


WHZ:

found some time
ago in Nichols's
old desk..

give to W. Bailey
for historical files
of University?
or Division?

WMB



WHZ

For your files



Peace on earth,
good will towards men



HERE WAS A MAN who saw God face to face.

His countenance and vestments evermore
Glowed with a light that never shone before,
Saving from him who saw God face to face.
And men, anear him for a little space,

Were sorely vexed at the unwonted light.
Those whom the light did blind rose angrily;

They bore his body to a mountain height
And nailed it to a tree; then went their way;
And he resisted not nor said them nay,
Because that he had seen God face to face.

There was a Man who saw Life face to face,
And ever as he walked from day to day,
The deathless mystery of being lay
Plain as the path he trod in loneliness;

And each deep-hid inscription could he trace;
How men have fought and loved and fought again;
How in lone darkness souls cried out for pain;
How each green foot of sod from sea to sea
Was red with blood of men slain wantonly;
How tears of pity warm as summer rain
Again and ever washed the stains away,
Leaving to Love, at last, the victory.
Above the strife and hate and fever pain,
The squalid talk and walk of sordid men,
He saw the vision changeless as the stars
That shone through temple gates or prison bars,
Or to the body nailed upon the tree,
Through each mean action of the life that is,
The marvel of the Life that yet shall be.

—David Starr Jordan

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
LELAND STANFORD JUNIOR UNIVERSITY
Palo Alto, California

Menlo Park P. O., Cal.

July 28, 1891.

Dr. William R. Harper,
Chautauqua,
N. Y.

Dear Dr. Harper:

I have been very sorry that I did not meet you somewhere before coming west. You and I, as matters stand now, are more nearly engaged in the same work than any other two men in the country. Each of us has a remarkable opportunity, and I hope that neither of us will do any great mischief with the work that has been put in our hands. I find that we are likely to cross each other's path more than once in the selection of our faculty, and one of the strongest things that can be said in praise of the Chicago University is the character of those men to whom positions are reputed to have been offered.

Your name will, of course, be put on our mailing list, and I shall hope to receive copies of everything which you may publish.

Cordially yours,

DAVID S. JORDAN

C O P Y

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COPY

Office of the President
Leland Stanford Junior University
Palo Alto, California

Post Office: "Stanford University"

June 15, 1894.

Presr. W. R.

Chic

er,

Dec.

Dear Sir;

Stanford University sends
its congratulations to her younger
sister, the University of Chicago, on
the dedication of the Ryerson
Laboratory.

I regret that it will not
be possible for any representative
from this institution to be
present on the occasion.

Very truly yours.

David S. Jordan

Office of the President
Leland Stanford Junior University
Palo Alto, California

Post Office: "Stanford University"

June 18, 1894.

Presr. W. R.

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This image shows a blank, aged, light brown paper cover or endpaper of a book. The paper has a textured, slightly mottled appearance with some minor discoloration and wear. A large, irregular white tear is visible on the left side, partially obscuring the brown paper. The edges of the paper are slightly frayed and uneven.

Office of the President
Leland Stanford Junior University
Palo Alto, California

Post Office: "Stanford University"

Confidential

Jordan

Oct. 30, 1894.

Prest. William R. Harper,
University of Chicago,
Chicago, Ills.

Dear Sir:

The details of the foundation and organization of the Leland Stanford Junior University are familiar to you. In 1885, after the death of their only son, Leland Stanford and his wife resolved to devote their fortune to the cause of Higher Education, and they established the University by a grant of some 85,000 acres of land, and the erection of the necessary buildings at a cost of \$1,500,000. The University was opened in 1891, and has now 1050 students and 80 teachers.

On the death of Leland Stanford in 1893 he left the University \$2,500,000 in cash, his wife being the residuary legatee of an estate appraised at \$17,000,000. It was the understanding between Mr. and Mrs. Stanford that the survivor should give this sum to the University, of which the two were joint founders. This Mrs. Stanford has loyally endeavored to do, devoting every energy to this end and having already made great personal sacrifices. Every debt of the estate has been paid by her, and her sole thought has been how best to contribute to the strength and usefulness of the University. While she and her husband had the deepest interest

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President Harper -2

in University matters, they have given the University the utmost freedom of development. No gift so great was ever before made to the cause of Higher Education and none was ever made in a nobler spirit. No Faculty has ever been so free as this one to make the University what, in its judgment, a University should be.

There is but one cloud on the future of the University,- a claim made in the name of the Attorney General of the United States for the sum of \$15,000,000, the amount to be due in a few years on a second mortgage on the Central Pacific Railroad, in which Mr. Stanford was a stockholder. Able and distinguished jurists hold the opinion that this claim can have no legal basis. It is more than probable that the eventual result of litigation would be favorable to the University. Nevertheless prolonged litigation would be disastrous to the continuous growth and usefulness of the institution, and conceivably it might result in defeating entirely the intentions of the founders. During such litigation this vast fortune would doubtless be frittered away. Even if the United States should secure judgment -- and I know of no ground on which such a judgment could be based -- a forced sale of the stocks and bonds of which the Stanford estate is in great part composed would realize but little in the markets of the country.

The cause of Higher Education in America is deeply interested

Office of the President
Leland Stanford Junior University
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Very truly yours,

David S. Jordan

President.

Office of the President
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Dr. Harper.

THE STABILITY OF TRUTH. #

BY

DAVID STARR JORDAN.

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#ADDRESS AT THE DEDICATION OF HULL HALL, UNIVERSITY OF
CHICAGO, JULY 3rd, 1896.

Becker

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BY

DAVID STARR JORDAN.

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ADDRESS AT THE DEDICATION OF HULL HALL, UNIVERSITY OF

CHICAGO, JULY 24, 1893.

#ADDRESS AT THE DEDICATION OF HULL HALL , UNIVERSITY OF

CHICAGO, JULY 3rd, 1896 .

THE STABILITY OF TRUTH. #

DAVID STARR JORDAN .

Within the last few years three notable assaults have been made on the integrity of Science. Two of these have come from the hostile camp of mediaeval Metaphysics, another from the very front of the army of Science itself. Salisbury, Balfour and Haeckel agree in this, that "Belief" may rest on foundations unknown to "Knowledge", and that the conclusions of Science may be subject to additions and revisions in accordance with the demands of "Belief". To some considerations suggested in part by Balfour's "Foundations of Belief" and Haeckel's "Confession of Faith of a Man of Science", I invite your attention to-day.

The growing complexity of civilized life demands with each age broader and more exact knowledge as to the material surroundings and greater precision in our recognition of the invisible forces or tendencies about us. We are in the hands of the Fates, and the greater our activities, the more evident becomes these limiting conditions. The secret of power with man is to know its limitations. To this end we need constantly new accessions

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of truth as to the universe and better definition of the truths which are old. Such knowledge, tested and placed in order, we call Science. Science is the gathered wisdom of the race. Only a part of it can be grasped by any one man. Each must enter in- to the work of ~~xxx~~ others. Science is the flower of the Altruism of the ages, by which nothing that lives "liveth for itself alone." The recognition of facts and laws in the province of Science. We only know what lies about us from our own experience and that of others, this experience of others being translated into terms of our own experience and more or less perfectly blended with it. We can find the meaning of phenomena only from our reasoning based on these experiences. All knowledge we can attain or hope to attain must, in so far as it is knowledge at all, be stated in terms of human experience. The laws of Nature are not the products of Science. They are the human glimpses of that which ^{is} the "Law before all time."

Thus human experience is the foundation of all knowledge. Even innate ideas, if such ideas exist, are derived in some way from Knowledge possessed by our ancestors, as innate impulses to action are related to ancestral needs for action.

But is Human Experience the basis also of Belief as it is of Knowledge?

One of the questions of the day is this, is "To Believe" more than "To Know"? Shall a sane man extend Belief in the directions where he has no knowledge and in lines outside the reach of his power to act? Can BELIEF soar in space not traversable by "organized common-sense"? If such distinction is made between "KNOWING" and "BELIEVING", which of the two has precedence as a guide for action? Is Belief to be tested by Science? Or is Science useful only where Belief is indifferent to the subject matter? If Belief is subordinate to the tests of Science, to be accepted or rejected in the degree of its accord with human experience, then it is simply an annex to Science, a foot-note to human experience, and the authority of the latter is supreme. If however, Truth comes to us from sources outside of human experience it must come in some pure form, free from human errors. As such it must claim the first place. In this event the progress of Science will be always on a lower plane than the progress of Belief.

In a recent address before the British Association for the Advancement of Science, the Marquis of Salisbury made in brief this contention. The central thought of Modern Science is Evolution, the change from the simple to the complex. This implies not only the fundamental unity of all life, but the fundamental

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In a recent address before the British Association for the Advancement of Science, the Marquis of Salisbury made in brief this contention. The central thought of Modern Science is Evolution, the change from the simple to the complex. This implies not only the fundamental unity of all life, but the fundamental

unity of all matter, and perhaps of all force as well. In spite of the claims of scientific men even the fact of Organic Evolution, is far from demonstrated while of inorganic evolution, the development of the chemical elements, Science can tell us nothing. Wherefore the Marquis, in view of the failure of Science to keep up with the progress of Belief, grows jocular and patronizing. His advice to his scientific associates might be stated in the words of Thackeray that "We should think small beer of ourselves and pass around the bottle."

More recently another English Statesman, Mr. Arthur J. Balfour, has discussed the "Foundations of Belief". He has shown that the methods of Science cannot give us Absolute Truth. Its methods are "of the earth, earthy". Its claim of trust in the infallibility of its own processes has no higher authority than the claim of infallibility made at times by religious organizations. For as only the senses and the reason can be appealed to in support of the claims of the senses and the reason, the argument of Science is of necessity reasoning in a circle. Science can give us no ground solid enough to bear the weight of Belief. Belief must exist and it may therefore rest on the innate needs of man and the philosophy which is built on these needs in accordance

with the authority which the human soul finds sufficient.

Balfour calls attention to the fact that human experience is not in its essence objective. It consists only of varying phases of consciousness. These phases of consciousness at best only point towards Truth. They are not Truth itself. They vary with the varying nerve cells of each individual creature on whom phases of consciousness are impressed and again with the changes in the cells themselves. The tricks of the senses are well known in Psychology, as is also the failure of the senses as to material outside their usual range. Life is at best "in a dimly lighted room", and all the objects about us are in their essence quite different from what they seem. This essence is unknown and unknowable. We are well aware that we have no power to recognize all phases of reality. The electric condition of an object may be as real as its color or its temperature, and yet none of our senses respond to it. Our eyes give but an octave of the vibrations we call light, and our ears are dull to all but a narrow range in pitch of sound.

Likewise is reason to be discredited. The commonest things become unknown or impossible when viewed "in the critical light of Philosophy." Balfour shows that the simple affirmation "the sun gives light", loses all its meaning and possibility when taken out of the category of human experience, and discussed in terms of

philosophy. In like manner can any simple fact be thrown into the category of myths and dreams. A man can be led by the methods of Metaphysics, to doubt the existence of himself or of any object, about him. For instance, take the discussion of "John's John" and of "Thomas' John", as given by Dr. Holmes. Is the real John, the John as he appears to John himself? Or is he real only in the form in which Thomas regards him, or as he looks to Richard and Henry whose interest in him is progressively less? All we know of the external universe is through the impressions made directly or indirectly on our nervous systems and through recorded impressions made on the systems of others; and a part of this external universe we ourselves are. All that we know of ourselves is that which is external to ourselves. Thus with all this, each man forms in his mind a universe of his own. "My mind to me a kingdom is", and this kingdom in all its parts is somewhat different from any other mental kingdom. It is continually changing. It was made but once and will never be duplicated. When my vital processes cease, this kingdom will vanish "like the baseless fabric of a vision, leaving not a wreck behind." Our mind is of the "stuff that dreams are made of" - and our bodies - what are they? Physically each man is an alliance

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of animals, each one of a single cell, each cell with its processes of life, growth, death, and reproduction, each one with its own "cell-soul" which presides over these processes. In the alliance of these cells, forming tissues and organs, we have the phenomena of mutual help and mutual dependence. In man we find the phenomena of animal life on a larger and more differentiated scale, but the fact of self grows faint as our study is continued. What is this vital force, and what have we to do with it, and is it after all more than another name for the movement of molecules? And of what are our cells composed? Carbon, Oxygen, Hydrogen, Nitrogen, we know by name, but what are these in essence and how are they different one from another? Does matter really exist? Mathematicians have claimed that all relations of ponderable matter and force might exist if the atoms of matter were not realities, but simply relations. Each of these atoms possessed of attraction or weight may be a vortex, ring or eddy in the ether, ^{the} ~~whose~~ ^{of which} ultimate units have vibration but not attraction. If therefore the body of man be an alliance of millions of animal cells, each cell formed of millions of eddies in an inconceivable and impossible ether; if all things around us are recognized only by their effect on the most unstable part of this unstable structure, then again let us think small beer of ourselves

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Each fact or law must be expressed in terms of human experience, if it is expressed or made intelligible at all. To such terms, the word reality applies, and beyond such reality we have never gone. Apparently beyond it we cannot go, at least in the only life we have ever known. Balfour's plea for "philosophic doubt" of the reality of the subject matter of Science is simply a rhetorical trick of describing the unknown in terms of the unknown. By the same process we may call a fish-wife an "Abracadabra" or an "icosahedron", and by the same process we can build out of the commonest materials "an occult science" or a new theosophy. The measure of a man is the basis of human knowledge, and whatever ^{may} be brought to this measure is no part of knowledge. In converse fashion Balfour speaks of the unknown in terms of the known; of the infinite in terms of human experience. This gives to his positive foundations of belief an appearance of reality as fallacious as the unreality he assigns to the foundations of science. This appearance of reality is the base of Haeckel's sneer at conventional religion as belief in a "Caseous Vertebrate"

It is perfectly easy for Science to distinguish between subjective and objective nerve conditions. It can separate those produced by subjective nervous derangements, or by conditions al-

ready passed, from those which are contemporary impressions of external things. It is perfectly easy for common sense to do the same. To be able to do so is the essence of sanity. The test of Sanity is its liveableness, for insanity is death. The Borderland of Spirit of which we hear so much often of late, the land in which subjective and objective creations jostle each other is the borderland of Death. The continued existence of animals and men is based on the adequacy of their sensations and the veracity of their actions. The existence of any creature is, in general, proof of the sanity of its ancestry, or at least, of the sanity of those who controlled the actions of its ancestors.

This veracity is gauged by the degree of coincidence of subjective impressions and objective truth. Who so makes a fool's paradise or a fool's hell of the world about him is not allowed to live in it. This fact in all its bearings must stand as a proof that the universe is outside of man and not within him. In this objective universe which lies outside ourselves we find "the ceaseless flow of force and the rational intelligence that pervades it." No part of it can be fully understood by us, but in it we find no chance movement, "no variableness nor shadow of turning." That such a universe exists seems to demand some intelligence capable of understanding it, of stating its proper-

ties in terms of absolute truth, as distinguished from those of human experience. Only an Infinite Being can be conceived as doing this, hence such Knowledge must enter into our conception of the Infinite Being, whatever may be our Theology in other respects. For to know an object or phenomenon in its fullness, "all in all", "we should know what God is and man is." ^H It is therefore no reproach to human Science that it deals with human relations, not with absolute truths. "The ultimate Truths of Science," Dr. Schurman has said, "rest on the same basis as the ultimate Truths of Philosophy," that is, on ^a ~~the~~ basis that transcends human experience. This is true, for Science has no "Ultimate Truths." There are none known to man. "The perfect Truth," says Lessing, "is but for Thee alone." With ultimate truths human philosophy tries in some ⁿ ~~f~~ashion to deal. To look at the Universe in some degree through the eyes of God is the aim of philosophy. In its aim it is most noble. Its efforts are a source of strength in the conduct of human life. But its conclusions are not truth. They range from the puerile to the incomprehensible, and Science, that is, "common sense", only can distinguish the two. For this reason just in proportion as philosophy is successful, it is unfit as a basis of human action. Human knowledge and action have limitations. The chief of these

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is that whatever cannot be stated in terms of human experience is unintelligible to man. Whatever cannot be thought cannot be lived.

Philosophy has its recognized methods of procedure. These are laid down in the mechanism of the human brain itself. Science has found these methods untrustworthy as a means of reaching objective truth. The final test of scientific truth is this. Can we make it work? Can we trust our life to it? This test the conclusions of philosophy cannot meet. In so far as they do so they are conclusions of Science. As Science advances in any field philosophy is driven away from it. The fact has been often noted, that every great conclusion of Science has been anticipated by Philosophy, most of them by the philosophy of the Greeks. But every theory science has shown to be false has been likewise anticipated. The Greeks taught the theory of Development centuries before Darwin. But if Darwin's studies in life variation had led to any other result whatsoever, he would have been equally anticipated by the Greeks. In other words, every conceivable guess as to the origin and meaning of familiar phenomena has been exhausted by philosophy. Some of these guesses contain elements of Truth. Which of these has such elements it is the business of Science to find out. Philosophy has no means of doing so.

A truth not yet shown to be true is in science not a truth. It has no more validity than any other generalization not shown to be false. Helmholtz tells us that Philosophy deals with such "Schlechtes Stoff", such bad subject matter, that it can give no trustworthy conclusions. Science alone can give the test of human life. The essence of this test is Experiment. ^H The tests of philosophy are mainly these: Is the conception plausible? Has it logical continuity? Is it satisfying to the human heart? And in this connection the figurative word "Heart" is best left undefined. In other words, its sources and its tests are alike subjective, intellectual, or emotional. If we take from philosophy the "heart" element, the personal equation, it becomes Logic or Mathematics. Mathematics is Metaphysics working through methods of precision. It is a most valuable instrument for the study of the relations and ramifications of knowledge, but it can give no addition to knowledge itself. Dr. ^{William} James, defines Metaphysics as "the persistent attempt to think clearly." This definition is good so far as it goes, but to think clearly is a function of Science also. Metaphysics is rather the "attempt to think clearly" in fields where exact data are unattainable or unattainable. In so far as Philosophy is simply clear thinking it is a most valuable agency for testing the deductions of Science. But while it

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 Good so far as it goes, but to think clearly is a function of
 as "the persistent attempt to think clearly." This definition is
 no addition to knowledge itself. Dr. James, defines Metaphysics
 of the relations and ramifications of knowledge, but it can give
 ods of persuasion. It is a most valuable instrument for the study
 or Mathematics. Mathematics is Metaphysics working through meth-
 sophy the "heart" element, the personal equation, it becomes logic
 subjective, intellectual or emotional. If we take from philo-
 undefined. In other words, the sources and the tests are alike
 And in this connection the figurative word "Heart" is best left
 Has it logical continuity? Is it satisfying to the human heart?
 of philosophy are mainly these: Is the conception plausible?
 man life. The essence of this test is Experiment. The tests
 trustworthy conclusions. Science alone can give the test of hu-
 "Scholastic stuff", such bad subject matter, that it can give no
 false. Holmholte tells us that Philosophy deals with such
 has no more validity than any other generalization not shown to be
 A truth not yet shown to be true is in science not a truth. It

can reject false conclusions, it can add no new matter of its own.

For example, the claim ^{is made in} ~~its name~~ on the name of Evolutionary philosophy that all matter is one in essence, therefore all the chemical elements, some seventy in number, must be the same in substance. In this case, all must be derived from the same primitive stuff, and the hypothetical basis of all ponderable matter has been called Protyl. As a working theory this is most ingenious. But is it Science? Is it worthy of belief? Certainly Science knows nothing as yet of the identity of these elements. In a general way Science is finding out that the processes of nature are more complex than man supposed, while the elements on which these processes rest, matter and force, are more simple. How far can this generalization go? To every test human experience has devised, each chemical element remains the same, its atoms unchangeable as well as indestructible. Therefore to speak of them as forms of one substance is to go beyond knowledge. Science does not teach this. But to Philosophy this offers ^{no} difficulty. It is still plausible to suppose that by some combination of primitive units, these variant atoms are formed. Such an idea would have logical continuity, and as we are becoming used to the notions of primal unity, we find such an

idea satisfying to our consciousness. If this is true, somewhere, somehow, lead will be resolved into its primal elements, and these elements may be united in the form of gold. Then will the dream of the alchemist become fact. But Science must make this objection: "Not until then." Such transmutation is as yet no part of knowledge. We certainly do not know that lead can be changed into that which is transmutable into gold. We do not know it, I say; but may we believe it? Is the foundation of Belief less secure than that of Knowledge? Can we trust Philosophy to tell us what to believe, while we must look to Science to tell us what we know?

This brings us to the question of definitions. If knowledge and belief are of like rank, both must rest on science and the results of philosophy must come to science only as hints or suggestions as to ~~future~~ lines of research.

If Knowledge implies stability and Belief does not, the relation of the two is also clear. In that case Belief would be a word of light meaning, expressive of whim or of the balance of opinion. Such weight as it has would be drawn from its association with prejudice. Belief would then be the pretense of knowledge, as compared with knowledge itself. Along its paths Life cannot march with courage and effectiveness. It is not for

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such beliefs as this that the martyrs have lived or died. Their inspiration was the positive belief of Science or the negative belief of the falsity of the ideas, tyranny or superstition had forced upon them. ⁹ To avoid a discussion foreign to my purpose, I wish if possible to separate the word Belief - as used in this paper from the word Religion. The essence of Belief is the categorical statement of propositions. These may be built into a creed, which word is the Latin synonym of belief.

Religion implies rather a condition of the mind and heart, an attitude, not a formula. Faith, Hope, Charity, do not rest on Logic or Observation. Religion implies a reverent attitude towards the universe and its forces, - a kindly feeling towards one's fellow mortals and immortals.

"Pure religion and undefiled" has never formulated a "creed" has never claimed for itself Orthodoxy. It has no stated ritual and no recognized cult of priests. Much that passes conventionally as religious belief among men, has no such quality or value. It is simply the debris of our grandfathers science. While religion and belief become entangled in the human mind, so as not to be easily separable; the one is not necessarily a product of the other. In the higher sense no man can follow or inherit the religion of another. His religion if he has any is his own. Only

forms can be transferred; realities never, for realities in life are the product of individual thought and action.

As the third of these efforts to discredit science I have placed Professor Haeckel's recent address, "The Confessions of Faith of a Man of Science." This remarkable work is an eloquent plea for the acceptance of the philosophic doctrine of Monism as the fundamental basis of Science. This doctrine once adopted we have the basis for large deductions, which forestall the slow conclusions of Science; for Monism brings the necessity for the belief in certain scientific hypotheses resting as yet on no foundations in human experience, incapable as yet of scientific verification, but which are a necessary part of the Monistic creed. The primal conception of Monism is first, "that there lives one spirit in all things, and that the whole cognizable world is constituted and has been developed in accordance with one common fundamental law." This involves the essential oneness of all things, matter and force, object and spirit, nature and God. This philosophical conception of Monism and Pantheism cannot be made intelligible to us, because it can be stated in no terms of human experience. But it has certain necessary derivatives, according to Haeckel, and these are intelligible, because their subject matter is available for scientific experiment.

First among these postulates, called by Haeckel, "Articles of Faith" comes "The essential unity of organic and inorganic nature; the former having been evolved from the latter only at a relatively recent period." This involves the "spontaneous generation" of life from inorganic matter. It also resolves "the vital force" or the force which appears in connection with protoplasmic structures, into properties shown by certain Carbon compounds under certain conditions. Life is thus in a sense an emanation of Carbon, "the true maker of life" according to Haeckel "being the tetraedral carbon molecule."

This "Article of Faith" implies also the unity of the chemical elements, each of which is a product of the evolution of the primal unit of matter ~~and force~~. Force and matter are likewise one, because neither appears except in the presence of the other. The inheritance ^{of} acquired characters is also made a corollary of Monistic belief.

Now all these hypotheses are possibly true, but none of them are as yet conclusions of Science. They meet the conditions required by philosophy. They are plausible. They have the merit of logical continuity, and, excepting to those persons biased by early subjection to contrary notions, they satisfy the "human heart". ^{There} ~~They~~ should be no natural repugnance to Monism or to

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Pantheism, difficult as it is to associate the idea of truth and reality with either - or with the opposite of either. Speaking for myself, I feel no repugnance ^{to} ~~against~~ them. They lend themselves to poetry; they appeal to the human heart. In Haeckel's own words referring to something else: "Such hereditary articles of faith take root all the more firmly, the further they are removed from the rational knowledge of nature, and enveloped in the mysterious mantle of mythological poesy." The present resistance to them may in time be turned into superstitious reverence for them. For of all the philosophic doctrines brought down as lighting from Heaven for the guidance of plodding man these seem most attractive, and least likely to conflict with the conclusions of science.

But can we give them belief? Let us pass by the doctrine of Monism, with which science cannot concern itself. What of the Corollaries? Spontaneous generation, for example, has been the basis of many experiments. Like the transmutation of metals, it seems reasonable to Philosophy. The one idea has been the will-o-the-wisp of Biology as the other has of Chemistry. We know absolutely nothing of how, if ever, non-life becomes life. So far as we know, generation from first to last has been one unbroken series - all life from life. We have no reason to be-

lieve that spontaneous generation exists under any conditions we have ever ~~seen~~ known. We have likewise reason to believe that if it exists at all we have no way of recognizing it. The organisms we know have all had a long history. Even the smallest shows traces of a long ancestry, a long process of natural selection, and of many concessions to environments. We know of no life that does not show such concessions. We know no creature that does not show homologies with all other living beings whatsoever. So far as this fact goes, it tends to show that all life is one. If this is true, spontaneous generation, whatever it may be, is not one of the ever-present phenomena of life.

If life does now appear without living parentage; if organisms fresh from the mint of creation now appear from inorganic matter, they are so simple that ^{we} ~~they~~ cannot know them. They are so small that we cannot find them. They would be made, we may suppose, each of a small number of molecules. If there is truth in the calculations of Lord Kelvin and others, that a molecule is as small in a drop of water as a marble in comparison with the earth, then we may not look for these creatures. If we cannot find them we do not know that they exist. If we do not know that they exist, shall we "believe" that they do? Is it not better, as Emerson suggests, that ^{we} ~~we~~ should not "pretend to know

and believe what we do not really know and believe?"

It may be that the existence of life in a world once lifeless renders Spontaneous Generation a "logical necessity." But the "logical necessity" exists in our minds, not in nature. Science knows no "logical necessity" for the simple reason that ~~there~~^{we} are never able to compass all the possibilities in any given case.

If we are to apply philosophic tests to the theories of Reincarnation we may find them equally ~~eligible~~ eligible as "articles" of belief. They are plausible, to some minds at least; they have logical continuity. They are satisfying to the human heart, at least this is claimed by their advocates. Their chief fault is that they can be brought to no test of Science and have no basis in inductive knowledge. In other words their only reality is that of the vapors of dreamland. If plausibility and acceptability serve as sufficient foundations for Belief, then Belief itself is a frail and transient thing, no more worthy of respect than prejudice, from which indeed it could not be distinguished. Some such idea as this seems to be present in the mind of Mr. Gladstone. In a recent article, quoting in part the language of the honest Bishop Butler, he ascribes to certain doctrines "a degree of credibility sufficient for purposes of

religion and even a high degree of probability." In other words, Religion which deals with ~~human life~~ and hopes and fears has less need of certainty than Science which is ultimately concerned with human action.

Haeckel makes the same distinction clearly enough. He uses the term "Belief" for "hypotheses or conjectures of more or less probability" by which "the gaps empirical investigation must leave in Science, are filled up," "These", he says, "we cannot indeed for a time establish on a secure basis, and yet we may make use of them in the way of explaining phenomena, in so far as they are not inconsistent with the rational knowledge of nature. Such rational hypotheses" he says "are scientific articles of faith". It is not clear, however, that so large a name as faith need be taken for working hypotheses confessedly uncertain or transient. The word "make-believe" used by Huxley in some such connection might well be applied to hypothetical "articles of faith", until given a basis by Scientific Induction. But it seems to me that it is not necessary for the man of Science to say "I believe", in addition to "I know". He should put off the livery of Science when he enters the service of the Delphian oracles.

That all the doctrines above mentioned are necessarily included in Monism may perhaps be doubted. Monism would still

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flourish were all these theories disproved. For human philosophies have wonderful recuperative power. Their basis is in the structure of the brain itself, and external phenomena are only accessory to them.

If Monism is purely ^aphilosophic conception, it can have no necessary axioms or corrolaries, except such as are involved in its definition. These could not be scientific in their character, because they could in no way come into relation with the realities of ^{human} life. If, however, Monism be a generalization resting in part on human experience, then it must be tested by the methods of Science. Until it is so tested, however plausible it may be, it has no workable value. There is no gain in giving it Belief or in calling it Truth. Still less should we stultify ourselves by pinning our faith to its postulates as to the matters yet to be decided by experiment and to be settled by human experience only. Haeckel says, for example: "The inheritance of characters acquired during the life of the individual is an indispensable axiom of the monistic doctrine of Evolution." "Those who with Weismann and Galton deny this entirely exclude thereby the possibility of any formative influence of the outer world upon

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Organic Form." Here we may ask, /Who knows that there is any such formative influence? What do we know of this or any other subject beyond what in our investigations we find to be true? When was Monism a subject of special revelation, and with what credentials does it come, that one of the greatest controversies in modern science should be settled by ~~the~~ simple word? "Roma locuta est; causa finita est" is a dictum no longer heeded by Science.

The great bulk of the arguments in favor of the heredity of acquired characters, as well as most of those in favor of the opposed dogma, the unchanged continuity of the germ-plasm, are based on some supposed logical necessity of philosophy. All such arguments are valueless in the light of fact. Desmarest's suggestion to the contending advocates of Neptunism and Plutonism was "Go and see". When they had seen the action of water and the action of heat, the contest was over. For argument and contention had vanished in the face of fact. To believe without foundation is to discredit knowledge. Such "Confessions of Faith" on Haeckel's part lead one to doubt whether in his zeal for Belief he has even known what it is to know. In fact, if we may trust his critics, much of Haeckel's scientific work is vitiated by this mixture of "believe" and "make-believe". The same confusion is

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shown

in this remarkable passage which President White quotes from John Henry Newman: "Scripture says that the sun moves and the earth is stationary and Science that the earth moves and the sun is comparatively at rest. How can we determine which of these opposite statements is the very truth till we know what motion is? If our idea of motion is but an accidental result of our present senses, neither proposition is true and both are true; neither true philosophically; both true for certain practical purposes in the system in which they ^{are} respectively found."

Again if we are to allow the revision of the generalizations of Science by the addition of acceptable but unverified doctrines we must allow the right of similar revision by rejection. Mr. Wallace, for example, would be justified in adding to the certainties of organic evolution, his idea of the special creation of the mind of man. The old notion of the separate existence of the Ego, which plays on the nerve cells of the brain, as a musician ^{on} ~~of~~ the keys of a piano, would still linger in Psychology. The astral body would hover on the verge of Physiology, and a strong plea would go up for the reality of Santa Claus.

I have a scientific friend who finds it necessary to exclude by force, from his Biological beliefs, all that is unpleasant in the theories of evolution. And he has the same right to do this that Professor Haeckel has to insist that any scientific beliefs, for which science has yet no warrant, are a necessary part of the orthodoxy of Science.

For Haeckel is not content to speak for himself, asking tolerance by tolerance towards others. His belief is no idiosyncrasy of his own. He speaks for all. Every honest, intelligent, courageous scientific man, he tells us, so far as he is truthful, competent, and brave shares the same belief. His confession of faith is nothing if not Orthodox. He says:

"This monistic confession has the greater claim to an unprejudiced consideration, in that it is shared, I am firmly convinced, by at least nine-tenth of the men of science now living; indeed, I believe, by all men of Science in whom the following four conditions are realized: (1) Sufficient acquaintance with the various departments of natural science, and in particular with the modern doctrine of evolution; (2) Sufficient acuteness and clearness of judgment to draw, by induction and deduction, the necessary logical consequences that flow from such empirical knowledge;

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(3) Sufficient moral courage to maintain the monistic knowledge, so gained, against the attacks of hostile dualistic and pluralistic systems; and (4) Sufficient strength of mind to free himself by sound, independent reasoning, from dominant religious prejudices, and especially from those irrational dogmas which have been firmly lodged in our minds from earliest youth as indisputable revelations."

Against such assumption we must protest. I have nothing against the doctrines save that they are not yet true. In themselves, as I have said, they are attractive. One may naturally feel a hopeful interest in wide reaching theories which seem possible, but are still unproved or unworkable. This is, however, not "Belief." It is rather open-mindedness, open to negative evidence as well as to the positive.

As Science goes wherever the facts lead, so Science must stop where the facts stop. It can not add to its methods the running high jump, nor place the divining rod with the microscope, crucible, and calculus among its instruments of precision. Beyond the range of scientific knowledge extends the working and the unworkable hypotheses. Beyond the confines of these extends the universe of the mind, the boundless realm which is the abode of Phi-

losophy. None should better realize these distinctions than men of Science.

The primal motive of Science is to regulate the conduct of life. This is in a sense its ultimate end, for it ~~is~~ the first and the last function of the senses and the intellect. If science has any message to man it is expressed in these words of Huxley: "There can be no alleviations of the sufferings of mankind except in ^{absolute} veracity of thought and action and a resolute facing of the world as it is, with all the garment of make-believe thrown off."

"Still men and nations reap as they have strewn". The history of human thought is filled with the rise of philosophic doctrines, laws, and generalizations not drawn from human experience and not sanctioned by science. The attempt to use these ideas as a basis of human action has been one of the most fruitful sources of human misery. It is true that wrong information may sometimes become the basis of right action, as falsehood may secure obedience to a natural law which might otherwise be violated.

But in the long run men and nations pay dearly for every illusion they cherish. For every sick man healed at Denver or Lourdes ten well men will be made sick. Faith cures and patent

medicines feed on the same victims. For every Schlatter who is worshipped as a Saint some equally harmless lunatic will be burned as a witch.

And now we ^{may} turn for a moment to the positive side of scientific belief.

I was walking not long ago in the garden with a little girl to whom I told James Whitcomb Riley's story of the "goblins that get you if you don't watch out", - a story supposed to be peculiarly attractive to children. "But there isn't any such thing as a goblin," said the practical little girl, "and there isn't ever going to be ^{any} ~~xxxx~~ such thing." Mindful of the arguments of Berkeley and Balfour, I said to her in the spirit of philosophic doubt: "Maybe there isn't any such thing as anything, Barbara?" "Yes, there is," she said, "such a thing as anything", and she looked about her for unquestioned reality, "there is such a thing as anything; there is such a thing as a squash."

And in this conclusion of the little girl, the reality of the objective world, the integrity of Science, and the sanity of man are alike bound up. And for its evidence, if we are not confined to Balfour's arguments in a circle, we may look to the facts of Organic Evolution, of which the existence of ~~man~~ ^{man} is a part.

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going back in the past to the unknown beginnings of life. Into this chain of life as far as we know Death has never entered, because only in life has the ancestor the power of casting off the germ-cells by which life is continued. Each individual is in a sense the guardian of the life-chain in which it forms a link. Each link is tested as to its fitness to the conditions external to itself in which it carries on its functions. Those creatures unadapted to the environment, whatever it may be, are destroyed, as well as those not adaptable. And this environment by which each is tested is the objective Universe. It is not the world as man knows it. It is not the world as the creature may imagine it. It is the world as it is. Nature has no pardon for ignorance or illusions. She is no respecter of persons. Her laws and her penalties consider only what is, and have no dealings with semblances. By this experience we come to know what reality is, that there is an external world to the demands of which our senses, our reason, our powers of action are all concessions. The safety of each chain of life is proportioned to the adaptation of its links to these conditions. This adaptation is in its essence obedience. The obedience of any creature is conditioned on its response in action to sensations or knowledge. Sense perception and intellect alike stand as advisers to its power of

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choice. The power of choice involves the need to choose right.

For wrong choice ^{leads to} ~~is punished~~ by death. Death ends the chain of

which the creature is a link and the life of the world is contin-

That "the sins of the fathers are visited on the children" is, in the long run, the expression of infinite mercy
 used by those whose choice has not been fatal. Severity of con-

dition and stress of competition are met in life by the survival

of those adequate to meet these conditions. Thus "in creatures

sore bestead by the environment" when instinct and impulse fail,

reason rises to ensure safety. At last the civilized man's

reason comes to be a chief element in guiding the choice of life.

With greater power to know and hence to choose safely, greater

complexity of conditions become possible, and the multifarious

demands of modern civilization finds some at least who can meet

them fairly well. To such the stores of human wisdom must be

open. To others right choice in new conditions is possible only

through following the footsteps of others. The multitudes of

civilized men, like the multitudes of animals, are saved to life

by the instinct of conventionality. The instinct to follow

those whose footsteps are secure is one of the most useful of all

impulses to action. In the same connection we must recognize

authority as a most important source of knowledge to the indivi-

dual. But its value is proportioned to the ability of the indi-

vidual to use the tests ~~at~~ wisdom must apply to the credentials

of Authority. But instinct, appetite, impulse, conventionality, and respect for authority all point backward. They are the outcome of past ~~xxxxxxxx~~ conditions. "New occasions bring new duties", and new facts and laws must be learned if men are to remain adequate to the life their own institutions, their self-realization and their mutual help have brought upon them. To the wise and obedient, the most complex life brings no special strain nor discomfort. It is as easy to do great things as small, if one knows how. But to the ignorant, weak, and perverse, the growth of civilization becomes an engine of destruction. The freedom of self-realization involves the freedom of self-perdition. Hence appears the often discussed relation of "Progress and Poverty" in social development. Hence it comes that civilization of which the essence is mutual help or altruism, under changing conditions, seems to ~~xxxx~~ become one vast instrument for the killing of fools. In the specialization of life conditions are constantly changing. Every age is an age of transition, and transition brings unrest because it impairs the value of conventionality. With the lowest forms of life there is no safety save in absolute obedience to the laws of the world around them. This obedience becomes automatic and hereditary because the disobedient leave no chain of descent to maintain their disobedience.

All instincts, appetites, impulses to action, even many conditions of the nature of illusions point toward such obedience. Whether we regard these phenomena as variations selected because useful, or as inherited habits, their relation is the same. They survive as guarantees of future obedience because they have brought obedience in the past. And so with the most enlightened man, the same necessity for obedience exists, and the instincts, appetites and impulses of the lower animals remain in him, or disappear only as reason is adequate to take their place. And in any case there is no alleviation for the woes of life "save the absolute veracity of action; the resolute facing ^{of} the world as it is."

The intense practicality of all this must be recognized. The truths of science are approximate, not absolute. They must be stated in terms of human consciousness and they ^{can} never be severed from possible human action. Knowledge which can only accumulate without ^{being} woven into conduct, has never been a boon to its possessor. As food must be formed into tissue, so must perception go over into action. In the lower forms, we have the devices, chiefly automatic, by which sensation transmitted to the Sensorium reappears as motion. In like manner we find in man besides these reflex transfers, and the reflex connections formed by habit, that Science becomes changed to Art, and know-

All instincts, appetites, impulses to action, even many conditions of the nature of illusions point toward such obedience. Fresh-er we regard these phenomena as variations selected because useful, or as inherited habits, their relation is the same. They sur- vive as guarantees of future obedience because they have brought obedience in the past. And so with the most enlightened man, the same necessity for obedience exists, and the instincts, app- etites and impulses of the lower animals remain in him, or disap- pear only as reason is adequate to take their place. And in any case there is no alleviation for the woe of life "save the abso- lute veracity of action; the resolve facing the world as it is." The intense practicality of all this must be recognized. The truths of science are approximate, not absolute. They must be stated in terms of human consciousness and they ^{can} never be dis- severed from possible human action. Knowledge which can only accumulate without having woven ^{being} into conduct, has never been a boon to its possessor. As food must be formed into tissue, so must perception go over into action. In the lower forms, we have the devices chiefly automatic by which sensation transmitted to the sensorium appears as motion. In like manner we find in man besides these reflex transfers, and the reflex connections formed by habit, that Science becomes engaged to Art, and know-

ledge to power. Power and effectiveness are conditioned on accuracy. Every failure in the same organ, every form of deterioration of the nerves shows itself in reduction of power. Reduced effectiveness shows itself through the processes of natural selection as reduction is safety in life. Thus the degeneration of the nervous system through excesses, through precocious activity or through the effect of stimulants shows itself in untrustworthy perceptions, in uncontrolled muscles, and in the lack of security in life. Incidentally all these are recorded by fall in social standing. With the reduction of the accuracy of recognition of reality the person ceases to hold his place as a man among men. Similar failure comes with any cause impairing the recognition of the reality of external things. The sober mind is necessary to secure life. In general all civilized men are well born. They come of good stock. For the lineage of perversity, insanity, and even stupidity is never a long one. The perverse, insane, and the stupid live through the tolerance of others. They cannot maintain themselves, and in spite of charity and the sense of conventionality, the mortality caused by the foolkiller is something enormous. It is an essential element in race progress. It grows with increased civilization, because of increasing complexity of condition. It is the chief

compensating influence for the life saving which has been made possible for scientific research. As Prof. H. H. Powers has said "there is in civilization not a single vice that race progress can spare." "The fool-killer", Dr. Bailey tells us, "the fool-killer, the fool-curer, and the fool-preventer are alike servants of the living God."

The recent "recrudescence of superstition" a striking accompaniment of an age of science is in a sense dependent on science. Science has made it possible. The traditions of science are so diffused in the country at large, that fools find it safe to defy them. Those who take dreams for realities; those whose memory impressions and motor dreams are uncontrolled through defective will; those who mistake subjective sensations produced by ~~disease~~ or disorder for objective conditions; all these are sooner or later dropped from existence taking with them the whole line of their possible successors. The condition of mind which is favorable to mysticism, superstition and revery is unfavorable to life and the continuance of such conditions leads to death. On the billboard across the street I ^{saw just now} ~~see~~ the advertisement of a lecture on the "Ethical value of living in two worlds at once." Whoever thus lives in two worlds is certain soon to prove inadequate for either.

If all men sought healing from the blessed handkerchief of the lunatic, or from contact with old bones or old clothes; if all physicians used "revealed remedies," or the remedies Nature finds for each disease; if all business were conducted by faith; if all supposed "natural rights" of man were reorganized in legislation; if ~~N~~ all the porotean phases of that which Zangwill has cleverly called the "Higher Foolishness" were worked out in action the insecurity of these beliefs would speedily appear. Not only civilization but civilized man himself would vanish from the earth. The safe shelter of the cove and hollow tree would be the cradle of the "new man" and the "new woman". The long and bloody road of progress through fool-killing would for centuries be traversed again. The fool lives in society only by suffrance of the sane; the weak by the altruism of the strong. That is strong which endures. Might does not make right, but that which is right will justify itself by becoming might. What we call social virtues are the elements of race stability.

In the ordinary affairs of life it may be as safe to believe in Mahatmas and magic, in cobolds and norms, as to have the vague notions of microbes and molecules, atoms and protoplasm which form part of the mental equipment of the average modern man. But the difference appears when the knowledge is to be turned into action.

If all men sought healing from the blessed handkerchief of the inner-
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Microbes and molecules become more real the more nearly one comes to deal with them. If one learns to use them they become as real as rocks or dollars and as capable of influencing human ~~affairs~~ welfare. But those conceptions which are figments of ignorance and insanity become less real as we try to deal with them, and the action based on them is not safe nor effective.

So clearly is knowledge linked to action that in general, among animals and men, when action is not possible, sensation is absent or not trustworthy. Objects too small to be touched are invisible to the eye. Objects beyond our reach, as the stars or the clouds are not truthfully pictured. Accuracy of perception grows less as distance increases. The unfamiliar lends itself readily to illusions. The familiar is recognized chiefly by breaks in continuity. The real forces of nature are hidden by their grandeur, by their immortality. Men see the form of the surface, but not the mighty tides that move beneath it. Again the senses are less acute, than the mechanism of sense organs would make possible. This is shown through occasional cases of Hyperaesthesia or ultra sensitiveness. This occurs in abnormal individuals or in unusual conditions. It occurs normally in creatures whose lives in some sense depend on it. Thus some of the most remarkable exhibitions of "mind reading" may be paralleled by

by retriever dogs whose reason for existence is found in the hyperaesthesia of the sense of smell. Hyperaesthesia of more than one of the senses would be to most animals a source of confusion and danger rather than of safety. ¶ Man's high development of the brain in large degree takes the place of acuteness of special senses. It is part of the function of the will to keep down the senses. And in his perception of external relations he is aided by the devices of science, which may be taken up or laid down at will. By means of instruments of precision any of the senses may be aided to an enormous degree, and at the same time the personal equation or individual source of error is largely eliminated. The use of instruments of precision is the special characteristic of the advance of Science. No instrument of precision can give us the ultimate essence of any part of the universe. No scientific experiment can do away with the measure of human experience as the basis of intelligibility. At the same time we can throw large illumination into "the dimly lighted room" in which according to Balfour, the phenomena of consciousness take place. By the simple process of photography, for example, we may reproduce the objects of our environment. That such pictures do express phases of reality admits of no doubt. For in the photographic camera, all personal equation is eliminated.

As to form of outline and reflection of light the "sun paints true", and the paintings thus made by means of the action of non-living matter produce on our senses impressions coinciding with those of the outside world itself.

How do we know that this is true? Because Belief in it adds to the Safety of life. We can trust our lives to it. If it were an illusion it would kill, because action based on illusion leads to death.

One can trust his life for example, to the message sent on a telegraph wire. All who travel by rail do this daily. One can trust his life to the reading of a thermometer. The chemists' tests will select for us foods among poisons. We may trust these tests absolutely. We may safely and sometimes wisely take poisons into our bodies if we know what we are doing. By the advice of a physician, trusting in the weigher's instruments of precision, poisons may do no harm. One grain of strychnine may be an aid to vital processes; a dozen may mean instant cessation of these processes. The balance advises us as to all this. All these instruments of precision belong to Science. They are examples, taken from thousands of the methods of organized common sense. By means of common sense, organized and unorganized, all creatures that can move are enabled to move safely. The security

of human life in its relations to environment is a sufficient answer to the "philosophic doubt" of Berkeley and Balfour as to the existence of external nature. For if all phenomena were within the mind, no one of them could be more dangerous than another. A dream of murder is no more dangerous than a dream of an afternoon pink tea, so long as its action is confined to the limits of the dream. But the relation of life to environment is inseparable and inexorable. Cause and effect are perfectly linked. This is a world of absolute verity, and its demands absolute obedience. Life without concessions of conditions is the Philosopher's dream.

What we know as pain is the necessary signal of warning of bad results, of bad relations. Without pain, life conditioned by environment, would be impossible. We need such stimulus to veracity. Those dangers which are painless are the hardest to avoid; the diseases which are painless are the most difficult to cure. Misery in general is only nature's protest against personal degradation. The way out of misery is the way into life.

In this relation must Science recognize the value of Ideals? The ideal in the mind tends always to go over into action. The noble ideal discloses itself in a noble life. It is part of the wisdom of each generation, its science as well as its religion, to form the ideals of the rest. History is written in these ideals

before it is come to the stage of life. An ideal is not a dream. A dream is fleeting. An ideal has the will behind it. The persistence of a lofty ideal is the central axis of the life worth living.

An old parable of the conduct of life shows man in a light skiff in a tortuous channel beset with rocks, borne by a falling current to an unknown sea. He is kept awake by the needs of his situation. As his boat bumps against the rocks he must bestir himself. If this contact were not painful he would not heed it. If it were not hurtful he would not need to heed it. Had he no power to act, he could not heed it if he would. But with sensation, will, freedom to act, narrow though the limits of freedom be, his safety rests in some degree in his own hands. That he has secured safety thus far is shown by his continued existence. He may choose his course for himself, not an easy thing to do, unless he scans most carefully the nature of the rocks and waves, and his control of the boat itself. He may follow the course of others with some degree of the safety they have attained. He may follow his own impulses, in man's case inherited from those who ~~these who~~ found them safe guides to action. But in new conditions, neither conventionality nor impulse nor desire will suffice. He must know what is about him in order that he may know what he is doing. He must know what he is doing in order to do anything

effectively. Ignorant action is more dangerous than no action at all. The "sealed orders" under which live the lower animals and our "brother organisms the plants" are in a measure inadequate for man. With the power of movement and the "knowledge of good and evil", he has no choice but to accept the conditions. He must shape his own life. He must make his ideals into actuality. And thus it comes that there is "no alleviation for the sufferings of man except through absolute veracity of thought and action, and the resolute facing of the world as it is." For wisdom is only knowing what should be done next, and virtue is doing it. And thus it comes that it is well for man not "to pretend to know or to believe what he really does not know or believe." For there is no safety in life either for ourselves or others, if we guide our conduct by any influence less wise or potent than that developed from the coordination of human wisdom. We may play at Philosophy, if we have pleasure in doing so. We may find intellectual strength through exercise of the mind, even on its own products. But we must guide our lives by Science. The appetites, impulses, passions, illusions, if you choose, which have proven safe in the past development of life, Science would not destroy. But they must be subordinate to the will and intellect. And this subordination of the lower to the higher motives in life is the cut

mination of Evolution, as it has been the ideal of those whose strivings for better relations of man to man, and of man to nature, have been worthy of the name of religion.

The will is the soul of man in action. The intellect is its guide. If the life of man is hemmed in by the Fates, the human will is one of the fates and must take its place by the side of the rest of them. The man who can will is a factor in the universe.

As knowledge is in its essence only a guide to action, and as knowledge being human can be approximate only; not reality, but a movement toward reality, we are brought to the oft quoted words of Lessing:

"It is not the truth in Man's possession that makes the worth of man. Possession makes him selfish, lazy, proud. Not through possession but through long striving comes the ever-growing strength. If God should hold ~~it~~ in his right hand all truth and in his left hand only the ceaseless struggle to reach after Truth, and He should say to ^{me} ~~you~~ choose, I would fall in humbleness before his left hand and say:

'Father, give; the perfect Truth is but for Thee alone.'

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