

Head-Quarters of the Army.


Washington Jan'y 7, 63.

Major Genl Burnside
Comdg F.C., Exmouth.

Genl


Your communication of the 5th, was delivered to me by your Aide de Camp at 12 M. to-day.

In all my communications and interviews with you since you took command of the Army of the Potomac, I have advised a forward movement across the Rappahannock. At our interview at Warrenton I urged that you should cross by the fords above Fredericksburg, rather than to fall down to that place; and when I left you at Warrenton it was understood that at least a considerable part of your army would cross by the fords, and I so represented to the President. It was this modification of the




plan proposed by you that I telegraphed you had received his approval. When the attempt at Fredericksburg was abandoned, I advised you to renew the attempt at some other point, either in whole or in part, to turn the enemy's works, or to threaten their rings or communications. In other words, to keep the enemy occupied till a favorable opportunity offered to strike a decisive blow. I particularly advised you to use your Cavalry & light Artillery upon his communications & attempt to cut off his supplies & engage him at an advantage. In all our interviews I have urged that our first object was, not "Richmond", but the defeat or scattering of Lee's Army, which threatened Washington & the line of the Upper Potomac.

I now recur to these things simply to remind you of the general views which I have



expressed, and which I still hold. The circumstances of the case, however, have somewhat changed since the early part of November. The chances of an extended line of operations are now on account of the advanced season, much less than then. But the chances are still in our favor to meet and defeat the enemy on the Rappahannock, if we can effect a crossing in a position where we can meet the enemy on favorable or even equal terms. I therefore still advise a movement against him.


The character of that movement however, must depend upon circumstances which may change any day and almost any hour. If the enemy should concentrate his forces at the place you have selected for a crossing, make it a feint, & try another place. Again, the circumstances at the



time may be such as to render an attempt to cross the entire army not advisable. In that case, theory suggests that while the enemy concentrates at that point, advantages can be gained by crossing smaller forces at other points, to cut off his lines, destroy his communication & capture his rear-guards, outposts, &c. The great object is to occupy the enemy, to prevent his making large detachments or distant raids, and to injure him all you can, with the least injury to yourself. If this can be best accomplished by feints of a general crossing, and detached real crossings, take that course; if by an actual general crossing, with feints on other points, adopt that course. There seems to me to be many reasons why a crossing at some point should be attempted. It will not do to keep your large army inactive. As you yourself

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admit, it devolves on you to decide upon the time, place, and character of the crossing which you may attempt. I can only advise that an attempt be made, & as early as possible.

Very respectfully
Your obt^d Serv^t.

(signed). J. W. Wallack.
Genl in Chf.

18th Nov 1890

My dear Mr. ...
I have just received your letter of the 14th inst. and am
glad to hear that you are well. I am at present
on a short holiday and cannot
reply to you more fully at present.
I will write again when I
return to my duties.
Yours faithfully,
J. B. ...

Genl Halleck
to
Genl Dumont

Jan. 8. 1863.

I understand Gen. Halleck
has sent you a letter of which
this is a copy & approve the
letter. I deplore the war of
conscience with you, in opinion
by your General officers, but
I do not see the remedy.

Be cautious, and do not
desert the government,
or country, is advising you, I do
not see how I could pro-
fit by changing the command
of the A. P. & if I did, I
should not wish to do it by
accepting the resignation of
your Commissioner. Lincoln

Gen. Burnside.

Journal of
J. M. Smith

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