

Appointments to officers.

- All that the people can be supposed to make an act as any other body would be made by them - because the sovereignty is their's and only they have the power it can be better exercised by superior; and because there is less danger of corruption.
- To the execution or to have the great execution of the laws as ought this power to have the app't of the subv. directly in vent. they will a large body must made by the hands they receive. The app't from.
- It is equally the will of the people as large that you must be by some minister and the lower comparatively as to on all -
- on the execution and on it of the people as to on the lower. concerned in the making proper app'ts as on the people from their own elect. clear make but for the rest must be made by the execution.
- the execution is a most for the benefit of the people as to on the great 2. of the government depends on a great measure on the action depends on the knowledge and virtue of those who administer it.
- the app't to officers is very important part of the government and that much should be adopted as best is most likely to make the best choice.
- A choice is then a more likely to be executed with great and fidelity, when the person who gives the order chooses the whole without any other the person who executes it knows that he must be answerable to him for his conduct in the business.
- the legislature is much the choicest part of the government of the app't to officers is given to them also, added to what they will hope to be done, they want so to be able to make the other persons who are in their power, and in turn enable them to exercise all authority in their own hands.
- nothing less so much to prevent in the case and what in the legislature is a more effectual way of work that takes place there.
- when they appoint, determine on the officer and fix salary low, moderate or high conduct.
- they may create more officers, fix high salaries, but they expect to get them themselves.
- but if they have not the app't they will make none but what will keep them from being as high salary them in proper proportion to have a right to expect that both should be observed.
- no corruption in it may be kept from this cause than all others.
- and when one begins with others to other instances.
- they have a right to impeach too for misconduct - if they have power to appoint -
- the right instead of being in a position to put in and out only by looking on a power to put in favour and put out others.
- one man for a favour and connection than 50.
- perhaps to exclude him and in improper choice because of his sole responsibility which does not sufficiently exist in 50.
- in case of disagreement cannot be put many appoint it is too often that on some cases the case is the in the case of the legislature.
- the appointment of the judiciary by the executive, directly in some manner. the division of powers, and the checks arising from the independence of each.
- but the danger is left from the person who chooses by which they select their officers.
- because the independence of the judiciary being necessary for a judge a proper choice will more probably be made by one man than many.
- because in most cases the danger arises from the app't by the executive than the legislature.
- and because there is a natural alliance of it between the executive and judiciary, in keeping the legislature in proper bounds.
- as there is much more reason that the responsibility of those who appoint for the persons and competency of the persons on whom they bestow their choice and the interest they have in the subject holds are more for the justice and satisfaction of affairs with others as sufficient to make the best possible choice.
- of the person who is to be made to be in a position for the proper execution of the power as neither way other - the legislature act.
- there is a sole responsibility in them - none in the legislature from their numbers.
- the person to whom immediate management the execution of the laws is committed ought to be considered as the agent of the people in the execution of the laws and on their account they ought to direct them and to be subject to their approbation and ought to be subject to their superintendence.

One man of discernment better qualified to analyze our situation
the peculiar qualities adapted to the particular office than a
body of men of equal, or perhaps even of superior education,
the oath and sense of responsibility of one, with the public
sense of duty and respect to reputation.
as he will have power, the sort of friends he serves he will have
been an imbecile, the latter is true.
a man may be a legislator, it is within a history of one party,
or a compromise between two.
both are less chance for a proper choice. as an example of
that the source being rarely allowed to be either.

Any legislative body that is numerous is governed by itself
its members, say to
each member will have his power and connection to provide for
the desire of material gratification which is a secondary one,
the power of votes and consequence for place.
The private attachments of some men may readily be satisfied
but the safety of the private attachments of men, would be a
monopoly of all the principal employments of the
government, in a few families, and would be a bad
arrangement.

Exp! and present opinion on the American form of the plan,
as first at the const. convention the appⁿ on the level,
ultimately at the next const. con. then by the executive,
and also the judicial government.

In whom ought the constitution of a free country, to vest the power of making appointments to office?

As it is a self-evident proposition that no country can be happy, till its constitution be such it may possess the government of that country is duly administered: it is a matter of the greatest importance for a member of the convention to ascertain in whom the constitution ought vest the power of appointing those officers who are to administer that government.

Knowledge and virtue in those who are appointed to public office are the great objects which ought to be sought after by those who are to make those appointments: and that much ought to be assigned by the constitution which will be most likely to produce officers possessing those qualities: and which will be clear of those fundamental evils which ought to be provided against in every constitution.

Then appointments must be made, either

1. by the people themselves; or
2. by the legislature; or
3. by the Governor, under such restrictions as may be directed by the constitution.

As the government was established for the benefit of the people at large; as their happiness or misery is essentially involved in the conduct of those who are to administer that government; as the people will always act to the best of their judgment in making the appointments which they must serve to themselves; and as there is always danger that those to whom that power is delegated may be influenced by corrupt motives in the exercise of it: the people ought in all cases in which they can make the appointments without too much inconvenience to themselves and as much or greater advantage to the public interest, as their appointments could be made by any other mode to make the appointments themselves and not trust them to be made by any other persons, whether be cause they will then escape the danger of their being made by others from corrupt motives. But when the people cannot from their scattered situation make the appointments without too great a loss of time or when they cannot make them with any great probability of promoting the public interest, as if they had been made by some of their representatives: the people ought not to surrender to them the power of making those appointments; because on those cases they would encroach more widely than they would sustain by delegating the power to others. However, as the power to the wisdom of the convention to separate those cases in which the appointments may be made with advantage to common utility at large, I will inquire whether when that cannot be done, the power of making the appointments ought to be lodged by the constitution with the legislature or the executive branch of the government. We ought during the discussion of this subject, to recollect that those who come from that branch are all and equally, the servants of the people; nor was

them from them. and that in the allotment of
the powers which are to be given by the constitution to
either of those branches, that they should be given to
or withheld from either of them, as reason and equity
may shall direct, with the view to the interest of
the people at large; without paying any regard to
the addition or diminution which will be by these
means made in the power and consequence of those
individuals, who will compare either the one
branch or the other.
On the other power to be lodged in the Legislature.