaders in good stead. Endeavour, not acquiescence, is the need now. And this is precisely the moment at which it is becoming harder than ever to obtain.

Reports in recent months, coming from various parts of the Reich, have been pointing to an increasing "paralysis of initiative" among the working-class which does not so much lead to active resistance as to hours and even days being spent in a state of semi-stupor. There have been frequent official complaints about the tendency to develop a "bunker psychosis" which leads workers to go to shelter the moment an air raid alarm is given and stay there until all danger is past. It is justly pointed out that "such conduct seriously jeopardizes the German armament potential". Other frequent complaints concern people who evade registration and work for months and months or, being liable for work after air-raids, leave their working place and domicile without permission. P/W interrogations have also provided cases of workers evacuating their families from target areas and failing to return themselves.

The German authorities have not relied solely upon exhortations to check these tendencies, but all evidence suggests that the apparatus of control is weakening under the strain placed on it, and enforcement becoming increasingly impossible. The lukewarm reception generally given to the Rundstedt offensive, based largely on the feeling that the only result of success would be to lengthen the war, suggested how far disintegration had gone and how small were the chances of recovery. Conversely the observation of the "cellar life" in newly-occupied areas shows that, once people have absorbed the initial shocks of bombing and made the necessary physical and psychical adjustments, morale is not so much "destroyed" as inertia produced.

Thus the crisis with which Goebbels is faced is not simply one of morale as such but one of the effects of inertia (absence of morale) upon German war economy. The hopeless feeling that all effort is vain, aggravated by the day-to-day bodily and mental strain of events, renders the individual incapable of putting forward the needed extra effort. Many Germans would probably welcome defeat because they expect it to mean at least the end of all need for effort, preferring it for this reason to any continuation of the contest. The morale situation is critical because it lowers production, already crippled by Allied offensive action, below the level needed to hold the present fronts. Because of the time-lag between factory and battlefield, added to the fact that Germany held until recently

certain ultimate reserves of materials which are now being drawn on, the repercussions of mentality upon action may take a little while before becoming fully evident. But the frenzied exertions of Goebbels indicate that the German leaders are fully aware of their gravity, to realise that, unless they can be checked, the doom of the Third Reich is irretrievable.

#### THE PARTY TIGHTENS ITS GRIP

In announcing a set of very drastic regulations for the conduct of refugees and soldiers in Germany, DNB on 9 March made the most open admission yet of mass desertions and evasions of regulations. The most important points are the following:

1. All leaves for the Wehrmacht, except in case of sickness or for feats of valor, are cancelled. This confirms reports that soldiers on leave often did not rejoin their units, and in many cases just kept riding trains, where there was little likelihood of their being caught due to the overcrowding and the lack of military police.
2. The Fuehrer's order that men from enemy-occupied territory on either front could, if they desired, be assigned to the defense of their immediate Heimatgau was cancelled. This is mainly of theoretical importance, because the order was almost completely disregarded in practice by unit commanders, unwilling to let men go without being assured of replacements, and because of the difficulties involved in the travel from one front to the other.
3. All men of the 1884-1929 age groups who have not been called up must report to the recruiting office or Sub Area H.Q. and produce their military papers. This is an open admission that many men have evaded their V.S. duties, since all men of these age groups should be enrolled in the V.S. already.
4. Political leaders and functionaries of the N.S.D.A.P. must report to the new Kreisleitung. The inclusion of Party leaders in this order shows that they after having left their assigned post often try to disappear probably because of fear of punishment for leaving their post.
5. Food offices and welfare authorities have been instructed to issue ration cards or make payments only after a registration certificate is produced.
6. Everybody giving lodging to a person liable to registration has to satisfy himself that all requirements have been met.
7. Everybody who knows of persons suspected of shirking their military or labour service has to inform the nearest police station without delay.
8. Evaders will be regarded as deserters and treated as such. Not only the guilty will be punished but also those who help them in any way.

#### CONDITIONS IN BERLIN

For weeks now Berliners have been anxiously watching the Oder front, feeling perhaps that once the Russian avalanche breaks across this obstacle the days of Berlin are numbered. When fighting flared up around Kuestrin, Berliners stormed the newsvendors every afternoon. The fall of KUESTRIN, a few days later, was not mentioned in home output at all, and in transmissions for Europe it was denied.

On 12 February, Front und Heimat reproduced some exemplary sentiments from an Order of the Day issued by Lt.-Gen. Ritter von Hauenschildt, "whom the Fuehrer has charged with the military defensive measures in Wehrkreis III and Berlin". This was a new appointment since as late as December these two posts, which had not hitherto been combined, were held by General von Kortzfleisch and Major-General Hoffmeister (appointed after July 20 to replace a conspirator). Transocean, on 14 March, confirmed the appointment, giving von Hauenschildt's official title as "Commander-in-Chief of the Defense Zone Berlin". The announcement noted that the General, experienced in the defense of fortified places, commanded a tank division which had penetrated into the outskirts of Moscow in October 1941, was later evacuated from Stalingrad, after he had been badly wounded, and decorated with the Oakleaves. (The General's experience at

Stalingrad is not mentioned in home output, probably to prevent Berliners from inferring that their city is to become a second Stalingrad). Others associated with the defence of Berlin, probably in connection with internal police and security measures rather than tactical operations, are: SS Obergruppenfuehrer and General of Police KALTENBRUNNER, a policeman with no military experience who has been Himmler's right-hand man on security matters; and SS Brigade-fuehrer and Major General FUCHS, formerly a high police official in Yugoslavia.

Von Hauenschildt's plan, as announced to Europe, is to allow the enemy to approach on a broad front and wear himself out in Berlin's system of field fortifications, which get thicker the nearer one approaches the center of the city, and then to finish him off in the labyrinth of fortified blocks. He has ordered an "offensive defensive, above ground and underground, with fanaticism and imagination by means of every deception and trick". The broadcast closes with the remark: "Allied air raids have prepared Berlin well for ground fighting. Bomb craters and heaps of debris may well become classic ground for close fighting with the foreign invaders". (How the Propaganda Ministry twists facts to suit its purpose can be seen from a DNB dispatch of 6 March about the defense of Cologne: "The completely devastated and partly still burning ruins, completely laid waste by many hundred air raids, offer only slight possibilities for defense")

Difficulties are being encountered in the organization of the V.S. The Berlin Staff Gau Directorate of the German Volkssturm publishes an announcement in the Berliner Illustrierte Nachtausgabe explaining that the "service is the same for all V.S. units". "The various levies simply indicate the capacity of the individual". This statement is given "to clear up repeated misunderstandings". The article closes with the explanation "A complete exemption from V.S. service, similar to the reservation (UK Stellung) of the Wehrmacht is never granted".

On Hero's Day (11 March) Hitler issued a proclamation and a ceremony was held in Berlin, although both were omitted last year. The Fuehrer was represented by Goering, who placed a wreath in Hitler's name on the War memorial. Also present were Lt.-Gen. v. Hauenschildt, Admiral Doenitz and various other high-ranking Nazis.

One fairly reliable source reports that the Anhalter Bahnhof and the Hotel Excelsior have been completely destroyed. A British repatriate, describing the bomb damage in Berlin, says that the center of the town is almost completely destroyed except for the "Wilhelmstrasse with the windowless Reich Chancellery and the Hotel Adlon". The attitude of the population is summed up by the same source as follows: "When you meet one German he will tell you he does not mind what happens as long as the war ends, but if you meet two Germans they will say 'Heil Hitler'".

#### WHAT THE RUSSIANS ARE SAYING

The Russian "radio offensive" against Germany continues to orient itself deliberately towards the specific groups and interests - army, navy, women and workers - who make up the key threads in the disintegrating Nazi social fabric.

Linking the loss of Pomerania to the food problems of the overharrassed Hausfrau, Moscow Radio reminds German women that "Pomerania produced 6% of Germany's beef and 8% of Germany's pork", and concludes that "it goes without saying" that shorter rations are around the corner.

Another broadcast to women, by a former woman delegate to the German Reichstag, blames "German militarism" for "pushing Germany into two wars in two generations", and declares that only its destruction will permit "Germany to take her place among the decent and peace-loving peoples". (These charges stirred Dittmar to angry reply last week).

Moscow's radio messages to the German Navy tauntingly compare the statements of Dr. Ley, and other Nazi notables who promised "miracle defenses", with the dismal military facts on both fronts. Assuring the German navy that the endangered Baltic bases will inevitably be lost, Russian output raises the specter of rugged infantry combat for the sailors. "Certain death" can be avoided only if the sailors "leave their posts, go to their home towns and work against the Nazis for Germany". German sailors were also informed, by recent

Moscow talks of a new undetectable British mine now being laid in Danish waters; of the death sentence of 67 German U-Boat officers and men in Norway because of sabotage; of a strike of 20,000 workers in Berlin over food rations; and of disorders in Munich between workers and SS.

Further illustrations of "occupational programming" is provided by a Free Germany talk to German transport workers, urging them "to save the German transport system from destruction". The same talk offered workers the hope of eventual re-integration in the international trade union movement on the basis of their sabotage record "in co-operation with foreign workers". Continuing its appeals for violent anti-Nazi action, the Free Germany committee called upon a united movement of "the Wehrmacht, Volkssturm, men in economic life, in administrative offices, priests and workers and soldiers" to "raise their weapons against the Gauleiters, SS, and Gestapo".

PART II - WEHRMACHT MORALE

I. General

Due to differences in amount and type of resistance being encountered, the following summary of current Wehrmacht combat morale is presented sector by sector.

(a) 21 Army Group Front

Recent fighting, according to a report dated 3 March 1945, has brought a greatly increased number of group captures on this front. However, interrogation of Ps/W taken in this way does not lead to the conclusion that the attitude to the war in the minds of Germans in the West has undergone a radical change. These captures are ascribed to "our artillery, which drove them into cellars or trenches and kept them there for a long time in which they often fell asleep. When they emerged either our infantry were on top of them or our tanks behind them". It should be noted that although reports of increased group surrender from other sectors stress the purely tactical circumstances of such group captures, mention is made of the extreme defeatism of many of the Ps/W as well as at least the isolated occurrence of some leadership and premeditation in assisting the surrender.

An increase is noted in this report in the number of officers and NCOs who, after their units have suffered heavy casualties, refuse to take the responsibility for driving their men to certain destruction. On the other hand, steadfast performance of the para divisions under heavy pressure has been notable, largely due to the effectiveness of junior officers and NCOs. (Since this report was written, para units in the WESEL area West of the RHINE have effected a withdrawal in good order, only under heavy pressure and with few Ps/W being taken). In general, on this sector, it was found that the German soldier is tolerant of supply and equipment shortages and of scanty medical attention. So long as the local tactical situation is reasonable, the German soldier continues to fight.

(b) First US Army

Morale in this sector was determined by the helplessness of the enemy to stop our attacks which resulted in the speedy fall of COLOGNE and the unexpected establishment of the bridgehead across the RHINE. Large numbers of troops were cut off by the swiftness of our attack. Many seemed in no hurry to retreat from threatened encirclement, according to a report from the First US Army Combat PW Team. Once isolated, they were even more unwilling to fight their way back to the RHINE. Officers were quite willing to follow their orders to stand, rather than retreat, in order to give themselves an "honourable" excuse for captivity. General von Schimpf surrendered with his staff in BAD GODESBERG after having received orders to fight with his men on the west bank. He declared he could have crossed but he preferred to follow the order to the letter. Other high ranking officers left their units in disgust and crossed the RHINE. Their men, thus abandoned, usually offered limited resistance.

Civilian Clothes

According to CIC reports, many soldiers are being detected in civilian clothes in this quickly over run territory. In most cases they openly admit the fact at the first opportunity. Some of them are deserters of long standing who were hiding in towns with their families or girl friends. Others were men who had recently changed their clothes so that their retreating officers would not force them to cross the RHINE. In their actions they were willingly supported by the civilian population which assisted them by offering clothes, food, and a hiding place. A number of men caught in various towns were soldiers on furloughs who did not want to return to their units but waited for our arrival.

(c) Morale East of the RHINE

A preliminary report of the morale of troops captured on the east bank of the RHINE, supplied by FWD SHAFF interrogators, points out that although all of the Ps/W considered an Allied crossing of the RHINE as inevitable, most of them were surprised that it was accomplished so soon and so easily. For the most part, the Ps/W interrogated belonged to units which had crossed the RHINE at either REMAGEN or KOBLENZ within 24 hours prior to capture, and were thrown hastily into the bridgehead sector. Many of the Ps/W are convinced that the bridge remained intact as the result of premeditated sabotage. Others felt that the Germans had delayed the destruction of the bridge too long in order to withdraw as much material as possible, or that the drive of the Americans was unexpectedly swift and caused the resulting confusion. As a result of the confusion of the retreat and the hasty manner with which they were thrown into the battle, their morale seems to have been completely undermined. Not a single one of them believed that the Americans could be thrown out of the bridgehead or that victory could ultimately be achieved.

Being among the first thrown against the bridgehead, many of these Ps/W had been told that the Americans had not gotten any heavy equipment across the River. When they ran into heavy fire, they realised otherwise and in some cases offered token resistance. (Since then heavy reinforcements have been brought into the sector and stiff resistance is being encountered. No reports on the morale of these new troops have been received as yet).

All of the Ps/W of this initial group were aware that the Russians have already deprived them of their entire Eastern industrial area. The possible fall of BERLIN was considered of little significance, but it was strongly felt that the occupation of the RUHR would definitely seal the fate of GERMANY, which has already lost the war. One soldier commented: "If the RUHRGEBIET is lost, the Wehrmacht will be unable to continue organized resistance. It will be only a matter of individual battle groups, if everything is not already completely destroyed".

(d) US 7th Army

Resistance in this sector during the present offensive has consisted mainly of mines, roadblocks and artillery fire according to G-2 sources. Psychological warfare interrogation reports from this sector deal mainly with Ps/W captured before the 7th Army offensive began. But even then, growing awareness of the hopelessness of GERMANY's position was undermining determination to resist to the very end. A report from this sector reviews in great detail the circumstances of capture of 44 Ps/W. 10 of the group were classified as genuine resisters, two of whom fought to the last bullet, while 8 gave themselves up after a brief fight. There were 12 who could be classed as genuine deserters; this comparatively high number being attributed to the relative static nature of the front here. (They for the most part got themselves assigned to outposts or got themselves lost while on patrol). The majority, 22, were borderline cases, but all of them asserted they had, at one time or another, considered desertion or the advisability of becoming a P/W. Some of them merely stood fast or hid in the way of the American advance, while others welcomed the hopeless situation in which they soon found themselves.

(e) Volkssturm Resistance

The numerous Volkssturm units encountered by the First, Third and Ninth US Armies in the push to the RHINE have, in general, offered little organized resistance to our attacks. The lowest possible grade of personnel from the military point of view, the lack of training and equipment, the poor leadership and the high level of defeatism before commitment made such a performance inevitable. Although many Volkssturm soldiers professed that they really would have fought if they were in the East, fighting against the Americans was another thing. They realised that they were inadequately

trained and were reluctant to carry on guerrilla operations.

In the main they hoped that the war would have swept past their homes with such great speed that they could resume normal civilian lives quickly. On the other hand, fear of being considered as partisans, led them after capture to claim that they were members of the Wehrmacht. Many Volkssturm men were quick to cite the fact that Allied radio and leaflets had promised them the same treatment as regular Wehrmacht soldiers, if they surrendered.

#### Party Leadership

Party leadership failed to instill any sense of military discipline or determination in their ranks. Interrogations tell of endless cases of minor personal and political bickerings among all concerned. In larger towns, men with previous military training were passed over for command position in preference to trusted Party members. Infractions of discipline, especially being absent from training sessions were frequent, yet few counter-measures were taken. One Volkssturm leader commented on difficulties in this respect by pointing out that he could hardly punish his customers, and that he had no intention of destroying his business because of the Volkssturm.

Relations between Volkssturm leaders and Wehrmacht officers before commitment seem to have been correct and marked with little friction. The Volkssturm leaders knew from the outset that they were to come under the command of the Wehrmacht. But the Wehrmacht officers on their side displayed but little interest in this last reserve, except to follow out orders perfunctorily. During this period Volkssturm men were often, for co-operation and training, given simple labour battalion tasks; guarding cattle, trenching and construction of fortifications. As the Allied forces began to threaten a particular area the Volkssturm units were usually moved to more military tasks, although the swiftness of our advance prevented this from being accomplished in many sectors. Volkssturm men were assigned to bunkers, to manning tank barriers and the like. Often a sense of isolation developed quickly as the ordinary Wehrmacht soldier displayed little interest in the support from the Volkssturm. Ridicule rather than comradeship was more often the case. Coordination between commander of the Volkssturm and the Wehrmacht officer was little better.

In isolated cases Volkssturm units had to receive fire before they were captured. But more frequently they were prone to surrender to the first American on the scene, to hide until overrun, to disband and go home, or even seek out American troops to whom they could surrender.

#### II. Long Term Increase in Defeatism

The Allied offensive into the RHINELAND has shattered the last remaining hopes among German soldiers, and produced almost complete after capture defeatism among all, except a minority of 10 percent. The long term downward trend in confidence, sharply accentuated since January, can be strikingly seen in the write-in surveys conducted by PWD SHAEP among Ps/W since D-day. The most recent poll of 388 Ps/W captured between 25 February - 7 March on the 12 Army Group front reveals a marked depression in contrast to the temporary stabilization of the immediate pre-Rundstedt offensive period. For description of previous samples and trend results to key morale questions (see attached table).

From a mid-October high of 55 percent who believed that GERMANY was winning the war, only about 10 percent in the March sample persisted in this belief. They are the fanatical "hard core" on whom events make no impression and who may even retire into the BAVARIAN ALPS for a last ditch stand if called on. A similar drop was encountered in answer to the questions "Do you think that it is possible to eject the Allies from FRANCE" (now question asks from Western GERMANY) and "Do you believe GERMANY has war decisive secret weapons". (A

SECRET

## TRENDS IN WEHRMACHT MORALE BASED ON WRITE-IN QUESTIONNAIRES

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Date of Capture	June 26-28 1944	July 1-17 1944	Aug. 1-10 1944	Sept. 1-10 1944	Mid-Sept. 1944	Mid-Oct. 1944	Nov. 15-30 1944	Jan. 1-14 1945	March 1945
Number of Prisoners	363	155	160	643	634	345	453	324	388
Place of Capture	CHERBOURG	CARENTON to ST. LO	ST. MALO to LE MANS	METZ-NANCY Region	WEST FRONT	WEST FRONT	AACHEN-METZ	WEST FRONT	WEST FRONT
<u>QUESTIONS</u>	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Do you trust the Fuehrer?	Yes 67 No 18 N.A. 15	57 27 16	68 17 15	65 19 16	60 24 16	42 43 15	64 22 14	62 30 8	31 52 17
Do you think it is possible to eject the Allies from France?	Yes 42 No 38 N.A. 20	37 49 14	49 29 22	27 51 22	- - -	- - -	51 30 19	39 47 14	10 * 83 * 7 *
Would you prefer a continu- ation of the war for years to an Anglo-American- Russian occupation of Germany?	Yes 30 No 54 N.A. 16	30 62 8	36 40 24	24 63 13	29 52 19	18 65 17	23 64 13	22 67 11	21 64 15
Do you believe that Germany is winning the war?	Yes - No - N.A. -	- - -	52 11 37	38 39 23	46 33 21	28 57 15	50 27 23	44 42 14	11 78 11
Do you believe that revenge will be taken against the population of Germany after the war?	Yes 16 No 75 N.A. 9	13 81 6	36 51 13	23 61 11	21 67 12	18 74 8	- - -	- - -	- - -
Do you believe that Germany still has war decisive "Secret Weapons"?	Yes 37 No 35 N.A. 28	44 37 19	66 15 19	49 37 20	48 32 20	33 52 15	53 29 18	47 40 13	14 77 9

Notes: \* Question on March 1945 "Do you think it is possible to eject the Allies from Western Germany?"

Character of Samples - (1) Mixed: Navy, Inf, Airforce, Some N.C.O.s; (2) Inf, Armour, Airforce, Some NCOs; (3) Para, Airforce, Many NCOs;  
 (4) Mainly Armour & Inf; (5) Mainly Inf, Some 2nd Line, Some NCOs; (6) Mainly Inf. Some 2nd Line, some NCOs;  
 (7) Mainly Inf, 2nd Line & Arty, Few NCOs; (8) Mainly Inf, Armour & Para 2nd Line; (9) Mainly Pvts. Inf. Units & few Vs.

different picture is presented by a similar sample of 188 Ps/W, weighted with para and panzer grenadier units, from units captured between 14 - 18 February by 21 Army Group in the GOCH and REICHSWALD areas. Here, 45 percent thought that GERMANY will win the war. This figure of higher morale, which reflects the stiff resistance encountered here, is due to the high proportion of para, panzer and panzer grenadier troops).

It is interesting to note that as early as mid-summer 1944, PWD SHAEF appreciations estimated the existence of the hard core who would resist and stiffen resistance regardless of the strategic situation to be 15 percent.

#### Faith in Hitler

[The sharpest index in increased defeatism was a marked decline of confidence in Hitler, encountered for the first time.] It has long been pointed out that many a German soldier although personally despairing in ultimate victory continued to resist vigorously, in part, because of devotion to Hitler. Hitler who was a man who had done so much good for GERMANY, who had so clearly shown his affiliation with the interests of the common man, could not have continued the war unless he believed it to be the best advantage of GERMANY, politically at least. [Throughout the entire Western campaign faith in Hitler was expressed by well over fifty percent of the Wehrmacht, with the exception of one particularly low morale group. However, in this March poll only 30 percent answered "Yes" to the question: "Do you trust the Fuehrer"?.] (1)

The pronounced degree to which confidence in the Nazi conduct of the war has been undermined in recent weeks can also be seen by the fact that in December only 35 percent of one sample believed that the Nazis were continuing the war only to save their own skins; in January the figure rose to over 45 percent; and in the most recent poll a figure of 70 percent was encountered, while only less than 20 percent answered "No". Likewise, in this March sample, less than 10 percent believed that Germany by prolonging the war will obtain better terms from the Russians and the Anglo-Americans. Thus political defeatism is so strong among these Ps/W that one of the most important positive political incentives for continuation of the war, as put forth by the Nazis, has little influence except among the hard core of Nazis themselves.

Aside from the undermining of the political basis for continued resistance, the actual territorial advances of the Anglo-American and Russian armies seem to have depressed rather than developed a determination to resist to the very end. About 20 percent of the March sample reported that their homes were occupied either by the Anglo-American forces or by the Russians. In the case of residents of the Western regions, only 2 Ps/W reported that they were spurred on, 23 said that they were discouraged; while among Ps/W of Eastern regions, the results were slightly less favourable in terms of increasing defeatism; 10 were spurred, but 23 professed to have been discouraged.

#### III. Discipline Problems

Captured documents and P/W statements reveal the stringent steps that the Nazis are attempting to apply to maintain essential military discipline. Blaskowitz, in a captured order dated 5 March 1945, takes the most drastic possible steps against stragglers. It orders that "it will be made known to all soldiers that stragglers do not exist". Soldiers who lose contact with their unit will attach themselves immediately to the "First troops in the line which he can contact by the very noise of battle where troops can be found." The excuse of a straggler looking for his unit will no longer be accepted. The creation of mobile courts martial, which will be positioned at bridges and ferry sites in particular, is ordered so that soldiers encountered away from their units can be summarily tried and shot.

The elimination of the 48 hour time limit for stragglers obviously indicates how drastic the situation has become. The need to retire swiftly across the RHINE has no doubt exaggerated the problem of stragglers. Moreover, the High Command knows well that stragglers are not only a loss of potential manpower but also dangerous carriers of defeatism.

An order of the Day from Reichsmarschall Goering, dated 16 January 1945, consists entirely of scores of courtmartial sentences handed down against GAF personnel. The wide distribution of the Order and the stiffness of the sentences confirm the serious lag in discipline. Equally significant is the fact that the offenders range from privates to lieutenant general, with heavy emphasis on the higher ranks. Another even more revealing document is an order by Keitel declaring that the issuance of passes and orders for simulated reasons, and the use of forged papers has taken on proportions which seriously jeopardize the conduct of the war. The Fuehrer has ordered that this state of affairs must be counteracted at once with the sharpest measures. Officers who aid a subordinate to leave the combat zone unlawfully by carelessly issuing him a pass or other leave papers are to be considered saboteurs and will suffer death. Any subordinate who deceitfully obtains leave papers or who travels with false papers, will as a matter of principle be punished by death (Ps/W recently back from the interior of GERMANY comment more frequently on the confusion of control of soldiers travelling alone or in small groups on trains. One P/W pointed out that with the weakening of controls soldiers are "marking time" on trains in expectation of the coming end).

Reports of self-mutilation as a technique of undermining discipline are received. An interesting, if not useless attempt to deal with this problem is reported in a captured order of 8 Para Division in which the Commanding General is disturbed by the reports of desertions and self-mutilation among his men. In the future, therefore, he plans to hold not only the commanding officer and NCOs responsible for such outrages, but also the NS Indoctrination officers.

This fetish of attempting to solve discipline problems by clearly fixing responsibility and by filling out oaths apparently still impresses Nazi commanders. German officers seem to believe that small units in specific situations can be made to resist with greater determination by the signing of specific oaths. In one case some NCOs were required to complete the following oath: "I bind myself under oath to defend with my men, emplacement number 96, to the last man and against every enemy attack. I guarantee not to yield my position, not even if the enemy threatens to encircle it. I know that I and my men will be shot as deserters if I abandon my position without orders during the enemy attack".

#### IV. Allied Propaganda

##### (a) Leaflets

Exposure to leaflets among German Ps/W continues to be impressive. A survey of 450 Ps/W captured between 25 February and 2 March on the 12 A.G. front revealed that over 50 percent had seen leaflets dealing with surrender. A smaller sample of a group of Ps/W (188) captured between 14 -18 February in the GOCH and REICHSWALD areas showed that over 50 percent of these Ps/W had seen Allied leaflets at the front. Professed acceptance of the contents of our leaflets increased during this period. Although subjects remembered continued to be "promise of good treatment" and self-preservation through surrender, specific mentions of news sheets are increasing. Among the 188 Ps/W mentioned, above 25 percent reported that they had seen "Nachrichten fuer die Truppe", alone.

##### (b) Radio

Interrogations point to the fact that recently more Ps/W report having listened to Allied radio programs. This is partly due to the fact that

many of the soldiers encountered as replacements who had the opportunity to listen while in the rear, either on company sets or with civilians. There is not much statistical information on this point, but, for example, it was found that among the previously mentioned 188 Ps/W over 35 percent reported having listened in to enemy radio broadcasts. This figure, however, does not indicate how recent and frequent these listening habits were.

(c) PA Appeals

In the rapidly moving present situation, Army Psychological Combat Teams are making increased use of public address appeals, especially to encircled units. Notable successes have been achieved. A Third Army G-2 report credits PA missions with assisting in the capture of at least 500 Ps/W in the breakthrough of the 4th US Armoured Division from KYLL River to the RHINE. The combat loudspeaker was installed in a light tank and followed command tanks to make broadcasts either on the move or during pauses in firing, deploying and regrouping. Since the German soldiers who surrendered came near the combat loudspeaker, it was possible to interrogate them immediately on tactical information. Broadcasts were also made requesting foreign workers to report to the loudspeaker where they were interrogated for tactical information of immediate interest.

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