

Consider

1. it proper and necessary to have one at all
2. the manner in which it should be elected;
3. the form of their service;

1. it proper and necessary to have a Senate:

the will be made manifest by an attention consideration of the dangers that will attend the vesting the legislative power in a single body and the additional security which will be derived from a second branch in the legislative.

Liberty consists not merely in an absolute exemption from the control of men and no our laws but in being free from the danger of having such a power that people government and constitution in the present which make the best provision for the making of wise and salutary laws. A good government implies two things

1. fidelity to the object of the government which is the happiness of the people.
2. a knowledge of the means by which that object can be best obtained.

As a Senate if properly chosen must possess greater wisdom experience and a better knowledge of the general interest of the country than the members of the H. R. AA
Therefore there must when there is such a body be less danger of having impulsive laws passed a greater security and greater confidence in the people that they will not be passed. The same inclination to promote the happiness of the people and a vigilance over the propriety of the means to point out the means by which that happiness can be attained. Therefore a Senate must conduce to the preservation of liberty and the happiness of the people.

The faction and unwholesomeness of a single legislative body are equally dangerous to the people. In the first place from the conflict of different parties who have great views not the public good for them of such. So the other too often in the consequence of a general consent of the members of that body, to exert all power into their hands for their private purposes. The effect of both will be counteracted by a Senate.

Establishing a Senate is only dividing the same powers between two Houses instead of giving all to one. In republican government the legislative authority must necessarily be confided to a body of men. A body to be prepared upon the boundaries and the Legislature has so much of it constitutionally that no sufficient barrier can be opposed to its encroachments and of consequence it will accumulate into their hands all authority. But as power is the only proper check to power. Establishing a second branch of the Legislature will be a sufficient check on the improper use of that power. For power in the exercise of power and always views with jealousy the power by which it is rivaled. Therefore each branch of the Legislature will at all times be ready to check the usurpation of the other and the people by throwing themselves into either scale will make it preponderate.

The abuse of power in the Legislature will be more guarded against because least dreaded and watched by the people.

The dangerous coalition between the two Houses not to be dreaded in proportion to the rivalry which exists naturally between them. The good because of the diff. of their views - Local - General - and because of the diff. manner of their being collected by corruption - by the state. The rivalry will produce efforts in each to exceed the other.

The sense of a majority of the people in any country
when it is directed and feared ought to prevail:
as the Senate with teachers from the state at large they will
be more likely to pay proper regard to the sense of the body
of the people than the representatives in many of whom may be
influenced by the local interest, or by opinion of a few may be
inclined to disregard and oppose the Genl sense:
and if the Senate do not follow the sense of the body of the
people they may in some instances of the body of the
lay as arguing that a whole body at one election.

But as the sense of the body of the people ought to pre-
vail, the caprice or injustice of a part, on the momen-
tary abolition of the body of the people themselves
ought to be set aside by a good government.
The most likely to be done by the senate
nothing but the evil which can influence them conclude
if that just such is the operation of abolition, they will of
course for a time will reason as persons in their place;
the honor of their office.
The very evil of the improper views of a party,
stop the momentary folly of all
and acquiesce in the settled abolition of the majority
c.e.

Public bodies as well as individuals are liable to the influence of sudden and violent passions under the operation of a truth the voice of reason is so lowered, that even the capacity of discussing the points of dispute between two bodies of men or two distinct states is separated and not dependent on each but if at any time one part should appear to be under the influence of passion the many be a power in the other branch suff. to check every pernicious measure.

of the partial views of the members of the H. of R. and the
partial laws which they give birth to is one of the great
weaknesses in a representative government.
This partiality proceeds from their being chosen by partial
constituencies, which is properly in violation of that principle
their objections lead of the general welfare.
This is a weakly & especially the case by a Senate chosen
for the 20th state.
as well as from their being gradually losing their partiality,
and coming to see the whole as acting for the 20th state.
Hence the weak union and personal spirit in the Senate.
Hence the general course of the effort of legislation
and hence the weak check on the partial and undisciplined
acts of the other branch.

of the South men & to say that such steps as will increase
honorably connect the people that they are pursuing their
real interests.
Others in the H. of R. will from their number, their influence
on, and from the private letters of the people bid them to con-
sider of their being placed immediately by them, as the
people on their side in case of a dispute.
Thus each man shall seek to then understand the persons that
are in for the public good,
which then superior wisdom shall enable them to discern:

3d. a republic where power is given for a limited time a lesser
 crime a less punishment might suppose an offence comparable a
 man for betraying his trust
 more than equivalent for the proportion of interest in the con-
 mon stock
 and an overbalance to the obligations of duty.
 On a second branch seems there was additional of state
 to be surmounted by corruption or a def. a valuable acqui-
 sition to a government on that account.

... can never be dangerous to the happiness and
welfare of the people at large. On
the contrary, they be suffering &ly dependent on the people & they
will not.

The first supposition is well & sufficiently restrained by
the discipline from forming schemes obnoxious to the pro-
prietors.
On the other supposition it is not proper the confidence of
the people and the schemes to them presented without any
discretion by the H. of R. supported by the people.

great danger of popular apoplexy or them being misled
by a popular and foul leader.
such a character cannot be a member of both houses and therefore
on, although every and from each
of each house in the house, the same is not of much help at
least between the two houses.
will prevent a coalition between those leaders,
and on each house so each of its leaders will endeavor to
increase the public confidence by the good work of this measure.

Intellectual and confusion have been the mortal disease under which popular government has every where perished.

H. of R. ought always to be chosen annually;
each new election brings about a change of great part of
the members,
a change of men a change of measures
then there there is only a single branch every thing is fresh
again!

For all things, I have a brotherly person with me, and I am
in a party. I am in
to be at a time before a few experiments have been made of
this system, and I believe to the government.
on a table, but in a way of

When a man is in a dangerous position, and
when there are a few things, a man does not know a thing
in obeying or breaking the command. But he does not know a thing
when he is in a dangerous position, and he does not know a thing
to be perfect.

time to put the body of the people into the power of the organization
who can have a new means of reaching the consciences.

and it will have the confidence and affection of the people
for no government any more than we are deserving at all long b.
respectable without being truly respectable nor b. truly res-
pectable; a most happy position for our nation.

When there is but a single branch of the logarithm and
not known for a year there is not a suff. degree of respon-
sibility:
because of the great number emp. in a short time,
not any long enough to allow to or answer for the success of
measures.
Sustained by being checked for a longer time will be more res-
ponsible for the measures taken.

of the Senate may by their share in the legislation always prevent a measure which would be fatal or prejudicial to the people.
but they can't only postpone a measure which is really for the public good:

The difference to the public but the consequences of their going
bas church must be chosen in their favor.
in one case they may be the salvation of their country
in the other they only bring on it a tem for any inconvenience:
the latter is one fatal step may be ever lasting ruin:
the not acting for a short time can be with be very pre-ju-
dicial —

Page money - break the Union -

Before the Senate can be dangerous it must corrupt itself. It must corrupt the H. of R. it must corrupt the electors; and it must corrupt the body of the people. It is with that the Senate must be first & corrupt itself before it can betray the interests of the people. A House corrupting the H. of R. the opposition of that corrupt branch of the Legislature would inevitably defeat the attempt without corrupting the electors they would make a new choice; and without corrupting the body of the people.

then making a new choice of electors a new set of Senators
want to be chosen all will then be defeated.
37 The Senate should attempt any thing dangerous before they
have completed the work of corruption. The H. R. with the
people on their side would always be able to disapprove them.
Against the force of the Connecticut paper in relation of the
people nothing will be able to maintain in the Congress
on all authority of the Senate but such a display of enlight-
ened policy and attachment to the public good as will
convince that branch of the Legislature the affection
and support of the entire body of the people the
Blessed the means of corruption must always be pro-
posed by the corrupter before he can effect his purpose
but the Senate cannot acquire those means but with the
consent of the H. R.
Therefore they would be restrained from the attempt by the
want of the means.

The difference between the two houses could never be lasting
or fatal.
Some difference of opinion and quarrel will take place and might
for a short time stop salutary measures
but they must proceed on either from the operation of reason
making a conviction in the mind of one party
or through the influence of the body of the people
or from a spirit of compromise dictated by the public
good
and then difference must end on a determination being
made.
It is resolution when delay would be useless,
and never later to it than is possible.

One reason on the other can be relied on for the reason in favor
of a Senate.
but we must consult experience on the subject, she is the
best construction may better than a theoretical theory.
The history of all the best governments that we are acquainted
with affords strong proofs of the utility of a Senate.
Rome - Athens - Carthage - Sparta
and their orators and most of their property have been
attributed to them.

England, Hanover
and we will say the government can be not easily with it
may the long party that has merged at present is not done
to both the other for getting it out
they have both the same of good results.
but we state general and well informed on the subject
in America
and if we find on inquiry that the people of America are
less unanimous in their opinion in favor of it than
one of the strongest arguments that can be used for it
for we are better and well informed people seldom asleep
as, shoddy by measure for many years in approving a
measure contrary to their true interests.
Every state in the Union has a Senate in its government but
the Revolution except Georgia - and Pennsylvania
Georgia thought no such necessary on the H. of R.
Pennsylvania thought a check necessary but instead of
a Senate elected that all laws of a public nature be
published for consideration.
but this upon experiment like all other paper checks
are found ineffectual,
and Pennsylvania and Georgia both have found their
governments and each has now its Senate.
This is a decisive proof that America all think it right.
The great government affords a still stronger one
that was a unity of power in almost every part of Amer-
ica,
and yet 3 years since in part,
we heard in private or public debate every objection
made to a Senate being introduced on both
but must be conclusive as to the sense of America
Notwithstanding the concurrent testimony of a reason
and experience in favor of a Senate some public men
in

B. B.

From the mode of election it will be all but impossible for any other democratic candidate to practice with one exception over an anti by which elections are too often carried; and the suffrage of the electors being thus more free will be more likely to centre on men who possess the most attractive merits, and the most efficient understanding of character.

A. A.

and as they ^{will} have no separation the same interest with the body of the people from their living with them, being directly them being subject both in person and property to the same laws, but liable to be punished for small offences in office, and finally being dependent on the good will and favorable opinion of the people for a continuance in office.

C. C.

There can be no time in all countries when such a body as I have said then coming from disunion or ruin. of the law such an one as at the time of the American war to not have passed a law which rendered it a capital crime for anyone to propose applying the money designed for the theater to the military service.

D. D.

The legislative body being composed of two parts one checks the other, by the mutual restriction of their actions. But there is a necessity for movement in the course of human affairs, they are forced to move, but still to move in concert, and without violence or government concern in the necessity of such a body:

England was a such a republic as long as the senate was more than an authority. But the virtue of the magistrates in the authority of the senate both fell at the same time, and then the republic was ruined.

The Senate - Plato says the institution of the senate by his country did by his I think all any and qualify the heads of the government and always both preserved the state of the C. D. and kept it in good form. In the state which before has no form liable to disorder but emanation from some one side and at another time to the other, for in this institution of the senate a counterpoise which balances the things in a just equilibrium, provided a firm order and settlement.

Jefferson 126.

his reasoning applies much more forcibly when the legislative power is in one hand, or by force of law the consequence of that is in grasping all power into its hands; and the danger must be still greater when the power is in one hand, than it is in two. If there were two branches of the legislature, because in the last case they would be some who not an effectual check on each other.

E. E.

The publican government is more moderate than when the people are to be answering every cry in their own name or in their own name they have chosen to govern them.

Power controlled or abridged in almost every branch of that power by which it is controlled or abridged. This will always prevent such a coalition as will be dangerous, and thus insures with productive effort in each branch the other in the prosecution for the public good.

3rd - of any dispute between the two branches the lower must always prevail if they pursue the public good. Their number - their being chosen immediately by the people themselves - their superior influence - will always make the body of the people adhere to them - the senate cannot counteract this, as it can later but by showing the people unquestionably that they are pursuing their true interests.

3rd - Republics persons elevated from the mass of the community by the suffrages of their fellow citizens, in stations of great prominence and power may find compensation for betraying their trust, as there is any but merely actuated by superior virtue may appear to exceed the proportion of interest they bear in the common stock, and to outweigh the obligations of duty. The diversity of the legislative power and the increase in the difficulty of the corruption will be a natural consequence.

The powers of the legislature if not divided between two branches will accumulate in a single body until it will embrace all the most important prerogatives of sovereignty, a body which will superintend our property the most essential form of government that can be contrived.

3rd - it is a truth which the experience of every man has attested that the people are commonly most in danger when the means of improving their rights are in the possession of those of whom they entertain the least suspicion. And the power will be the more dangerous because it will be held by a body of whom the people will not be naturally jealous.

Power being always the great object of power, each branch of the legislature will at all times stand ready to check the usurpations of the other. The people by throwing themselves on either scale, will infallibly make it preponderate. If they see that their rights are attempted to be encroached by either, they can make use of the other to prevent it. There are but two ways in which by establishing the two branches to give to themselves an advantage which can never be too highly prized.

A senator who is chosen by electors from the state at large will be more likely to seek for information and advice, and to make himself acquainted with the prevailing humours and dispositions of the people at large, so as to be a very useful legislator than one chosen from a particular county. But not natural partiality for him is a condition for the favour of the people and as he is dependent on the suffrages of his fellow citizens for the continuance of his public honours, he will take care to inquire himself of their dispositions and inclinations and should be willing to attend them their proper degree of influence upon his conduct. Other dependencies and the necessity of being bound to his proper duty by the laws to which he gives his assent are the true and strong chords of sympathy between the representative and the constituent.

3rd - a republican government the legislature authority necessarily predominates. The remedy for this inconvenience is, to divide the legislature into different branches, and to render them by different modes of election, and different principles of action, as little connected with each other as the nature of their common function, and their common dependence on the society will admit.

3rd - it is observable that the immediate election of the senators should be made by men most capable of analyzing the qualities adapted to the station, and of discerning all the passions and inclinations that are proper to govern their choice. A small number of persons, selected by their fellow citizens, will be more likely to possess the information and discernment required in so complicated an investigation.

an unstable government from the excess of confidence which
it attracts in the public councils, and in every respect
undermining the success and progress of which many depend
on the continuance of existing arrangements, and a high
magnitude the ample of a steady system of national
policy.

But the most deplorable effect of all is the demoralization
of attachment and reverence which is made in the hearts of
the people, towards a political system which brings
so many marks of infamy, and also appoints so many
of their flatterers. The government any more than
an individual, can long be respected without being truly
respectable, nor be truly respectable without being
very a certain portion of order and stability.

5th. The want of respectability; arising from the too few
quintessences of men, which prevent any from being
answerable for measures.

The House of Representatives ought to be elected only for a
short time.
Therefore this ought to be an additional body in the legisla-
tive department, which having sufficient permanency
to provide for such objects as require a continued atten-
tion, and a train of measures, may be fully and effectually
answerable for the attainment of those objects.

6th. Merit as a defence to the people against their own tempo-
rary errors and delusions.

As the cost and deliberation of the community ought in
all governments, and actually is in all free governments,
ultimately to prevail over the excess of its numbers; so this
is particularly manifest in public affairs, when the pre-
judices stimulated by some irregular passion or some
ill-considered measure, or misled by the artful misrepresen-
tations of unprincipled men, may cause the most ready to
condemn.

3rd. The critical moments, however, will be the in-
terference of some temperate and respectable body of
citizens in order to check the going wheels, and
to suspend the blow which is by the people against
themselves, but which may be further and truth can be
given their authority over the public mind.

Of the different consequences of their interference prove
the utility of it.

If they oppose a good measure, it is only postponed.
The more it is urged, the more fully it will be pro-
prietarily be carried out, and it may often be adopted,
but if they oppose a bad measure, they may by the
stop put to the measure at that time, keep their
country from ruin.

It is a solemn responsibility that the not acting for a short
time in any particular way even to of any great
prejudice to the community.

but our further step actually taken may be irre-
versible.

Paper money - proposition to break union to.

Before the Senate can be dangerous it must corrupt itself.
It must corrupt the House of Representatives. It must
corrupt the electors; and it must corrupt the body of
the people.

3d. In order that the Senate must be first corrupted. If before
it can betray the interests of the people; without corrupting
the House of Representatives the opposition of that co-ordinate
branch of the Legislature would inevitably defeat the at-
tempt. Without corrupting the electors they would make
no choice; and without corrupting the body of the people by
making choice of a new set of electors all things would be
wholly subject to their private order.

3d. The Senate should attempt any thing dangerous before they have
completely the work of corruption in the House of Representatives
with the people on their side. If at all times be able to bring back
the corruption to its primitive form and principles, against the
form of the corrupt representation of the people, nothing will be
able to maintain from the constitutional authority of the Senate,
but which a display of enlightened policy, and attachment to the
public good, as well as directly with the benefit of the Legislature,
the efficiency and support of the entire body of the people, than
- 5 -

To a republican government it is essential that the
 decision from the great body of the society, not from an
 inconsiderable proportion, or a few, or a class of the
 It is sufficient for such a government that the persons
 + administering be appointed either directly or
 indirectly by the people; and that they hold their ap-
 pointment during pleasure, for a limited period,
 or during good behaviour.

The greater the power is the shorter ought to be its duration
 + and the smaller the power the more safely may its
 duration be protracted.

Republican government is never more in danger than
 when the people want to be and every citizen thinks him-
 self on a level with those they have chosen to govern
 them.

The purpose of establishing different houses of representa-
 tion is to introduce the influence of different principles
 or of different interests. But when the senate are chosen
 + by the same electors at the same time and out of the
 same description, the choice falls of course on men of the
 same description. When then in the case a state does not
 derive from the separation of the legislature the two
 houses the benefit which a proper complication of prin-
 ciples is capable of producing.

Madison page 4 and 2.

Many laws Senate - paper money - Conf. estate -
 + Consistent very low in relation to all of these.
 Federal Senate not objected to in all the debates in America.

Exp. of American. all have them at first but Georgia and
 Penna. the last in fact constitution. The first two
 + in bills as a substitute, found in effectment,
 both have them in the last.

Non-Albion and Canthage.

Every large popular assembly should be viewed as a map
 of men capable of political distinction and political action.
 + capable of too much attachment and too much animosity.
 It is capable of being biased by wealth and by wealth's motives,
 easily to be governed by undue influence, by caprice,
 and by corruption.

Liberty converts necessity in an actual exemption
 from the constraint of necessity and necessary laws but
 + future people government and constitution in the present
 a great many the best provision for the enacting of a
 prudent and salutary law.

This security greatly encourages, and this provision too, by
 a secure branch of the legislature.
 + when that security is added to a government liberty is
 increased by that means.

of the factions and irregularity of single legislation
 + body an equally dangerous.

A single power
 to fortify the power and secure the stability of government
 to oppose and stop the propensity of the members of the
 people;
 + opinion may be regulated among the multitude with
 proof or examination acquiring confidence and respect
 rather than by being repeated from one to another, and
 that paper on founded upon this opinion differing them
 sides with a rapidity that can neither be accounted for
 nor ruin for sometimes a country with the most
 violent commotion. Now the only way to stop the per-
 mutation is to divide the mass; that is to erect districts.

bodies are constituted differently by choice and having different
 propensities and estimates by different passions and interests
 concern in some measures. This is only in itself a bad reason
 stop the effect of a more invidious distinction a bad reason
 taken place and a still happier in all free countries
 for that is most likely to be right and expedient
 was ought to be taken place, as he appears to be so to
 the separate judgment and decision of a small majority
 of the people. at least that is general in right
 for them which is agreeable to their fixed opinions
 and desires.
 Some occasions may arise in which the choice may be
 saved by the selection of the Senate to yield to
 the more invidious whimsies or caprices of the people.
 Examples in Rome 177.

It is the nature of power always to press upon the boundary
 which confers it. Hence how much faction every im-
 plication of control or interference in this position com-
 mon to all bodies of men to extend the claims and author-
 ity of their order above all that of power, and of
 showing it a kind of sacredness or superiority. This
 may be said and a truth in popular assemblies is
 inflamed like every other passion, by communication
 and encouragement. Thus motions added to private
 claims and resolutions operating upon the great
 share of power a kind of right to the legislative
 might induces a majority or at least a large party of
 men in that assembly to insist in insisting to
 draw to themselves the whole power of the state.
 On the proper checks to power thus dangerously used, in
 house bodies in other hands, the executive or second branch
 of the legislature has been found the only effectual
 check to the first.

All passions are prejudicial and all augmented for
 upon a collected multitude. Besides when numbers
 are concerned in an unjust action they derive the shame
 of it and shelter themselves from another's exam-
 ple: each man thinking his own character his in the crowd.
 Establishing a Senate is only dividing the same quan-
 tity of power into more hands, a truth on which liberal
 bodies must always be favourable to liberty.
 Experience proves that the happiest disposition can not
 brook the abatement of power, which has no share
 but with a desire to give advantage: as though one
 should not the very idea of a branch; nor does it care
 to struggle like it has beaten down every boundary.

From 174 to 177 at large: further points.
 A man is obliged by the Senate in not lost for
 this only postpones. Delay in the business of the leg-
 islation might be salutary. It has even been shown that
 a little more respect cannot be taken up again the same
 session.
 Though the early and more invidious opinions of the people
 moulded by the division are more likely to be made the
 Senate may be what they thought was wrong yet when
 the people after full information on the subject persevere
 in their opinions, such opinions ought to be chosen
 for them it may be said that the voice of the people
 is the voice of God.
 and if the Senate should refuse to give due weight to
 this opinion at the next election the electors choose
 by the people would displace them.
 and upon a change of members on such a principle
 can be no doubt but that the new set would conform
 to the wishes and interests of the people. Whenever the leg-
 islation is chosen by the people they must sooner or later
 conform to their will.

Senate chosen by elections chosen by the people, as
 much their choice as laws made by representatives
 may be said to be made by the people.
 Indeed an act by another does it himself.

The tyranny of a large body is of all known tyrannies
 the most cruel and the most intolerable. Every
 remedy for the oppressed: a human a single citi-
 zen is at length stopped in his career by suffer-
 ing. He has the riches of remorse, of shame or
 that of the public opinion: but a large body makes
 no calculations, feels no shame or remorse and
 chooses to do it glory when in fact it does it
 the utmost disgrace.

When party operates to produce party laws a single
 house is a single person and subject to the last
 caprice and passion of a single dual sovereignty.
 at least it is an aristocracy.

But no man says that by tyranny cannot be said in a
 large assembly. It may become a many heads
 hydra as far as power as an individual.

Examination of

Public bodies as such an undivided body liable to
 the influence of sedition and violent passions, render
 the operation of which the voice of reason is silenced.
 In a large body the capriciousness of choice, the powers of
 legislation between two bodies of them a house
 others: that of at any time one part shall be up-
 held by an undue influence, either from passion
 or from an over-valuation of any cause, than
 sufficient to check every proper measure.
 A Senate besides being a check on the other branch
 may be made a collection of wisdom and experience
 by requiring greater age and longer residence to
 qualify the Senate than for the house of representatives.
 By the means it will be better men in rank
 than from their age, experience, and the way of men
 and the art of governing are not liable to the cap-
 of passion that govern the young.
 Experience in the best sense of the word is better than
 a theory and the voice of the history of all the repub-
 lican governments as an agreeable and a
 approach proof of the utility of different branches in
 a legislature.

A member of the house of representatives is chosen for
 a particular country, hence his views are local and
 confined. The senator is chosen for the whole state.
 Hence they gradually lose their partiality, per-
 nature their views are more enlarged than in
 acting for the whole state. Hence by the Senate
 in every respect wisdom and firmness. Hence
 may say they view at once the object of legislation
 and act on the more partial and interested
 each of the other branch.
 of the knowledge being drawn from the whole state
 with effectually expedite business, as no man can
 be a whole state.
 Hence drawn in choice the people must with vol-
 for the more persons or persons they are chosen
 to.
 This equal choice will annul the partial views in
 legislation which is one of the greatest evils in a re-
 publican government.

32 in objects that no separate interests should exist in a state and that a democracy of the higher talents has a tendency to create them.

But this objection is founded on jealousy not on reason.

Other states can have no separate ^{interest} from the body of the people. They live among them. They are chosen by them. They must use an ^{amount} of their power in four years. They are liable to be punished for mal practice. They are properly in ^{some} ^{other} ^{other} among the people, subject to the same laws, and they can never be recalcitrant to that officer but by the favor of the people.

Then the separation of the legislature divides the power - checks - restrains - diminishes the probability of the same time it creates no division of interest that can triumph either branch to encroach upon the other or upon the people. 32 But the least harm such a branch is an equal safety - in fact - it is an obvious calculation for the general good, both branches will be unanimous.

A Senate thus chosen will not be immediately over-ruled by the more numerous branch. The danger of the House of Representatives may claim an increase of power, with a little more power as the rising billions prove their ability to reach. Nor is not for the difference of the manner in which the two houses are constituted, a jealousy may be entertained of too perfect a co-operation of the two branches.

Other collective wisdom brought in. They to obtain their precarious, for by their qualities alone. They will be educated officers; they will have no peculiar views for they will be educated among and on a footing with the people; men of ability. They will not be chosen for their wealth but for their reputation. They will have a high regard with all for their will be chosen for their qualifications; a few only who are not eminently endowed with moral qualifications will find their way there, and they will be such as will be sent there from a reliance on their virtues public and private.

32 in a part of observation that the people of any country (if like the American intelligent and well informed) seldom adopt an steadily preserve for many years, in an opinion respecting their true interests. This conclusion ought to inspire us with a great respect for the wisdom of America as to the propriety of having two branches of the legislature.

Stability, and confidence have been the mortal dangers under which popular government has every where perished, and continue to be the principal and fruitful sources from which the adversaries to liberty derive their most specious denunciations.

Every thing that can be done in a government which has a tendency to prevent this will be of great service to the cause of liberty itself.

Another great and religious motive can be relied on as an additional check on the impetuosity and violence of individual passions, and they lose their efficacy in proportion to the number combined together. That is in proportion as their efficacy becomes divided.

From this mode of election it is all but impossible for for any one body of electors to practice with success the vicious art, by which elections are too often carried, and the suffrages of the electors being more free, and more likely to be controlled by the people, the more likely to be the more able characters.

The difference of opinion and the passage of the two houses though they may sometimes obstruct or delay salutary laws, yet often promote deliberation and circumsppection, and serve to check excesses in either. Where a resolution too is once taken the opposition must be at an end, because that resolution is a law and resistance to it punishable.

Montagu

The Americans propose law which renders it capital crime for any one to propose applying the money designed for the theatre to the military service.

Bartholomew as a well regulated republic as long as the Senate preserve their authority. But the virtue of the magistrates and the authority of the Senate both fall at the same time, and then the republic is ruined.

The legislative body being composed of two parts, one checks the other by the mutual privilege of rejecting. But as Rome is a principle for movement in the course of winter affairs, they are for to move but still to move in concert.

Plutarch

The establishment of the Senate by Licinius (says Plutarch) did by the Whigge allayans qualify the hands of the government, and always both preserved the state of the C. M. and kept it in good temper. For the state at that time had no firm basis to stand on but leaned at one time to one side and at another time to the other, finding in this establishment of the Senate a counterpoise, which always kept things in a just equilibrium, preserved a firm order and settled state.

Temperance always in danger when the people grow with them and are equal to those they have elected to govern them.

Three modes of choosing senators.

1 by the people themselves in districts;

2 by the people throughout the state;

3 by electors chosen by the people in districts.

By the first mode in districts, local reputation is chosen, by the second mode in the same manner though more in number some kind of merit is chosen.

By the second mode men would not be elected because in civil life they cannot be supposed to have the 15 or 30 but men of a good name or character.

By the third mode chosen in that part of the state which is the most populous or the most virtuous and the most in favor of particular actions.

By the third mode men will be called forth from the whole country, electors will communicate with each other, they will be better qualified to judge of the merits of the candidates.

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A division of the legislature into two or three parts best meets
the case. It is adopted by the legislature for it is pro-
bably the best and most useful either for doing or undoing what
the public good requires.
A division in opinion or between the parties is the most probable
way of producing truth;
what is adopted by two is approved by all and has the
greater chance to be for the public good;
what is rejected is only lost power.
A division of the executive power is the established mode of
the right of the strongest.
A division of the legislative power is either truth, or the
general tranquillity.

Of the people as such as money has been occasion, and even
more than them, to be directed by a council or senate. Some
think to have a proper confidence in them they should have
the election of the members; and thus to have the election
to make by themselves as it is there; or by some magis-
trate deposited for that purpose, as on certain occasions
was customary at Rome. Montaigne.

When there is but one branch of the legislature, the legis-
lature power is continually in motion; and as it is
freely directed, almost every question of it is attended
with some injury either to the laws or the state.
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